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This thesis examines a paradox: namely, how the administration of President 
George W. Bush, which placed freedom at the core of its political ideology, 
developed and implemented policies that ran counter to the tradition of 
liberty to which, in the discourse of freedom that it constructed, it constantly 
appealed.  
 The thesis suggests that the explanation for this paradox lay not so 
much in the conventional political sphere as in the administration’s 
understanding and interpretation of the meaning of freedom itself. This 
interpretation, the thesis argues, reflects the deep influence upon the 
administration of neoconservative ideology as well as that of the Christian 
right.  Using Isaiah Berlin’s ideas about freedom as an analytical tool, the 
thesis firstly considers the interpretative paradigms of the American liberty 
tradition and the nature of freedom embedded within it together with the 
contribution made to that tradition by early theorists. It then explores the 
philosophical roots of neoconservatism and draws conclusions about the 
interpretation of freedom embedded within that political ideology. 
 It is argued that the American tradition of liberty is grounded in an 
ideal of freedom which, using Berlin’s terminology, is essentially ‘negative’ in 
character, whilst neoconservatism adheres to a concept of freedom that is  
‘positive’, and, accordingly, liable to perversion to something akin to its 
opposite. The thesis demonstrates neoconservative influence upon the 
administration and its interpretation of the meaning of freedom by exploring 
a number of key policy areas. In foreign affairs it considers the background of 
neoconservative foreign policy objectives and how these were manifested in 
the administration’s conduct of the ‘war on terror’ and the Iraq war following 
the events of 9/11. In domestic terms the thesis makes reference to the 
exercise of presidential power, the suppression of dissent and the 
manipulation of science. 
 Through the consideration of these examples the thesis concludes that 
the Bush administration amply demonstrated the perversion to which 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION     
 
 
We will do whatever it takes to make the homeland secure and to make    
freedom reign across the world.1 
 
 


















                                                
1  President George W. Bush. ‘Remarks at the National Republican Senatorial Committee Dinner.’ 25 
September 2002, in Public Papers of the Presidents <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/>[accessed 30 
September 2007]. 
2 Abraham Lincoln cited in Roy P. Basler, The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, N.J:  
Rutgers University Press, 1953), Vol. VII, p. 301. 
 2 
I THESIS DESCRIPTION   
 
On 28 June 2004, during a conference being held at the Hilton Istanbul, Turkey, 
Condoleezza Rice, then National Security Adviser to President George W. Bush, 
handed him a note. The note confirmed that at 10.26 a.m., Iraqi time, Iraq was 
sovereign. The President read the note and scribbled a reply: ’Let freedom reign!’ 
The subject of this thesis is the ‘reign of freedom’ instituted by an American 
president for whom freedom was the centrepiece of his policy objectives, and 
whose ambition was to spread freedom throughout the world. It is not an 
analysis of the policies of the Bush administration, except where relevant, but an 
analysis of the administration’s interpretation of freedom and the mobilization of 
a discourse.    
The thesis has a number of interlinked objectives. Its principal task is to 
explore a paradox: how the administration of George W. Bush (2001-2009), 
infused with the ideas of neoconservatism, implicitly made the ‘Freedom 
Agenda’ its core theme, yet constructed a discourse in which ‘freedom’ as a 
rhetoric, a value, an ontology, threatened to undermine the very ideal of freedom 
that had for so long been integral to the American tradition.3   The American 
people, as this thesis will show, were confronted with measures at home and 
abroad that both curtailed individual freedom and weakened its protection. 
Using the language and rhetoric of freedom, and frequently appealing to the 
tradition of liberty referred to above, the administration changed the nature of 
the value which the American people have long held to be the central focus of 
their self-consciousness.  
What is the explanation for this paradox? How did the rhetoric of freedom 
become the leitmotif that was woven into a series of policies that embraced its 
                                                
3 The thesis is concerned principally with civil liberty or freedom, i.e. the relationship between the state and the 
individual and it is in that sense, except where clearly stated, that the term ‘freedom’ is used throughout. The words 
‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ are used interchangeably throughout and their meaning is considered synonymous. 
 3 
antithesis, not only in the pursuance of foreign wars of dubious legality such as 
the Iraq war, but in the torture of ‘enemy combatants’ and suspected terrorists, in 
the denial of civil rights and habeas corpus to those suspects held prisoner at 
Guantanamo Bay,4 in programmes of domestic spying and in the abrogation of 
the rule of law? How, in symbolic terms, did the Statue of Liberty become 
replaced by the image of Abu Ghraib? The conventional explanations for these 
policies and events are usually couched, as evidenced by a stream of memoirs 
and accounts of the Bush presidency, in political terms.5 The need of the 
President to appear strong in the face of terrorist threats, particularly after the 
events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) when the twin towers of the World Trade 
Centre in New York were destroyed by al-Qaeda, the desire of the 
administration to implement a radical conservative or neoconservative agenda, 
the need to keep appealing to the Republican electoral base, or indeed the 
manifestation and implementation of long-held political beliefs by key 
administration figures, are frequently cited. In these accounts, policies and 
actions have a political explanation; poor political judgement, ‘group think’ or 
‘short termism’ took over, or conflicts of political interest took place.  All of these 
political scenarios doubtless have some claim upon explaining the central 
paradox of the Bush administration. It is the burden of this thesis however, that 
the hitherto overlooked explanation lies, in significant part at least, within the 
realm of philosophy rather than in politics: namely, in the way in which the Bush 
administration, predominantly under the influence of neoconservative thought, 
but also that of the Christian right, interpreted the meaning of freedom, an 
interpretation that was underpinned by a Hegelian view of the nature of history. 
The thesis seeks to demonstrate that this interpretation of freedom ran counter to 
the American ideal of freedom as it had developed in the early life of the 
                                                
4 Over the entrance to which, inadvertently emphasising the paradox this thesis explores, are written the 
words: ‘Honour Bound To Defend Freedom’.  
5 See Section III below. 
 4 
Republic in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and upon which 
its tradition of liberty was built and developed.  
In pursuing this core argument, a number of areas are explored which 
underpin its validity. Consideration is given to the historical and philosophical 
framework of American ideas of freedom in the late eighteenth century and 
during the founding of the Republic. This acts as a site of comparison against 
which the discourse of freedom under the Bush administration is analysed. 
Philosophical notions of freedom are explored in some detail, particularly in 
terms of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ concepts, and the character of freedom implicit 
in neoconservative thought. Consideration is given to why an idea like freedom, 
which served so long, in historical terms, as a rhetorical instrument, was 
ensconced at the heart of the Bush administration with such thematic intensity, 
and how the administration’s interpretation of the nature of freedom was 
reflected in policy goals and objectives at home and abroad. Finally, 
consideration is given to how the administration constructed and shaped this 
discourse in order to dominate a political space and how the media assisted this 
process.   
 
II BACKGROUND AND SETTING 
 
i)  The power of a word 
 
It is a commonplace to observe that freedom lies at the heart of American 
identity. In the biography of America, no other idea or concept plays such a 
central structural role.  To use the notion developed by Benedict Anderson of 
America as an ‘imagined community’,6 freedom represents, in the minds of most 
Americans, the focal point of their communion with each other and an essential 
                                                
6 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 2003), p. 6. 
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element of the nation’s mythology. Myth, as Roland Barthes has argued, is a type 
of speech, and the ideal of freedom, a concept which grounds itself in myth, 
provides Americans with a unique form of self-identification in a simple and 
uncomplicated way. It offers Americans their own likeness, elevated into a type, 
and all Americans can participate in the mythology in which freedom is rooted; 
the historic past can be seen to live in the present. This is why freedom is such a 
potent word and why, in political terms, the control of the freedom discourse is 
so crucial. As Barthes suggests: 
 
In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of 
human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics, with 
any going back beyond what is immediately visible, it organises a world which is 
without contradictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in 
the evident, it establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by 
themselves. 7  
 
 
Thus for many Americans freedom has been, and still is, the apotheosis of 
American achievement. Others have believed that freedom is America’s unique 
contribution to the world, and a sign that America is a nation favoured by God. 
Indeed, it has frequently been thought of as ‘the gift of Heaven’8 and as President 
Bush, in an unsettling echo of that eighteenth-century quotation put it: ‘I do 
believe there is an Almighty, and I believe a gift of that Almighty to all is 
freedom.’9      
The potency of freedom in American political history is well-documented. 
Eric Foner and Daniel T. Rodgers, for example, have recounted how in the 
twentieth century, freedom became the rallying cry of World War II and how the 
word ‘swelled with new power in the 1940s’ as President Roosevelt made his 
                                                
7 Roland Barthes, Mythologies (St Albans: Paladin, 1973), p. 143. 
8 See epigraph to Chapter Two. 
9 Cited in Dan Froomkin, ‘Bush’s Middle Eastern Folly,’ Washington Post, 17 July 2007 
<http://busharchive.froomkin.com/BL2007071700706_pf.htm> [accessed 4 August 2008]. 
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‘four freedoms’ part of the vocabulary of the New Deal.10 In the 1940s the 
nation’s core documents, including those written by such luminaries as Jefferson, 
Hamilton, Washington, and Lincoln, as well as documents relating to the 
German and Japanese surrender, were packed into a ‘Freedom Train’ which 
toured the country and was visited by some three million people. As Rodgers 
writes, ‘Freedom had won the war. However differently an economic or 
geopolitical realist might have put it, that formulation of the war’s meaning, 
sweat and sacrifice, worked its way deep into the patterns of everyday speech’.11 
When the Cold War developed, the threat posed by the Soviet Union was once 
again cast in the rhetoric of freedom that had previously been developed in the 
Second World War. Freedom was the value that countered the ideology of 
communism and the slavery it implied.  
And yet freedom, as Lincoln so acutely observed, means different things to 
different people, and its meaning is shaped by traditions, struggles, revolutions, 
wars and mythologies. It is a terrain of conflict, an essentially contested concept. 
Nor has its progress through American history been smooth. The notion of civil 
liberties, that is rights that can be held by an individual against the state, have a 
chequered history as evidenced by Eric Foner in The Story of American Freedom 
(1998), and attempts to limit the application of freedom along racial, gender, or 
class lines have clearly been a persistent thread in American history.  
It is also the case that that there have been occasions in America’s history 
when the State has placed civil liberties in peril in a more general way. The 
suppression of abolitionist meetings in the 1830s, the ‘red scare’ after World War 
I and the grave impact of McCarthyism during the early period of the Cold War 
serve as pertinent examples. Indeed, it could be argued that America’s mood 
since 9/11 and the Bush administration’s attitude towards freedom and civil 
                                                
10 See Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom (London: Picador, 1999), pp. 249 – 252, and Daniel T. 
Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics Since Independence (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), p. 214. 
11 Rodgers, Contested Truths, p. 214. 
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liberties conform to something of a tradition in which the freedoms guaranteed 
by the Constitution become vulnerable when the State becomes convinced of the 
existence of internal enemies. However, it is not the objective of this thesis to 
argue that traditional concepts of freedom have not been undermined in the past 
or individual freedoms transgressed, because that clearly is the case.  
In foreign affairs, too, the American tradition of liberty has often been 
perverted. William Appleman Williams, for example, has noted the destructive 
consequences of inversions of freedom into modes of repression and exploitation 
in his critique of US foreign policy from the 1890s to the 1960s.12 Indeed, any 
review of American post-war foreign policy will locate numerous  examples – 
the Vietnam War, the promotion of the illegal military coup in Chile in 1973, the 
support for the ‘Contras’ in Nicaragua in the mid-1980s – to cite but a few – in 
which ‘freedom’ has been used as a political cover for actions that have led to its 
opposite. Such transgressions have been driven by various factors, including 
competing visions of America’s role in the world by different presidents, but 
they were not obviously underpinned by the same kind of ideological radicalism 
so characteristic of the neoconservatism that began to develop its influence in the 
1990s and which departed so significantly from ‘traditional’ conservatism. What 
this thesis seeks to demonstrate is that neoconservatism has no precedent, and 
neither does the extent of its influence as a political ideology. The Bush 
administration, as a result of the absorption of this particular strand of political 
and philosophical thought transformed the idea of freedom into a concept that 
betokened its antithesis. America may not have been made considerably less free 
than at other stressful periods of its history as a result, nor pursued a more 
significantly belligerent foreign policy, but the reasons for the violation of its 
freedom tradition were without easy parallel.   
                                                
12 See William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 
Inc., 1972). 
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Since the tradition of liberty helps to define what it is to be American, 
changes to the shape and boundaries of the concept are of considerable 
importance. The cultural theorist Raymond Williams has suggested that certain 
words, especially those that involve ideas and values, are ‘keywords’ in that they 
are charged with an additional level of significance beyond their everyday usage. 
Such words ‘are significant binding words in certain activities and their 
interpretation; they are significant, indicative words in certain forms of 
thought’.13 In similar vein, Daniel Rodgers has suggested that some political 
words  
 
can do more than mystify, they can inspire, enrage, energise. With words our minds are 
changed, votes acquired. Enemies labelled, alliances secured, unpopular programmes 
made palatable. Words make mass actions possible. With words ringing in their heads, 
masses of men have made revolutions and crusades, flung themselves into war. Through 
words some of the most potent forces of modern politics are released.14 
 
     
‘Freedom’ is clearly one of those words, and in American political 
vocabulary it not only describes but is value-laden with the speech-act potential 
to commend or condemn, approve or disapprove. Quentin Skinner has pointed 
out that any political vocabulary will contain a number of such terms and that it 
is ‘essentially by manipulating this set of terms that any society succeeds in 
establishing and altering its moral identity’.15 Thus by manipulating meaning the 
State or government can create a new norm; previously illegitimate acts or 
measures, detention without trial say, or the use of torture can be sanctoned in 
this process. Key to this process of manipulation is what Skinner refers to as  
 
changing the conventions of the governing sense, reference or speech act potential of some 
of these normative terms. The alteration of the sense, reference or evaluative force of the 
terms of an ideology will then serve to re-characterize  or re-evaluate the political situation 
                                                
13 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London: Fontana Press, 1988), p. 
15. 
14 Rodgers, Contested Truths, p. 4.  
15 Quentin Skinner cited in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, ed. by James Tulley, 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1988), p. 13. 
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it represents; legitimizing a new range of activity or beliefs, de-legitimizing or reinforcing 
the status quo, and so on.16  
 
Skinner further points out that attempts to stretch ideological conventions 
usually take the form of grounding the change in terms of that which is already 
accepted and taken for granted. Thus the discourse of freedom can be 
manipulated to mean something different to its traditional meaning by 
grounding it in that very tradition. As Daniel Rodgers argues, political words 
‘take their meaning from the tasks to which their masters bend them. They are 
instruments, rallying cries, tools of persuasion’.17 A successful modification of a 
term like freedom can, therefore, be disseminated through a compliant media to 
the extent that the change becomes orthodox; practices hitherto regarded as 
unlawful or unconstitutional are legitimized, and statements denying that such 
activities represent an undermining of the traditional ideal of American freedom 
assume an authoritative status. 
This process of manipulation has been made easier by the tenor of the times. 
The early part of the twenty-first century has been notable as an age of image 
politics, in which appearance is more important than substance, and the real ever 
more difficult to distinguish from artifice. Political argument elides into shorter 
and shorter sound bites, and the fragmentation of issues, the promiscuous 
trivialization of values, symbols, and images, is all-pervasive. The news itself is 
not an account of the events of the day but ‘the news’, a programme mediated 
and orchestrated by the networks and the media.18  The apparent compliance 
and lack of serious analysis by the media during a large period of the Bush 
administration, facilitated, this thesis suggests, a recasting or a perversion, of the 
meaning of freedom that lay at the heart of the American tradition. If it is indeed 
the case that the story of freedom in America, is, as Eric Foner suggests, ‘a record 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 Rodgers, Contested Truths. p. 10. 
18 For a detailed account of how this process works, see for example Thomas de Zengotita, Mediated: How 
the Media Shapes Your World and the Way You Live in It (London: Bloomsbury, 2005).   
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of a people forever contending about the crucial ideas of their political culture’,19 
this thesis seeks to reveal how at a particular time this ideal was subverted and 
betrayed.      
 
ii)  The ‘Freedom Agenda’ 
 
 The discourse of freedom pervaded almost every policy area during the Bush 
administration’s period in office. In speech after speech, in nearly every formal 
public utterance, the President made a reference to freedom. Although references 
to freedom are virtually obligatory in American presidential rhetoric, seldom, if 
ever, has the word been deployed so vociferously or with such fervour. From his 
inaugural address in 2001 when all Americans were told they, and America, 
were part of a ‘long continuing story [….] of a slave owning society that became 
a servant of freedom’ and that freedom ‘is now a seed upon a wind, taking root 
in many nations’,20 the President hardly faltered in his emphasis to the end of his 
period of office. In some periods the rhetoric of freedom was stronger than in 
others but the ‘discourse of freedom’ became more pronounced following the 
attacks of 9/11 and it was freedom rhetoric, above all, that framed America’s 
response to those attacks and the ‘war on terror’, to use President Bush’s words, 
that followed. America’s enemies were not simply enemies of America, but 
instantly transformed into the ‘enemies of freedom’ who ‘hate our freedoms – 
our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and 
assemble and disagree with each other’.21 
The nature of freedom, according to the President was universalist: 
‘freedom is the right of every person and is the future of every nation’ and is 
                                                
19 Foner, The Story of American Freedom p. xxii. 
20 President George W. Bush, ‘Inaugural Address’, 20 January 2001 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html> [accessed 7 July 2008]. 
21 President George W. Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, 20 
September 2001<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200010920-8.html> [accessed 21 
August 2008]. 
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‘God’s gift to humanity’.22 Perhaps the most remarkable paean to the ideal of 
freedom was Bush’s second inaugural speech of January 2005. In this address, 
crafted by the conservative evangelical Michael Gerson, in which the word 
‘freedom’, or variants of it, was mentioned no less than forty-four times, nine of 
which were in the last two paragraphs,23 the survival of freedom in America was 
equated with the success of freedom and liberty elsewhere: ‘The survival of 
liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. 
The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the 
world.’24 Crucially, too, from the perspective of this thesis, the rhetoric deployed 
in this same speech referred back to the past, to the period of the founding. Bush 
clearly wanted the American people to think of his administration as part of a 
continuum that defended the same ideals of freedom that formed part of the 
founding doctrine:  
 
When the Declaration of Independence was first read in public and the Liberty Bell was 
sounded in celebration, a witness said, “It rang as if it meant something.” In our time it 
means something still. America, in this young century, proclaims liberty throughout the 
world, and to all the inhabitants thereof. Renewed in our strength - tested, but not weary 
– we are ready for the greatest achievements in the history of freedom.25    
 
This was not the first time that President Bush expressed the view the ideal 
of freedom he felt to be under threat was the same as that located in the founding 
doctrine. In a sense he appealed to freedom’s tradition in order to justify the 
actions of the present, as demonstrated in his State of the Union Address of 29 
January 2002. Referring to the events of 9/11 he said: 
 
In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of 
liberty, that we’ve been called to a unique role in human events. Rarely has the world 
faced a choice more clear or consequential.  
                                                
22 President George W. Bush, ‘State of the Union address,’ 28 January, 2003. 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html> [accessed 13 November, 2008]. 
23 Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War Part III (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 378. 
24 ‘President George W. Bush, ‘Inaugural Address’, 20 January, 2005. 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html> [accessed 13 November, 2008]. 
25 Ibid. 
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Our enemies send other people’s children on missions of suicide and murder. 
They embrace tyranny and death as a cause and a creed. We stand for a different choice, 
made long ago, on the day of our founding. We affirm it again today. We choose freedom 
and the dignity of every life. 
Steadfast in our purpose, we now press on. We have known freedom’s price. We 
have shown freedom’s power. And in this great conflict, my fellow Americans, we will 
see freedom’s victory.26   
  
 
What the administration termed the ‘Freedom Agenda’ was a development 
of the initial response to the events of 9/11 in which the President articulated his 
vision of the shape and direction not just of American foreign policy, but also a 
strategy to guard existing freedoms.  The ‘Freedom Agenda’ was first outlined in 
the President’s West Point speech of 1 June 2002 and later crystallized in the 
National Security Strategy of September 2002. In the West Point speech, the 
President again harked back to the past, suggesting that the challenges faced by 
America were part of a continuum, going back perhaps even as far as the end of 
the Thirty Years War: ‘We have our best chance since the rise of the nation state 
in the 17th century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead 
of prepare for war.’27 The National Security Strategy (NSS) itself made clear what 
role the administration saw for itself at that moment of opportunity, which was 
‘to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe’.28   
The strategy outlined in the NSS was developed around the concept of 
freedom; freedom comprised its central framework and raison d’être. Above all 
perhaps, freedom was transformed into a deeply significant emblem, used 
almost in the manner of a cross upon a medieval crusader’s shield, the force of 
light versus the forces of darkness 29 
                                                
26 President George W. Bush,‘State of the Union address,’ 29 January 2002 
<http: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> [accessed 21 August, 2008]. 
27 President George W. Bush, ‘Graduation Speech at West Point’, 1 June 2002 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html> [accessed 13 August, 2008]. 
28 The National Security Strategy of the United States, September, 2002.  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsspdf> [accessed 21 October, 2007], (p. ii). 
29 President Bush, speaking a few days after 9/11 without the aid of advisers did use the word ‘crusade’; 
‘This crusade, this war on terrorism.’ See James Carroll, ‘The Bush Crusade’, The Nation, 20 September, 
2004. Carroll wrote: ‘That the President used the word inadvertently suggests how it expressed his exact 
truth, an unmasking of his most deeply felt purpose. Crusade, he said. Later, his embarrassed aides 
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Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person 
– in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and 
terror; it has been challenged by the clashing wills of powerful states and the evil designs 
of tyrants; and it has been tested by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity 
holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over all these foes. The 
United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission.30   
 
This language, this rhetoric, this developing discourse of freedom, 
thenceforward permeated almost all policy areas. In foreign policy it was 
perhaps more prominent; in foreign wars freedom became a kind of shorthand 
label: the war in Iraq became ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ and the war in 
Afghanistan ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. But the rhetoric of freedom was also 
a feature of domestic policy, especially where it concerned security issues. 
Comments or speeches relating to the Patriot Act or the Department of 
Homeland Security (website motto : ‘Preserving our Freedoms’),31 were laced 
with similar references to freedom.32 Even the initiative introduced by President 
Bush in January 2002 to coordinate and encourage the work of volunteers and 
volunteer bodies did not escape the freedom rhetoric and was accordingly 
dubbed the USA Freedom Corps, linked to homeland security and constituted as 
part of freedom’s armoury against external threats.33 In fact the fighting of 
foreign wars to secure freedom abroad was directly conflated with securing 
freedom in the ‘homeland’. At a fundraiser in August 2002, Bush declared 
“We’re fighting the first war of the 21st century. I say “the first war” – there’s no 
telling how many wars it will take to secure freedom in the homeland.” 34  
                                                                                                                                            
suggested that that he had meant to use the word only as a synonym for struggle, but Bush’s own syntax 
belied that. He defined crusade as war. Even offhandedly, he had said exactly what he meant.’  
<http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0902-06.htm> [accessed 17 August 2010]. 
30 The National Security Strategy of the United States, September, 2002. p. iii. 
31Department of Homeland Security < http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm> [accessed 17 August 2010]. 
32 See for example: ‘Bush Speaks About Homeland Security in Port Elizabeth, New Jersey’, 24 June 2002  
< http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0206/24/se.02.html > and 
‘Remarks by the President in a Conversation on the USA Patriot Act, Buffalo, New York, 20 April 2004’ 
<http://.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/0420040420-2.html> [accessed 14 March 2007]. 
33 President George W. Bush, ‘State of the Union address’, 29 January 2002. 
34 James Bovard, ‘Moral highground not won on battlefield’, USA Today, 10 August 2002 
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This all-pervading discourse of freedom constructed by the President and 
his advisers is, then, part of the background that frames the core argument of this 
thesis.  
 
iii) The neoconservative influence 
 
Another aspect of the context of this thesis is the importance of neoconservative 
ideas, which, as subsequent chapters explain, meshed with those of the Christian 
right. Chapter Four of this thesis is concerned with the background and history 
of neoconservatism and an analysis of its political philosophy, particularly in 
terms of its implicit interpretation of freedom. 
As Section I of this chapter foregrounds, it is a key premise of this thesis 
that a cadre of political thinkers and activists exerted a significant influence over 
the Bush administration in terms both of setting the political agenda and 
providing a philosophical narrative. A linked premise is that within the ideas of 
the progenitors of neoconservatism there existed a concept of freedom that ran 
counter to the American tradition, and that these ideas were, in turn, absorbed 
by the administration through the successors to the early neoconservatives and 
reflected in policy formulation.  In terms of the background against which the 
argument of this thesis is set, it is important to emphasise the reality of this 
influence upon the Bush administration.  
The neoconservatives were ideologues, of a kind without parallel in 
American political history.  Instead of disdaining ideology in favour of 
pragmatism – the traditional conservative position – they openly embraced it 
and believed that ‘politics is a kind of warfare in which ideology is an essential 
weapon’.35 Initially, their influence over the Bush administration was negligible. 
When the administration was formed there were few acknowledged 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinions/editorials/2002-10-08-oplede x.htm> [accessed 15 March 2008]. 
35 John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (London: Allen Lane, 2007), p. 
122. 
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neoconservatives in prominent positions, only John Bolton as under secretary of 
state for arms control, Paul Wolfowitz as deputy secretary of defence, and 
Douglas Feith as assistant secretary of defence, plus a smattering of lower-level 
posts. Even so, there was a number of appointments of members of the ‘Project 
for the New American Century’ (PNAC), a neoconservative think tank founded 
in 1998. These included the Vice President Dick Cheney, the Defence Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld, I. Lewis Libby (also at Defence), Elliott Abrams on the 
National Security Council, and Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defence Policy 
Board Advisory Committee. Whilst not all of this group can perhaps be 
described as being full neoconservative ‘believers’, they were clearly sympathetic 
to the overall neoconservative agenda.   
Initially, this agenda found little favour within the administration, but this 
all changed after the events of 9/11. Feeling that they had been right about the 
demise of the Soviet Union (many neoconservatives developed their ideas 
during the Reagan administration, (1981-89)) the neoconservatives ‘now [after 
9/11] felt like vindicated prophets. Now they would be inside the government, 
helping to shape U.S. policy’.36 In the days following 9/11 the neoconservatives 
were ready with a ‘detailed, plausible blueprint for the nation’s response. They 
were not troubled that their plan […] did not in any way represent a direct 
response to events themselves. They were motivated only to ensure its 
adoption.’37 Now that the neoconservatives’ hour had come, Bush ‘moved 
further and further into the web that the neoconservatives had woven for him 
[…..] ultimately [becoming] more enamoured of, or hostage to, the 
neoconservative vision, than many neoconservatives’.38 As Richard Perle noted, 
the neoconservatives enjoyed an advantage over those who wished to reflect 
upon various policy options, as ‘we have offered concrete recommendations’. As 
                                                
36 Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 
p. 245. 
37 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 138. 
38 Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, p. 235. 
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time went by, the neoconservatives became more certain of their influence, and 
Perle was able to confirm that ‘the President of the United States, on issue after 
issue, has reflected the thinking of the neoconservatives’.39 
This thesis will demonstrate that it was not only in the field of foreign 
policy that the neoconservatives exerted their influence over the Bush 
administration, although it was in this area that early ascendancy was 
established. The influence of neoconservative thought, including its 
interpretation of freedom, may be clearly detected in a number of domestic 
policy areas, including security, the administration of justice, science and climate 
change, the privileging of religion in education, and ‘faith based’ initiatives. 
Neoconservative influence was exerted not merely through policymakers within 
the administration itself, but through an interlocking network of think-tanks, 
magazines, periodicals, and news channels, which, in Noam Chomsky’s 
illuminating phrase, helped to ‘manufacture consent’.40 The extent and character 
of these networks is summed up well in an article in the New York Observer by Joe 
Hagan in which he refers to the New York origins and influence of 
neoconservatism:  
 
Now, after eight painful years, the neoconservative network is on a high, determined 
never to lose power again so easily, to make sure that its ideas are well-distributed and 
that the distributors are well compensated, and that the current President of the United 
States and his aides – from Vice President Richard Cheney to National Security Advisor 




Referring to the prominent influence of William Kristol, editor of the 
neoconservative ‘Weekly Standard’ the article goes on: 
 
                                                
39 Cited in ‘In their Own Words,’ Christian Science Monitor, 3 September  2003 <www.csmonitor.com.> 
[accessed 15April, 2008]. 
40 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: the political economy of the mass 
media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).  
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Mr. Kristol couldn’t have done it [exerted influence over the administration] without the 
New York firmament from which the movement came – from the right-wing think tank 
the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, to the op-ed pages of ‘The Wall Street 
Journal,’ to the elemental neoconservative journal ‘Commentary’, founded by neocon 
patriarch and matriarch, Norman Podhoretz and his wife, Midge Decter. Their son, John 
Podhoretz, is a columnist and former editorial-page editor for the ‘New York Post.’ 
At the top of the neoconservative network, of course, is Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corp., home of the Fox News Network and the ‘Post,’ both based on Sixth Avenue. Mr. 
Murdoch also owns ‘The Weekly Standard.’41 
 
 
Apart from PNAC and the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, another 
favoured neoconservative think-tank was the American Enterprise Institute 
(AEI). The AEI was the venue that President Bush chose to explain his intentions 
towards Iraq on 26 February 2003. Making a joke about being admitted by Irving 
Kristol (father of William) the President congratulated the AEI on being the 
home of ‘some of the finest minds in our nation’, and said that they had done 
‘such good work that my administration has borrowed twenty such minds’.42 
Fellows of the Institute included Lynne Cheney, wife of Dick Cheney the Vice 
President, and Richard Perle. 
The neoconservatives during the Bush administration, formed a 
sophisticated intellectual, political, and financial complex, and were in no sense a 
tangential influence upon the administration. Their ideas and influence were 
central, and reached to the administration’s heart. Even members of the 
administration who were not neoconservatives, like the President himself, or the 
secretaries of state and defence, came under their influence. They created the 
political climate, particularly after the events of 9/11, and it was their ideas that 
dominated and shaped policy. Most importantly, they created the intellectual 
energy that constructed the discourse of freedom as a policy tool. In effect, they 
won the battle of ideas.  As Mark Gerson, editor of The Essential Neoconservative 
                                                
41 Joe Hagan, ‘President Bush’s Neoconservatives Were Spawned Right Here in N.Y.C., New Home of the 
Right-Wing Gloat’, New York Observer, 27 April  2003 <http://www.observer.com/node/47455> [accessed 
14 July, 2007]. 
42 President George W. Bush,‘President Discusses Future of Iraq’ 26 February 2003 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226 - 11.html> [accessed 17 July, 2007]. 
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Reader (1996), remarked when referring to this battle, perhaps consciously 
echoing Voltaire: ‘The neocons so overwhelmingly won. The neocons more or 





The above, then, is the background against which this thesis is developed and 
argued, namely: a political, historical and cultural landscape in which freedom is 
a central feature and operates as a potent ‘keyword’; an administration which 
adopted freedom as its overarching rhetorical theme; and an influential 
ideological group that imposed its ideas upon that administration and played a 
key role in constructing a particular discourse of freedom which ran counter to 
the American tradition of liberty. 
 
III LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The philosophical and political literature relating to both freedom and 
neoconservatism is vast. Studies of the administration of President George W. 
Bush are perhaps almost equally numerous, although none appears to have 
focused on the discourse of freedom in their analyses of how the administration 
developed its policies. Equally, there is a wide range of work relating to the 
thought of Isaiah Berlin, whose ideas concerning freedom provide the analytical 
framework used to consider the discourse of freedom under the Bush 
administration. This thesis therefore both draws and builds upon a range of 
works in discrete subject areas, some of the most important of which are 
discussed below. 
                                                
43 Cited in Hagan, ‘President Bush’s Neoconservatives’.  
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Eric Foner’s The Story of American Freedom (1999) has been a useful source 
in terms of providing a history of freedom in America, although he makes little 
attempt – that not being his task – to locate or identify the philosophical 
character of that freedom, either within the founding doctrine itself, or as 
expressed within the political beliefs of specific administrations. This is what the 
present thesis sets out to do; it focuses a philosophical lens, as it were, upon the 
concept of freedom that can be located within the American tradition of liberty, 
i.e. that which developed following the founding, and compares it with that 
adopted by the Bush administration. No attempt is made at any kind of narrative 
of American freedom across the centuries. 
This thesis aims to relate the history of an idea to a contemporary reality 
and it is by considering the history of the idea of freedom that it becomes 
possible to interpret its contemporary manifestations. To that end the thesis 
considers briefly the contributions made to the foundations of American freedom 
by some major early theorists, namely John Locke, Richard Price, Joseph 
Priestley, Tom Paine and Edmund Burke. In considering the ideas of these 
theorists the thesis draws upon a number of works including A Companion to the 
American Revolution, edited by Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole, (2000),44 John Dunn’s 
Locke (1984),45 Bernard Peach’s Richard Price and the Ethical Foundation of the 
American Revolution (1979)46 and Jenny Graham’s essay ‘Evolutionary 
Philosopher: The Political Ideas of Joseph Priestley (1773-1804)’ (1989).47 Whilst 
Burke’s influence upon American concepts of freedom at the time of the 
founding is not perhaps as evident as, say, that of Locke (whose influence is  
discussed in some detail) or Paine, his thought was nevertheless important at the 
time and has resonated with conservatives ever since, including 
                                                
44 Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole, eds., A Companion to the American Revolution (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd., 2000).  
45 John Dunn, Locke, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
46 Bernard Peach, ed. with the research assistance of John Erik Larson, Richard Price and the Ethical 
Foundations of the American Revolution (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press,1979). 
47 Jenny Graham ‘Evolutionary Philosopher: The Political Ideas of Joseph Priestley (1733–1804): Part 
One’, Enlightenment and Dissent, No 8, 1989, pp. 43–63.  
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neoconservatives. For insight into Burke’s ideas about the nature of freedom the 
thesis refers in particular to Michael Freeman’s Edmund Burke and the Critique of 
Radicalism (1980)48 and Frank O’Gorman’s Edmund Burke: His Political Philosophy 
(1973).49 Tom Paine’s ideas of freedom, which appear to bridge both the 
republican virtue tradition and Lockean liberalism, are illuminated for this thesis 
by reference in particular to Eric Foner’s Tom Paine and Revolutionary America 
(2005)50 and A. Owen Aldridge’s Thomas Paine’s American Ideology (1984).51 Whilst 
the principal focus of these works has not been freedom, they have nevertheless 
helped to identify some of the strands of thought that contributed towards the 
American liberty tradition. 
The nature of freedom that can be located in the founding doctrine acts as 
a site of comparison in this thesis, and Bernard Bailyn’s The Ideological Origins of 
the American Revolution (1992) provides invaluable insights into the thought and 
history of the spokesmen of the Revolution, the ‘pamphleteers, essayists, and 
miscellaneous commentators’52 who, drawing upon the ideas of the English 
seventeenth-century ‘Commonwealthmen,’ helped to establish the republican 
virtue tradition as an important influence within the founding doctrine. During 
the 1980s and early 1990s, this was the dominant interpretative paradigm of the 
founding doctrine, undermining and replacing ‘Lockean’ liberalism which had 
hitherto prevailed, and represented in particular by Louis Hartz’s The Liberal 
Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Thought Since the Revolution 
(1955).53 However, amongst others, Joyce Appleby in Liberalism and Republicanism 
                                                
48 Michael Freeman, Edmund Burke and the Critique of Political Radicalism  (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1980). 
49 Frank O’Gorman, Edmund Burke: His Political Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1973). 
50 Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
51 A.Owen Aldridge, Thomas Paine’s American Ideology (London: Associated University Presses, 1984). 
52 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (London: The Belknap Press of the 
Harvard University Press, 1992), p. vi. 
53 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Thought Since the 
Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955). 
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in the Historical Imagination (1992)54 and Steven M. Dworetz in The Unvarnished 
Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American Revolution (1990)55, argue 
convincingly that the hitherto dominant ‘revisionist’ position is misplaced. These 
works have placed these competing influences in historical perspective, and have 
informed the findings of this thesis concerning the dominant interpretative 
paradigm in which the American tradition of liberty is grounded. They have 
provided the background against which the philosophical analysis of the 
character of freedom within each interpretative paradigm has been undertaken.   
As previously mentioned, neoconservative thought is an essential part of 
the conceptual framework of this thesis, and in this area a number of works have 
provided important perspectives. Leo Strauss was perhaps the most dominant 
figure in neoconservative thought and Steven B. Smith’s Reading Leo Straus: 
Politics, Philosophy, Judaism (2006)56 provided key insights into Strauss’s views 
about western decline and his devotion to Plato, whilst Anne Norton in Leo 
Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (2004)57 has emphasised the influence of 
Strauss upon contemporary neoconservative thought. This is echoed by Mark 
Lilla, who, in his article ‘The Closing of the Straussian Mind’ (2004), highlighted 
‘the genuine connection that seems to exist in the United States between Strauss’s 
self-proclaimed disciples and a highly partisan faction [the neoconservatives] in 
American public life.’58 These works and articles, amongst others, have facilitated 
one of the key findings of this thesis, i.e., that many aspects of Straussian (and 
neoconservative) thought are consistent with aspects of the republican virtue 
tradition.  
                                                
54 Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1992). 
55 Steven M. Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American Revolution 
(London: Duke University Press, 1990). 
56 Steven B.Smith, Reading Leo Strauss:Politics, Philosophy, Judaism (London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2006). 
57 Anne Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (London: Yale University Press, 2004). 
58 Mark Lilla, ‘The Closing of the Straussian Mind,’  New York Review of Books,  4 November 2004 
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17523> [accessed 7 May, 2008]. 
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As already indicated, a related and equally important aspect of the 
conceptual framework concerns the influence neoconservatism had upon the 
Bush administration, and in this area two works have provided the most specific 
recent research into the way in which that influence developed. Jacob Heilbrunn, 
in They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (2008) has traced the origins 
of neoconservatism from the City College of New York in the 1950s, where the 
neoconservatives were practically a Marxist vanguard, through to the trauma 
(for them) of the 1960s, in which they developed their critique of President 
Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society’. He traces the influence of Leo Strauss on such 
key figures as Irving Kristol and Allan Bloom amongst others, and, importantly, 
establishes the complex network of relationships between key neoconservatives 
who occupied important positions in various think tanks, the media, and, 
eventually, the Bush administration. Heilbrunn considers neoconservatism to be 
a ‘mind-set’59 but, as this thesis makes clear, it is much closer to being a radical 
ideology than perhaps he concedes. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke survey 
similar terrain in America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (2004) 
but focus in particular on how the neoconservatives secured their foreign policy 
agenda after the events of 9/11, the way in which Edward Said’s concept of 
‘Orientalism’ had a role in neoconservative discourse, and the manner in which 
neoconservatives influenced media outlets. 
Works relating to the Bush administration inevitably vary in focus. Some 
have attempted to cover a wide spectrum of the administration’s policy decisions 
as well as its performance in office; others have adopted a more specialised 
approach. Of the former, Sidney Blumenthal’s How Bush Rules: Chronicles of a 
Radical Regime (2006)60 offers comprehensive comment on the Bush 
administration’s position on a range of issues from torture to climate change. 
James Bovard’s Terrorism and Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, Justice, and Peace to Rid 
                                                
59 Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, p. 10. 
60 Sidney Blumenthal, How Bush Rules: Chronicles of a Radical Regime (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006). 
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the World of Evil (2003) 61 and The Bush Betrayal (2004)62 provide a fairly broad 
focus upon foreign and domestic affairs respectively, the latter work including 
research on how the administration suppressed dissent. More specialised works 
to which this thesis has referred in particular include James P. Pfiffner’s Power 
Play: The Bush Presidency and the Constitution (2008), 63 which highlights the ways 
in which the administration adhered to the Unitary Executive Theory, which led, 
inter alia, to domestic surveillance programmes of dubious legality. Also in this 
specialised category is Jane Mayer’s The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War 
on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals (2008),64 which establishes how the 
Bush administration underpinned the ‘Freedom Agenda’ by evading its legal 
responsibilities in respect of the mistreatment of prisoners, the outsourcing of 
torture, and the practice of ‘extraordinary rendition’. Whilst many of these works 
do indeed reflect upon the rhetoric of freedom used by the Bush administration – 
Bovard for example highlights what he calls the ‘freedom verbiage’ deployed in 
relation to the Iraq war 65– these works do not focus on the discourse of freedom 
in any significant way. In referring to these and many other works relating to the 
Bush administration, therefore, this thesis has sought to identify those policy and 
decision elements that reflect and manifest the administration’s implicit 
interpretation of freedom, and to subject them to the analysis previously 
described.  
The analytical framework described in the following chapter rests 
principally upon the thought of Isaiah Berlin. For interpretations of Berlin’s ideas 
the thesis relies mainly upon John Gray’s Berlin (1995),66 and George Crowder’s 
                                                
61 James Bovard, Terrorism and Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, Justice, and Peace to Rid the World of Evil 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
62 James Bovard, The Bush Betrayal (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
63 James P. Pfiffner, Power Play: The Bush Presidency and the Constitution (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2008). 
64 Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American 
Ideals (London: Doubleday, 2008). 
65 Bovard, The Bush Betrayal, p. 254. 
66 John Gray, Berlin (Glasgow, Fontana Press, 1995). 
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Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism (2004).67 These works are important in terms of 
placing Berlin’s ideas in a contemporary context, as well as providing insights 
into the way in which his ideas of liberty interact with liberalism and pluralism. 
Nevertheless, in applying this analytical framework it has been necessary to 
interpret Berlin’s thought in an unmediated sense by direct reference to his work. 
The most relevant and important source was Liberty (2005),68 which includes 
Berlin’s famous 1958 essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in which he posits the 
notions of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ liberty. It is these concepts that form a crucial 
element of the critical analysis the thesis undertakes. 
Quentin Skinner’s ideas concerning the nature of freedom are also 
considered principally through reference to his Liberty Before Liberalism (1998) 69 
and Visions of Politics: Volume II: Renaissance Virtues (2002).70 These works discuss, 
inter alia, aspects of neo-Roman thought and how this helped to frame 
republican ideas about the nature of freedom. Skinner’s ideas in this area run 
counter, in some crucial respects, to those of Berlin and this tension forms an 
important part of the thesis’s analysis. 
The term ‘discourse’, is used in this thesis in its Foucauldian sense, i.e. 
‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’71 and are 
highly regulated groupings of utterances or statements. Foucault’s ideas about 
discourse also forms part of the analytical framework set out in the following 
chapter where the relevance of his ideas to the freedom discourse is explained in 
more detail (see Chapter Two, Section V). For interpretations of Foucault’s ideas 
in this area, the thesis refers in particular to the works of Sara Mills, Michel 
                                                
67 George Crowder, Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). 
68 Isaiah Berlin, Liberty ed. by Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
69 Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
70 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics: Volume II: Renaissance Virtues (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2002).  
71 Michel Foucault quoted in Sara Mills, Michel Foucault (London: Routledge, 2004). 
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Foucault (2004) and Discourse (1997),72 together with The Philosophy of Foucault 
(2006) 73 by Todd May.  
 
IV  METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 
 
The research has utilised both primary and secondary sources. The primary 
material is derived principally from three sources. First, the speeches and public 
remarks of President George W. Bush, including inaugural addresses, State of the 
Union addresses, as well as press conferences and other set-piece speeches to 
different organisations and heads of state, were invaluable in eliciting the 
characteristics of the discourse of freedom. A second primary source was of 
course the quotations of key figures in the Bush administration, including, for 
example, Vice President Cheney, Attorney General John Ashcroft, Deputy 
Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz and John Yoo of the Office of Legal 
Counsel. A third primary source was memoranda written by various members of 
the administration, particularly in the Department of Justice, administration 
documents such as the ‘National Security Strategy of the United States’ 
published in September 2002, and documents published by various think-tanks 
such as PNAC’s ‘Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and 
Resources for a New Century’, (September 2000).74 The research makes extensive 
use of Internet resources to access presidential speeches and other documents, 
and frequent use was made of national newspaper websites such as those of the 
Washington Post and the New York Times, as well as magazine web sites, 
including those of Foreign Affairs and the Nation. Where appropriate, the thesis 
has also drawn upon notes taken at a conference on neoconservatism held at 
                                                
72 Sata Mills, Discourse (London: Routledge, 1997). 
73 Todd May, The Philosophy of Foucault (Trowbridge: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006). 
74 Project for the New American Century, ‘Rebuilding America’s Defenses’, September, 2000 
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Birkbeck College, London in May 2006,75 and at a lecture given by Quentin 
Skinner at the British Library in February 2009.76 
As explained, the analytical framework of this thesis rests in large part upon 
the thought of Isaiah Berlin, and many of his published works have been used by 
the thesis as a primary source, particularly as they relate to his ideas concerning 
liberty and pluralism. Quotations from these works have been used where 
appropriate to underpin the core arguments of the thesis, in particular from his 
1958 essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ and also from his essay on Hegel published 
in Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty (2003)77. Similarly, 
Research into the ideas of Leo Strauss was conducted at primary level, e.g. 
through the texts of Natural Right and History (1952)78 and Thoughts on Machiavelli 
(1957)79 and supported by secondary sources including for example, Shadia 
Drury’s The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss (2005).80  Neoconservative thought and its 
implications for the interpretation of freedom were also researched at both 
primary and secondary level, with Irving Kristol’s Neoconservativism: The 
Autobigraphy of an Idea (1995)81 and Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American 
Mind (1988)82 being notable examples of the former. 
The primary source material is illuminated by the use of secondary 
material, including books and academic journals and articles relating, inter alia, 
to the American founding doctrine, philosophical and historical concepts of 
freedom, neoconservatism, and the policy decisions of the Bush administration in 
the arenas of both domestic issues and foreign affairs. The research was therefore 
grounded in a diverse range of academic specialisms. The New York Review of 
                                                
75 ‘Libertarian Hawks or Cultural Communitarians? Neoconservatism and the Legacy of the New York 
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Books was of particular assistance in this respect, providing expert contemporary 
commentary on a number of the issues with which this thesis engages, including 
amongst many others, ‘the war on terror’, the legal issues surrounding the use of 
torture, and the manipulation of science.  
These primary and secondary sources were used to develop a historical, 
philosophical, and conceptual framework and to support the core argument of 
the thesis. All works specifically referred to are set out in the bibliography at the 
end of the thesis. 
 
V  PRESENTATION OF THESIS 
 
The thesis comprises seven chapters. Each chapter, apart from the first and the 
last, includes an introduction and a conclusion.  
Chapter Two sets out the analytical framework to be applied throughout 
the thesis by considering various aspects of the Bush administration’s policies 
and practices. The chapter explores in some detail Berlin’s thinking about the 
nature of freedom, its place amongst other social goods, its grounding in 
pluralism and its susceptibility to perversion. It also briefly considers the critique 
of these ideas offered by Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit. The chapter also 
includes a short section on how the term ‘discourse’ is applied in its Foucauldian 
sense throughout the thesis as the unconscious structuring which sets the 
boundaries for discussion and debate. 
Chapter Three fulfils two principal functions. First it considers some of the 
philosophical influences that inspired the American revolutionaries and the 
founders of the republic. The ideas of some these theorists are important because 
they helped to form the foundation of the American liberty tradition. Second, the 
chapter considers the competing interpretative paradigms of the founding 
doctrine, i.e. the ‘Lockean’ liberal interpretation and that of the ‘republican 
virtue’ tradition. The chapter then draws conclusions as to which paradigm 
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succeeded in becoming dominant, and, using the analytical framework 
established in Chapter Two, identifies the character of freedom embedded within 
it. These findings form the background and site of comparison against which the 
thesis considers the discourse of freedom under the Bush administration. 
Chapter Four provides background information on the roots of 
neoconservatism, and explores the ideas of three of the movement’s most 
influential early theorists, namely Leo Strauss, Irving Kristol, and Allan Bloom, 
whose ideas were inherited to a large extent by the neoconservative political and 
media nexus that was so prominent during the Bush administration’s period of 
office. In considering the nature of neoconservative thought and the influences 
that shaped it, the chapter also identifies and reflects upon its implicit 
interpretation of freedom and its philosophical links to the republican virtue 
tradition. 
The principal purpose of Chapter Five is to demonstrate how the 
neoconservative ideas and its interpretation of freedom were absorbed by the 
Bush administration and reflected in aspects of its foreign policy. The chapter 
considers the early neoconservative foreign policy influences that later formed 
the framework of the ‘Freedom Agenda.’ It also considers the extent to which 
neoconservative thought was influenced by a Hegelian view of history and the 
‘Orientalism’ characterized by Edward Said. Both influences, this thesis argues, 
were reflected in the foreign policy decisions and rhetoric deployed by the Bush 
administration, and both undermined, in different ways, the ‘freedom’ the 
administration claimed as the heart of its policy agenda. The chapter also traces 
how the discourse of freedom began to take shape in response to the events of 
9/11 and developed during the subsequent ‘war on terror’ and the Iraq war. 
Also explored is the legal advice that facilitated one of the administration’s 
central paradoxes: the torture and the abuse of prisoners in defence of freedom.   
Chapter Six focuses upon aspects of domestic policy that also evidence the 
administration’s absorption of neoconservative ideas and its interpretation of 
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freedom. The chapter explores the connections of the Christian right with 
neoconservatism and the influence of the former upon the Bush administration, 
and the way this influence was manifested in specific policy areas. These include 
the administration’s attitude towards science, and its approach to climate 
change, stem cell research, and sex education. The chapter considers aspects of 
the presidency itself, including the manner in which presidential power was 
exercised. The administration’s view of the scope of presidential power led to a 
number of abuses, including unlawful wiretapping, extensive domestic 
surveillance, and the suppression of dissent, exposing the strands of 
authoritarianism and paternalism which ran through the domestic agenda. All of 
these aspects of domestic policy undermine, it is argued, the negative concept of 
liberty implicit within the American tradition of liberty. The chapter also 
explores the way in which the media reflected and disseminated the discourse of 
freedom on the administration’s behalf.   
Chapter Seven summarises the policy evidence that supports the core 
argument of the thesis and concludes that the Bush administration wore a ‘mask 
of liberty’ and interpreted freedom in a way that ran counter to the American 
tradition.   





CHAPTER TWO: THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The essence of liberty has always lain in the ability to choose as you wish to 
choose, because you wish so to choose, uncoerced, unbullied, not swallowed 
up in some vast system; and in the right to resist, to be unpopular, to stand up 
for your convictions merely because they are your convictions. That is true 
freedom, and without it there is neither freedom of any kind, nor even the 


























                                                




This chapter sets out the analytical structure or framework upon which the thesis 
will rely to underpin the objectives outlined in the previous chapter. The broad 
aim is to construct an analytical framework concerning the nature of freedom, 
capable of being applied to different historical dimensions. The first dimension 
relates to the period discussed in the next chapter, i.e. the development of the 
founding doctrine and the formation of the American tradition of liberty. The 
framework will be used to attempt to define, in philosophical terms, the character 
of freedom or liberty that developed at the time of the founding and the early 
years of the republic.  The second dimension to which the framework will be 
applied is the philosophical nature of freedom that can be detected within 
neoconservative political thought, bearing in mind the influence of 
neoconservatism upon the Bush administration as discussed in Chapter One.  In 
succeeding chapters the framework will be used to analyse aspects of policy and 
the discourse of freedom that developed under the Bush administration. A 
subsidiary aim of this chapter is to establish the meaning of the term ‘discourse’ as 
it is used throughout and how its particular meaning bears on the thesis content.   
The analytical framework is grounded principally upon the thought of Isaiah 
Berlin, and in particular his ideas about the nature of freedom. Isaiah Berlin (1909 
–1997), was, and is, something of a contentious figure. His critics on the left found 
his ruthless criticism of communist totalitarianism during the Cold War 
uncomfortable. Similarly, the right, (including neoconservatives) were unhappy 
with his equally adamant attack on their idea that the good – in politics and 
morals – was non-contradictory and could be ‘proclaimed, ex-cathedra from the 
pulpits of the University of Chicago.’2 
Notwithstanding the reservations held about Berlin in some quarters both 
during his lifetime and today, it is clear that no other twentieth-century thinker or 
                                                
2 Michael Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life (London: Chatto and Windus, 1998), p. 230. 
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philosopher has addressed the concept of freedom with the same degree of 
originality, energy and focus as Berlin. Noel Annan, for example has argued that 
in ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (discussed below), Berlin set the framework for 
serious discussion of freedom ever since it was delivered as a lecture at Oxford 
University in 1958, and that Berlin developed a doctrine of freedom that is both 
profound and original.3 Berlin’s seminal formulation of the distinction between 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ conceptions of liberty remains what George Crowder 
calls ‘a standard point of departure for analyses of political freedom in 
contemporary theory’.4   It was part of a single dominant project that dominated 
Berlin’s life and work: the defence of liberal democracy against the dangers of 
totalitarianism and authoritarianism. He was an acknowledged liberal with a 
huge international reputation who, as his biographer Michael Ignatieff points out, 
‘was the only liberal thinker of real consequence to take the trouble to enter the 
mental worlds of liberalism’s sworn enemies.’5  
No other contemporary figure, therefore, has the stature of Berlin in the field 
of the philosophy of freedom and it is principally for this reason that his body of 
thought has been selected to provide the analytical framework described above. In 
addition, in the interests of objectivity, it is clearly important that the philosopher 
whose ideas provide the tools with which to analyse the discourse of freedom in 
the way intended, should not in any sense be by disposition antipathetic to the 
interests of the United States. This charge cannot be levelled at Berlin.6 His 
defence of the priority that freedom should be accorded in politics chimes to a 
considerable extent with the utterances of many presidents of the United States, in 
particular since World War II. Berlin was a firm friend of the United States, 
particularly during the Cold War, and indeed it was to a large extent the conflict 
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of ideas this struggle represented that inspired much of his work.  Furthermore, it 
has been argued by Michael Kenny, for example, that it is Berlin’s sensitivity to 
cultural pluralism and the incommensurability of human values that makes his 
thought especially pertinent to ‘liberal states in which conflicts associated with 
cultural, ethnic, and linguistic difference have moved to the centre of the political 
stage’.7 There are therefore strong reasons for arguing that Berlin’s thought has an 
important relevance to the undertaking of an analysis of the discourse of freedom 
in contemporary America. As mentioned in Chapter One, America experienced, 
during the Bush administration, an arguably unprecedented reliance upon the 
rhetoric of freedom in order to justify foreign policy options, and at the same time 
an ever-increasing curtailment of individual freedoms in domestic terms. Berlin’s 
concept of ‘negative liberty’, discussed below, appears as an important pre-
condition for the kind of society in which, as Mark Lilla put it, ‘individuals are 
protected from the dangers of political visionaries ready to sacrifice others on the 
altar of an intellectual fetish like “historical inevitability”’.8  
There is one further reason for selecting Berlin’s thinking about freedom to 
act as the analytic framework in the way described. Namely, that his analysis of 
freedom acts as a warning. For Berlin, totalitarian and authoritarian regimes may 
have emerged from economic factors or historical circumstances and from the 
personality of their leaders, but most importantly their origins lie in ideas. Ideas 
can be perverted to promote political ends that can be the antithesis of those very 
ideas. What Berlin demonstrates so forcefully is how liberty, often elevated to the 
supreme value among social goods, can be twisted to mean something very close 
to its opposite. Berlin teaches that freedom is a value that is perhaps uniquely 
vulnerable to misinterpretation of this kind, and that those who constantly appeal 
to it need to understand what he perceives to be its true meaning. 
 
                                                
7 Michael Kenny ‘Isaiah Berlin’s Contribution to Modern Political Theory,’ Political Studies, 48 (2000),  
p.1034. 
8 Mark Lilla, ‘Very much like a fox’, The Times Literary Supplement, 27 March 1998, (pp.6 – 7) p. 7. 
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II ISAIAH BERLIN’S CONCEPTS OF FREEDOM 
 
Berlin’s analysis of the nature of freedom needs to be set in the broader context of 
the tenor of his thought in order to be properly understood. The following 
consideration of Berlin’s ideas is not intended to be an exhaustive review, merely 
a highlighting of relevant elements sufficient to construct the analytical 
framework referred to, and act as a point of reference. 
The influence of the Enlightenment upon Berlin’s thought cannot be 
overlooked. Indeed, it is arguably the case that Berlin’s ideas about the nature of 
freedom may not appear wholly coherent unless understood within the context, 
initially at least, of his views concerning the Enlightenment. For Berlin, as for 
many others, the Enlightenment was not without serious consequences in the way 
in which mankind came to view himself and his place in history. In Three Critics of 
the Enlightenment (2000),9 Berlin crystallized these views with particular clarity. He 
suggests that leading figures of the Enlightenment were deeply divided amongst 
themselves as to how the progress of man could be attained. Despite these 
disagreements, there were a number of shared core beliefs that makes it possible 
to consider the Enlightenment in terms of a movement. These were in effect 
 
the conviction that the world, or nature, was a single whole, subject to a single 
set of laws, in principle discoverable by the intelligence of man; that the laws 
which governed inanimate nature were in principle the same as those that 
governed plants, animals and sentient beings; that man was capable of 
improvement; that there existed certain recognisable human goals which all men, 
rightly so described, sought after, namely happiness, knowledge, justice, liberty, 
and […] virtue; that these goals were common to all men as such, were not 
unattainable, were not incompatible, and that human vice, misery and folly were 
mainly due to ignorance either of what these goals consisted in or of the means 
of attaining them – ignorance due to insufficient knowledge of the laws of 
nature.10    
 
                                                
9 Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hermann, Herder (London: Pimlico, 2000). 
10 Ibid., p. 277. 
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In addition, the Enlightenment assumed that human nature was a constant; 
local and historical variations mattered little and human beings, in essence, could 
be described as a species rather in the same way as birds or animals. The new 
approach to knowledge would replace a world guided largely by superstition and 
guesswork, prejudice and dogma. A new world would thus arise in which happy 
societies were guided by reason. This, essentially, Berlin claims, is the noble, 
optimistic, rational doctrine of the great tradition of the Enlightenment from the 
French Revolution to the present. It rests upon faith in reason, the possibility of 
universal human goals, and the possibility of ensuring physical and spiritual 
harmony and progress by the use of empirically guided intellect.11      
Berlin found that this tradition contained within it the seeds of universalism 
and, in the context of the twentieth century, totalitarianism. The interpreters of the 
Enlightenment whom he discusses in Three Critics - Vico, Haman and Herder –   
can be viewed as harbingers of the Counter-Enlightenment or the Romantic 
movement. Whilst not rejecting the more noble aspirations of the Enlightenment, 
(which, after all, inspired Newtonian science and, inter alia liberated humanity 
from the received authority of religion, custom, and tradition), Berlin has 
considerable sympathy with their ideas which dispute this notion of a uniform 
human nature and a universality of outlook. As Berlin interprets Herder, for 
example, whilst men and women have traits in common, it is their differences 
which matter most. It is their differences that make men what they are, and 
through them that the individual genius of men and cultures is expressed. The 
goals and values of individuals and cultures may not only differ, but such 
differences may be intrinsic to man generally. If that is the case then 
 
the simple, harmonious, ideal way of life to which, whether we know it or not, all 
men aspire – (the notion which underlies the central current of the notion of a 
single unchanging, objective code of universal precepts – Western thought) – 
may turn out to be incoherent; for there appear to be many visions, many ways 
of living and thinking and feeling, each with its own centre of gravity, self-
                                                
11 Ibid. 
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validating, uncombinable, still less capable of being integrated into a seamless 
whole.12  
 
Berlin was among the first to connect the confidence of the Enlightenment 
mentality – the belief in immutable universal human nature and the utopian 
prospect of endless rational improvement – with the totalitarian consequences 
that blighted the twentieth century. What Berlin saw in the writings of those such 
as Vico and Herder was a stress upon the limitations of scientific method for 
understanding human conduct, and a celebration of the differences within a range 
of cultures and values. These two in particular opposed what they saw as an 
Enlightenment view that whole cultures could be regarded as ‘merely 
imperfections to be transcended’.13 Like them, as George Crowder points out, 
Berlin believed that each culture had its own distinctive strengths as well as 
weaknesses, both of which should be acknowledged. This is because, in the 
pluralist view (discussed below), ‘there are many more goods and virtues, and 
legitimate interpretations of these, than can be expressed within the life of any one 
human society’.14      
Notwithstanding the salutary correction to Enlightenment scientism that 
thinkers like Vico and Herder articulated, this Romantic reaction to rationalism 
also brought its own problems, not least of which was the Romantic conception of 
freedom that grew from it.  Berlin claimed, according to Crowder’s analysis of his 
work, something which is crucial to one of the key planks of this thesis: that the 
Romantic conception of liberty is dangerous ‘because it is susceptible to being 
twisted into the very opposite of what freedom ordinarily means. The ‘positive’ 
liberty of the romantics, however noble or innocent its inspiration, provides a 
model by which the dictators of the twentieth century can justify their oppressive 
rule in the language of freedom itself’.15 Whilst in no sense can the Bush 
                                                
12 Ibid., p.15. 
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14  Crowder, Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism, p. 122.  
15 Ibid., p.57. 
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administration be equated with any form of dictatorship, it is the extent to which 
it may have inverted the language of freedom into something different to ‘what 
freedom ordinarily means’ that will be explored in subsequent chapters. 
Berlin therefore sees dangers to freedom both in the Enlightenment itself and 
in the Romantic reaction to it. The threat to freedom from the Enlightenment is 
manifested by a strand of thinking characterised by scientism according to which 
human behaviour and conduct can be reduced to a set of universally applied laws 
formulated by managerialists and experts. It gave rise to a faith in the possibility 
of human utopias underpinned by technocratic solutions to the problems of 
mankind. It is this strain of thinking that gave rise to the historical determinism of 
Marx, for example, and which, ultimately, led to the excesses of the Stalinist Soviet 
Union. On the other hand, those who reacted against the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment, such as Rousseau, Fichte, and Hegel, tended to twist the meaning 
of freedom to the point where it could only be achieved through obedience to the 
State.16 What became the inheritance of the Counter-Enlightenment and the 
romantics was an aggressive form of nationalism, and a commitment to 
irrationalism which, to some extent, is a characteristic of neoconservative thought 
as discussed in the next chapter. Berlin has argued that irrationalism is the 
distinctive characteristic of twentieth-century political thought and is to be found 
within both communist and fascist regimes. A similar trend can be located within 
Western societies in recent years and what has been called ‘the assault on reason’ 
within America,17 particularly the Bush administration’s attack upon science, is 
explored in Chapter Six. Notwithstanding these deep flaws that flowed from their 
ideas, the Enlightenment’s critics, Berlin believed, bequeathed what Crowder calls 
‘the intellectual antidote to totalitarianism in all its forms’,18 which is the notion of 
value pluralism.  
                                                
16 See Isaiah Berlin, Freedom and its Betrayal, in which he discusses the ideas of these three thinkers 
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17 See for example Al Gore, The Assault on Reason (New York: Penguin, 2007). 
18 Crowder, Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism, p. 124. 
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Mark Lilla, et al., suggest that Berlin’s idea of value pluralism grew out of a 
distinction he saw in intellectual history, ‘between the “hedgehogs” who develop 
all-encompassing, unified theories of human action, historical experience, and 
political value, and the “foxes” who see multiplicity everywhere and who fear 
zealots who would sacrifice human nature on the altar of an idea.’19 It is the idea 
of value pluralism, described by the philosopher John Gray as ‘one of enormous 
subversive force’,20 that above all animates the whole of Berlin’s work, and in 
which his ideas of positive and negative freedom are grounded. What Berlin 
means by this term is that human values are not only multiple but sometimes 
irreconcilable. They are frequently conflicting and often uncombinable. Goals 
conflict, not merely in the sense that one man’s aims may interfere with another’s, 
but in the sense, as Alan Ryan puts it, ‘that there is no one true answer to the 
question of what the right goals are for a given individual’.21 This applies at the 
level of whole cultures – systems of value – as well between the values of a 
particular culture or individual.   
It is one of Berlin’s central claims that what he calls ‘moral monism’ lies at 
the heart of modern authoritarianism, and infects the foundations of mainstream 
Western thought as a whole, within which it is a dominant view.22 Moral monism, 
at its broadest, is the idea that all ethical questions have a single correct answer, at 
least in principle, that can be derived from a single universally valid, moral law. 
Berlin claims that it is an essential characteristic of the great monistic religions and 
political ideologies to claim that there is only one way to salvation, one true value 
structure.23 If there is a single, universally valid moral law, providing correct 
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21 Alan Ryan, The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin, ed. by Alan Ryan (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), pp.4 – 5.  
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answers to all ethical problems, then there is a universally valid conception of the 
good, some kind of uniquely superior good life: 
 
The notion that there must exist final objective answers to normative questions, 
truths that can be demonstrated or directly intuited, that it is in principle possible 
to discover a harmonious pattern in which all values are reconciled, and that it is 
towards this unique goal that we must make; that we can uncover some single 
central principle that shapes this vision, a principle which, once found, will 
govern our lives – this ancient and almost universal belief, on which so much 
traditional thought and action and philosophical doctrine rests, seems to me 
invalid, and at times to have led (and still to lead) to absurdities in theory and 
barbarous consequences in practice.24 
 
Berlin argues that moral monism is false, and that what defends us against 
its fanatical expression, which leads to fundamentalism, persecution, and 
intolerance, is the understanding that values are plural and often compete. By 
contrast with ‘the conviction that all positive values in which men have believed 
must in the end be compatible, and perhaps even entail one another’,25 Berlin 
suggests ‘that not all good things are compatible, still less the ideals of mankind.’26 
More strongly, he states that ‘it seems to me that the belief that some single 
formula can in principle be found whereby all diverse ends of men can be 
harmoniously realized is demonstrably false’.27 His view was that we are ‘faced 
with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the 
realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others’, that 
‘the ends of men are many, and not all of them are compatible with each other,’ so 
that ‘the possibility of conflict –  and of tragedy – can never be wholly eliminated 
from human life, either personal or social’, and ‘the necessity of choosing between 
absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human condition’.28 
Some values have therefore to be sacrificed for others. Goods such as liberty, 
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25 Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Liberty, pp 166 – 217 (p. 212). 
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27 Ibid., p. 214.  
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equality, and justice do not fit together in perfect harmony or hierarchy. Pluralism 
recognised that ‘human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and [are] 
in perpetual rivalry with one another.’29 By ‘incommensurability’ Berlin means 
that when these values conflict or collide ‘there is no common measure by which 
they can be weighed against each other’.30 
The inevitable outcome of the collision between values and their frequent 
incommensurability is that we are faced with a number of testing choices, some of 
which are extremely difficult, even tragic, because all choice involves significant 
loss. Over large areas of the public sphere, trade-offs between values take place in 
which competing goods are weighed against one another, and which involve a 
number of moral dilemmas. Choice as an integral part of the human condition 
moves centre stage, ‘becoming a meta-value that must be accommodated’.31 Berlin 
maintains that there is a minimum level of opportunity for choice – not of rational 
or virtuous choice alone, below which human activity ceases to be free in any 
meaningful sense.32 
It is in the context of these ideas about the pitfalls of both the Enlightenment 
and the Counter-Enlightenment into which man has frequently stumbled, 
together with his belief in value pluralism, the frequent incommensurability of 
values, the falseness of monism and the centrality of choice in human affairs, that 
Berlin grounds his influential thinking about the nature of freedom and the 
distinctions he draws between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ freedom. The core point of 
Berlin’s argument about the distinctions between these two definitions of freedom 
is that negative freedom, in accepting the idea that human values are diverse and 
that there is no single answer to the question of what the right goals are for a 
given individual, is less liable to perversion than the concept of positive freedom, 
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which embraces the idea that the human self is divided, and that freedom consists 
in our behaviour being under the control of our ‘true’ or ‘higher’ selves. 
For Berlin, freedom is not instrumental, a means to an end; it is a good in 
itself. When he asks what the value of freedom is, he finds it difficult to locate 
man’s desire for freedom in empirical foundations, but suggests that it is perhaps 
sufficient to say that for those who value it for its own sake believe it is 
 
an inalienable ingredient in what makes human beings human; and that this 
underlies both the positive demand to have a voice in the laws and practices of 
the society in which one lives, and to be accorded an area […] in which one is 
one’s own master, a ‘negative’ area in which a man is not obliged to account for 
his activities to any man as far as this is compatible with an organised society. 33 
 
This is the classical liberal view of what constitutes freedom, that there is a 
private sphere in which, provided the rights of others are not interfered with, or 
order undermined, a person can do, think, live and believe as they like. It is also 
the view, Berlin suggests, that finds expression, wholly or in part, in various 
declarations of the rights of man in America and France and in the writings of 
Locke, Voltaire, Paine, Mill, and Constant.34  
It is this basic liberal understanding of liberty with which Berlin associates 
his negative interpretation. He defines negative freedom further: 
 
I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men 
interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within 
which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from 
doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is 
contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being 
coerced, or, it may be, enslaved.35 
 
A person lacks political freedom if he or she is prevented from attaining a 
goal by other human beings, and the wider the area of non-interference, the 
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greater a person’s freedom. The standard obstacle to freedom in this sense is 
coercion. Mere incapacity to do something which involves no human act or 
omission cannot be an obstacle to negative freedom. This, Berlin points out, was 
what the classical English philosophers meant when they used the word freedom. 
There was recognition that freedom could not be unlimited, that order and 
security were important, and that the weak must be protected from the strong. 
Even so, thinkers such as Locke and Mill understood that there was a certain area 
of minimum freedom which could not be violated if the individual was to develop 
and flourish. If that freedom is invaded the result would be despotism.36 As is 
demonstrated in the next chapter, there were competing views as to what 
constituted individual liberties, and Burke, Paine, Jefferson and Mill, for example, 
all had different notions about the relative importance of freedom of religion, 
freedom of expression and opinion, guarantees about property, and so on. But, as 
Berlin makes clear, the argument for keeping authority at bay is always the same.  
We must preserve a minimum area of personal freedom if we are not to ‘degrade 
or deny our nature’.37 
The defence of freedom consists of the ‘negative’ goal of warding off 
interference. It is in this sense freedom from; freedom from coercion, from 
interference with certain minimum areas of personal liberty. It is non-interference 
with whatever an agent may wish to do, whatever people may think of it, non- 
intrusion into a space in which a person may go to the good or bad in his or her 
own way. To block a man’s choices before every door except the ones chosen for 
him, no matter how noble the prospects before him or how benevolent the 
motives of those who do the blocking, is  
 
to sin against the truth that he is a man with his own life to live. This is liberty as 
it has been conceived from the days of Erasmus […] to our own. Every plea for 
civil liberties, every protest against exploitation and humiliation, against the 
encroachment of public authority, or the mass hypnosis of custom or organised 
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propaganda, springs from this individualistic, and much disputed, conception of 
man.38 
 
The human capacity for choice, as John Gray points out, supports Berlin’s 
conception of freedom in that he designates as ‘basic freedom’ the capacity for 
choice itself. Negative freedom, understood as non-interference by others when 
acting in accordance with one’s desires, presupposes the capacity for choice 
among alternatives. Negative liberty then, is the availability of choice among 
alternatives or options that is unimpeded by others.39 
Berlin contrasts negative liberty with positive liberty, which is the idea not of 
the absence of interference but of the individual having control over his own life.  
It derives ‘from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master’, to be 
genuinely the author of his own actions, to be in rational control. Berlin does not 
deny the value of positive liberty; indeed he suggests that in some sense positive 
liberty is ‘essential to a decent existence’. Although these two kinds of freedom – 
the one concerned with a space in which I am free of interference, and the other in 
which I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not upon external forces 
– may seem no great distance from one another, these negative and positive 
notions of freedom have, Berlin asserts, historically developed in divergent 
directions until they came into direct conflict with one another.40    
Berlin’s case against positive liberty is that the conception allows liberty to be 
inverted into its very opposite. It contains a feature not found in the negative 
concept that lays it open to authoritarian corruption. This is the notion mentioned 
earlier, that the human personality is divided into two selves: on the one hand, the 
higher self, or nature, my ‘true’ or authentic self, (usually identified with reason); 
on the other, the lower self which is usually associated with passions, emotions, 
desires, and irrational impulses. This is the part of the human personality needing 
to be disciplined if ever it is to fulfil its ‘true’ potential. 
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Once this distinction is drawn, the way is open to advocating the 
suppression of people’s actual desires and wishes in the name of their ‘true’ or 
‘real’ selves. Berlin advances the view that it then becomes plausible to coerce 
people in their own best interests; to push them in certain directions which they 
would adopt if they were enlightened, but do not because of ignorance or 
blindness. It is then easy for the idea to take hold that men can be coerced in their 
own interests, because I, or a race, a tribe, church or a state can lay claim to know 
what they truly need better than they know themselves. This idea entails the 
notion that men would not resist this coercion if they were rational and fully 
understood their own interests as the coercer does. Even more than this may be 
claimed. The coercer may declare that what those that are being coerced are 
aiming at in their benighted state they consciously resist, because ‘there exists 
within them an occult entity – their latent rational will, or their “true“ purpose –   
and that this entity, although it is belied by all they overtly feel and do and say, is 
their “real” self, of which the poor empirical self in space or time may know little 
or nothing; and that this inner spirit is the only self that deserves to have its 
wishes taken into account’.41 
The slide towards authoritarianism, which the positive interpretation of 
freedom facilitates, is helped, as George Crowder interprets it, if not only 
authoritarian rulers claim to know the requirements of the true self better than the 
individual concerned, but if the true self is also identified with a collective self, the 
nation for example, or some universal entity in which the individual merely 
participates as an integral part. Berlin insists that the very idea of the ‘true’ self, 
distinguishable from merely empirical or contingent desires, is what opens the 
door to freedom’s betrayal. Unlike negative freedom, it ‘raises the logical 
possibility that a person’s actual desires may be mistaken, and, if so, ought to be 
suppressed’.42 Such suppression can ignore the actual wishes of men or societies; 
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they may be bullied or tortured in the name of their ‘real’ selves; the oppressors 
are secure in the knowledge ‘that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, 
performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, self fulfilment) must be identical 
with his freedom – the free choice of his “true”, albeit often submerged self’.   
This, then, is Berlin’s ‘monstrous impersonation’, which consists in ‘equating what 
“X” would choose if he were something he is not, or at least not yet, with what he  
actually seeks and chooses’.43   
Positive freedom, unlike negative freedom, which is manifested through the 
presence of uncoerced choice, consists in obedience to rational will. According to 
Berlin, this was the idea that was shared by thinkers such as Montesquieu, Kant, 
and Burke. For them, obedience to the law and the common good assists in 
providing the individual with true liberty. As with Rousseau, freedom resides not 
in doing what is irrational or wrong, but in complying with the dictates of our 
rational selves, which, for Rousseau, was embodied in the ‘general will’.44 Hence 
political freedom is obedience to the will of the sovereign body which acts for the 
common good. The State, in this sense, knows your true will and wishes better 
than you do, and in forcing you to comply with its laws (which are for the 
common good) it merely liberates your authentic moral will from your appetites. 
To force the empirical self into the right pattern is no tyranny, but liberation. 
Whereas choice implies genuine rivalry amongst competing goods, rational will 
points to only one course of action for the individual, one form of life. This 
directly conflicts with Berlin’s value pluralism. Berlin highlights Kant’s remark 
that when ‘the individual has entirely abandoned his wild lawless freedom, to 
find it again, unimpaired, in a state of dependence according to law’, that alone is 
true freedom, ‘for this dependence is the work of my own will acting as a 
lawgiver’.45  Liberty thus becomes not incompatible with authority, but virtually 
identical with it. It is this line of thought, made manifest above all by Rousseau in 
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his famous dictum that man can be ‘forced to be free’, that Berlin claims has been 
held in common by dictators from the Jacobins to Hitler and the communists. All 
claim that men ‘do not know what they truly want – and therefore by wanting it 
for them, by wanting it on their behalf, we are giving them what in some occult 
sense, without knowing it themselves, they ‘‘really” want’.46 
The problem of positive freedom then for Berlin, is that it presupposes moral 
monism. Instead of the conflicting goals and the rivalries between cherished 
goods and values that face the empirical selves of men, freedom for man is 
conceived as being the pursuit of what is rational and right. This in turn 
presupposes the notion of a single moral order which mandates the pattern, and  
diagnoses conflict as inherently pathological. This runs contrary to Berlin’s 
concept of human nature, which is not something within all men that awaits 
discovery and realization, but is manifested and invented through the exercise of 
choice. It is inherently plural and diverse, not common or universal. 
As George Crowder emphasises, the basic claim of pluralism, and the 
measure of negative liberty that it entails, implies the impossibility of political 
perfection; hence it implies also the need for a form of politics (which for Berlin 
was liberal) that accommodates and manages the imperfectability of human life 
rather than a politics that strives impossibly to transcend it.47 Within pluralism, 
and the concept of negative liberty that is grounded within it, there can be no final 
conception of the good life that will realise all human values. Positive liberty, by 
contrast, is facilitated by moral monism, the idea that there must exist some final 
objective answers to moral dilemmas. One of Berlin’s favourite quotations was a 
remark of Kant’s to the effect that ‘out of the crooked timber of humanity, no 
straight thing was ever made’.48 Berlin’s concept of negative freedom, rooted in 
value pluralism and the incommensurability of values, most easily accommodates 
this ‘crooked timber’. By contrast, moral monism and the concept of positive 
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freedom that it often entails seek to ‘straighten’ it against its will and nature, and 
bring about the perversion to which positive liberty is prone. 
 Berlin was not of course without his critics, and Joseph Raz, Charles Taylor, 
and Gerald MacCallum in particular have suggested what they perceive to be 
shortcomings in his analysis.49 The thesis does not survey exhaustively the 
arguments that have been mounted against Berlin’s concepts of liberty, although 
some mention of the concerns of two critics is appropriate, namely Quentin 
Skinner and Philip Pettit.  
Both Skinner and Pettit have argued that Berlin’s concept of negative liberty 
does not go far enough and fails to recognise an important element of neo-Roman, 
or republican, thought. Skinner argues that the neo-Roman concept of liberty 
rested to a large extent upon the ‘Digest’ of Roman law, which contrasted liberty 
with the condition of slavery. The predicament of the slave is defined as that of 
someone who, contrary to nature, is made into the property of someone else. 
Skinner explains that the essence of slavery in Roman thought is not coercion, but 
being within the power of another person. The term began to be used more 
widely to describe the predicament of anyone who depends on the (good) will of 
someone else.50 It was this understanding of political liberty that came to be 
deployed by some parliamentary spokesmen against the English Crown in the 
seventeenth century. The core of their argument, suggests Skinner, was that in 
times of necessity the Crown possesses the discretionary power to override civil 
rights. Therefore the people held their property and personal liberty not ‘of right’ 
but merely ‘of grace’. For liberties to be held at the discretion of the king was a 
state of dependency that reduced the people to servitude.51 The neo-Roman 
thinkers were insisting that freedom is restricted not only by actual interference or 
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the threat of it but also by the mere knowledge of living upon the goodwill of 
others. Such dependency equalled slavery. 
Skinner argues that the Declaration of Independence reflects the view that 
negative liberty consists not merely in the absence of coercion, but also the 
absence of dependence. It is a document that, obviously enough, stresses 
independence from the arbitrary power of the British Crown. What made 
Congress believe that this justified revolution, was, according to Skinner, their 
acceptance of the classical contention that ‘if you depend upon the goodwill of 
anyone else for the upholding of your rights, it follows that – even if your rights 
are in fact upheld – you will be living in servitude’.52 
Similarly, Philip Pettit argues that the neo-Roman definitions of freedom 
deserve further consideration, and that avoidance of interference or coercion is 
insufficient to qualify as freedom.  
 
Being unfree does not consist in being constrained: on the contrary, the restraint 
of a fair system of law – a non-arbitrary regime – does not make you unfree. 
Being unfree consists rather in being subject to arbitrary sway: being subject to 
the potentially capricious will or the potentially idiosyncratic judgement of 
another. Freedom involves emancipation from any such subordination, liberation 
from any such dependency.53    
 
Both Skinner and Pettit present the neo-Roman concept of non-dependence 
as potentially a rival theory of negative liberty to that of Berlin’s concept of non-
coercion. Berlin himself insisted that no such third concept of liberty could be 
coherently entertained, and maintained that if we are to speak of constraints on 
our liberty, we must be able to point to some visible act of hindrance, the objective 
or consequence of which is to prevent us doing what we otherwise would. The 
neo-Roman theorists whom Skinner and Pettit defend, however, reject this 
assumption and make the distinctive claim that a mere awareness of living in 
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dependence on the goodwill of others serves in itself to restrict our options and 
thereby our liberty. 54 
These ideas are linked to the view held by Skinner, Pettit, and others that, as 
discussed in the following chapter, the animating ideals of liberty expressed 
within the founding doctrine were republican in nature. Whilst Skinner broadly 
accepts the definition and critique of positive liberty formulated by Berlin, he has 
also argued that the republican or neo-Roman concept of freedom is a negative 
one and his views in this area are discussed briefly in the next chapter.    
What Skinner seems to be arguing, therefore, is not that Berlin’s definition of 
negative liberty is wrong, but that it suffers from a limitation in scope. On the face 
of it, it is clear that the ‘dependency’ argument made by Skinner, Pettit, and others 
carries a good deal of force. However, despite his unwillingness to consider a 
third concept of liberty, Berlin does not rule out the possibility of freedom as non-
domination. Indeed, as Crowder points out,55 it could be argued that Berlin 
acknowledges the validity of freedom as non-dependence when he argues that 
‘the extent of my social or political freedom consists in the absence of obstacles not 
merely to my actual, but to my potential choices’.56 This is an important feature of 
negative liberty, and is particularly relevant in terms of the Bush administration’s 
attitude towards science – see Section IV of Chapter Six. Berlin does not hold up 
negative liberty as an absolute and overriding ideal; it is at most the safer political 
option in comparison with the positive version, which has been historically prone 
to distortion and perversion.   
Despite these criticisms, Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative 
forms of freedom remains relevant, and his case against adopting the positive 
version, namely the error of supposing that values cohere in a harmonious whole, 
remains, if not entirely uncontested, original and illuminating in the present age. 
The distinctions he draws between different types of freedom and the important 
                                                
54 Skinner, ‘A Third Concept of Liberty’. p. 18. 
55 Crowder, Isaiah Berlin:. Liberty and Pluralism, p. 88. 
56 Berlin, ‘Five Essays On Liberty: Introduction’, in Liberty, p. 32. 
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background elements of his thought, particularly in relation to value pluralism, 
therefore form the principal analytical framework that this thesis adopts for 
considering both the character of freedom embedded within the American 
tradition, and the discourse of freedom developed under the administration of 




The term ‘discourse’ has become common currency in a variety of disciplines: 
critical theory, sociology, linguistics, philosophy, and many other fields, so much 
so that it is frequently left undefined. Foucault himself uses the term in his 
discussions of power, knowledge and truth, and talks of discourse as ‘practices 
that systematically form the objects of which they speak’.57 Discourse, in the 
Foucauldian sense should be seen as an overall term to refer to groups of 
statements that deal with the same topic, as well as those that seem to produce a 
similar effect, grouped together because they have a similar function. These are 
groupings that are often associated with particular institutions and sites of power, 
and lead to the reproduction of other statements that are compatible with their 
suppositions.58 
For Foucault, there are certain regularities that govern what can and cannot 
be legitimately said in particular circumstances and in certain conditions. It is not, 
as the philosopher Todd May points out, that certain things cannot be said for 
physical or legal reasons. ‘It is, rather, epistemic; that is, it has to do with 
knowledge. If certain unacceptable things are said, or if things are said that might 
be acceptable by the right authorities but not by this particular person, they will 
simply not be recognized.’59 These are not, however, conscious rules that 
determine what may or may not be said, and may not even be recognized by 
                                                
57 Cited in Sara Mills, Discourse, p. 17. 
58 Sara Mills, Michel Foucault, p. 64. 
59 Todd May, The Philosophy of Foucault, p. 38. 
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speakers who may wish to contradict prevailing wisdom or debate a particular 
issue. Instead, in what Foucault refers to as ‘the positive unconscious of 
knowledge’, they are unconscious structurings, setting the boundaries of, and 
opportunities for, debate and discussion.60 They are the framework, the 
perspective, unimposed from either outside or within, in which ‘the participants 
in discussion recognize one another in their proper role as participants and […]the 
statements of those participants are recognized as contributions to a particular 
discussion, or as establishing certain points’.61 
Although Foucault uses the term discourse in his discussions of power, 
knowledge, and truth, the notion of truth is not self-evident in Foucault’s thought, 
nor is it an ideal abstract quality to which humans aspire.62 He sees the truth as far 
more worldly and negative, supported by a whole range of practices and 
institutions that work to exclude statements that they characterise as false and 
keep in circulation those statements that they characterise as true.63  
  
Truth is of the world; it is produced there only by virtue of multiple constraints 
[…] Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is the 
types of discourse it harbours and causes to function as true: the mechanisms 
and instances which enable one to distinguish true from false statements, the 
way in which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures which are 
valorised for obtaining the truth; the status of those who are charged with saying 
what counts as true.64  
 
 
It is through this Foucauldian lens, as it were, that the discourse of freedom 
constructed by the Bush administration is considered. Thus the thesis seeks to 
demonstrate, inter alia, how this discourse succeeded in narrowing the field of 
vision of the American people; how it was used to suppress and extinguish 
                                                
60 Ibid., p. 39. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Mills, Discourse, p. 18. 
63 Mills, Michel Foucault, p. 58. 
64 Cited in Mills, Discourse, p.  18. 
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dissent; how it was used by the administration to isolate its policies from 
criticism and underpin their legitimacy.       
     
IV CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has established the analytical framework that will be used to 
support the core aspects of the thesis. Berlin’s ideas about the nature of freedom, 
and the perversion to which the notion of positive freedom is prone, is a central 
component of that analytical structure and will be applied to the American 
tradition of freedom discussed in the next chapter, the character of freedom 
embedded within neoconservative thought discussed in Chapter Four, and the 
Bush administration’s interpretation of freedom as manifested through aspects of 
foreign and domestic policy discussed in Chapters Five and Six respectively. The 
term ‘discourse’ is used throughout in the light of the characteristics that 
Foucault attributes to it. 
  
  
   --------------------------------------------- 
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CHAPTER THREE: ‘THE GIFT OF HEAVEN’   
                                    
 
                 
May the bright example be fairly transcribed on the hearts and reduced into 
practice by every Virginian, by every American. May our hearts be open to 
receive, and our arms strong to defend, that liberty and freedom, the gift of 
Heaven, now banishing from its last retreat in Europe. Here let it be hospitably 
entertained in every breast; here let it take deep root, flourish in everlasting 
bloom; that, under its benign influence, the virtuously free may enjoy secure 
repose, and stand forth the scourge and terror of tyranny and tyrants of every 














                                                
1 ‘Address of the Freeholders of Augusta County to Virginia’s Continental Congress Delegates, February, 
1775’, American Archives: Documents of the American Revolution 1774–1776. 
http://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/cgi-bin/philogic/contextualize.pl?  




America’s understanding of one of the core elements of its founding doctrine is 
an integral part of its self-consciousness and the ultimate source of its sense of 
purpose and normative vision. The characteristics of freedom at the time of 
America’s founding provide the benchmark by which it is possible to evaluate 
contemporary interpretations of freedom as manifested through events, 
practices, and policies. The dominant understanding of what freedom means 
reveals something not only about America’s values but, more crucially, about the 
values of its leaders and government. For the administration of President George 
W. Bush, which placed the ‘Freedom Agenda’ at its core, the founding paradigm 
of freedom constitutes an essential source of legitimacy. As previously 
mentioned, the administration made repeated references to the ideal of freedom 
that animated the founders; there was a continual reaching back into America’s 
past in order to demonstrate that the then current commitment of the 
administration to ‘freedom’ chimed with those of the past. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to consider the philosophical 
influences that animated and inspired the American Revolutionaries and the 
founders of the Republic as they sought to define an ideal of freedom suitable to 
their circumstances. The success of those endeavours is evidenced by the power 
of that ideal (‘the gift of Heaven’), which stretches from the late-eighteenth 
century until the present. The ideas of the theorists that are discussed in Section 
II below are important because they helped to form the bedrock upon which the 
defining idea of freedom at the time of the founding was constructed 
This chapter also considers two competing interpretative paradigms of the 
founding doctrine itself, that is, what might be termed the Lockean ‘liberal’ 
interpretation and that of the ‘republican virtue’ tradition. Each of these 
paradigms carries within it an implicit philosophy of freedom which is 
considered below in the light of the analytical framework established in the 
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preceding chapter. Conclusions are then drawn as to which paradigm eventually 
prevailed and dominated, becoming the foundation of the American tradition of 
liberty, and the nature of the freedom that is embedded within that tradition. It is 
against these conclusions about the character of the American tradition of liberty 
that the thesis considers the discourse of freedom that was such a distinctive 
feature of the Bush administration. 
  It is difficult to disentangle the American concept of freedom from the 
ideology of the Revolution itself and the founding of the Republic. The 
historiography of the Revolution is a crowded and much contested field, and the 
task of isolating ‘freedom’ in this context is made more difficult by the fact that, 
whilst in many senses it was the core element of the ideology of the Revolution 
and beyond, it has seldom been treated as such by historians. Until quite 
recently, the dominant focus of debate within historical explanation has been 
between the two competing interpretative paradigms referred to above. In both 
forms of explanation, freedom, as an abstract or philosophical concept which 
may of itself have crucially different meanings and roots, is something of a 
neglected area of study compared to interpretations of the political and economic 
influences that underpinned the founding doctrine itself. 2 
This chapter makes no attempt to provide an abbreviated ideological 
history of the American Revolution or the founding of the Republic and nor does 
it consider how the founders grappled with the exercise and distribution of 
power and representation, except in so far as those issues bore upon the ideas of 
political and civic freedom. Neither – except where there are obvious overlaps –  
does this chapter dwell in any detail upon the always important narrative of 
religious freedom. It is well known that the history of liberty, in the seventeenth 
                                                
2 Recent histories, for example, have tended to focus upon the crucial role of slavery in the American 
Revolution and the making of the Constitution. See for example Lawrence Goldstone, Dark Bargain: 
Slavery, Profits, and the Struggle for the Constitution (New York: Walker and Co., 2007), and Robin L. 
Einhorn, American Taxation, American Slavery (London: University of Chicago Press, 2007). It may be 
argued that it was because the Revolution placed such emphasis on freedom that slavery became such a 
problem for the founders. See Gordon S. Wood, ‘Reading the Founders’ Minds,’ New York Review of 
Books, 28 June 2007, p. 63.    
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century at least, was one in which the issues of civil and religious liberties were 
intimately entwined. Indeed, it was Milton who, in 1659, allegedly first wrote 
and had printed any of the phrases that, in the centuries ahead, would be used to 
bracket civil with religious liberty.3 The drive for religious freedom was a major 
element of the Puritan Revolution and inspired many of the first pilgrims to 
America. Any discussion of liberty in the seventeenth century, either in England 
or America, would therefore need to treat civil and religious liberty as 
inseparable. It is possible to argue that in the later part of the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries however, some Enlightenment values had taken root, 
man was credited with reason and free will, and God was something of a lighter 
presence, no longer the ‘despot’ of the seventeenth century. Whilst freedom of 
religion was an essential plank of the founding doctrine, it is clear that neither 
the founders nor their immediate successors felt that the State had the right or 
authority to enforce the claims of an absolute metaphysical or religious truth. 
Liberty therefore had become more of a political and civil issue. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this chapter is principally concerned with the 
secular aspects of the American tradition of liberty, freedom of religion as 
embodied in the founding doctrine is nevertheless important for certain aspects 
of this thesis. In their belief that the State should keep out of the business of 
propagating faith, the founders paved the way for a religious pluralism in which 
state power has no place in determining religious truth. The founding doctrine, 
in this respect, provided for what Simon Schama called ‘the coexistence of 
conflicting versions of the best way to redemption’ and, by not choosing any 
faith, encouraged them all; faith and freedom were thus mutually nourishing.4 
The extent to which the Bush administration attempted to circumvent this 
tradition is discussed in Chapter Six. 
                                                
3 Blair Warden, ‘Milton and Liberty’, paper presented at Yale University, Civil and Religious Liberty: 
Ideas of Rights and Tolerance in England c 1640 –1800, 25–26 July 2008, p. 1. 
4 Simon Schama, The American Future: A History (London: The Bodley Head, 2008), p. 148. 
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This chapter is primarily concerned, however, with attempting to locate and 
define the origins of a particular political and social good: the American idea of 
freedom as it was expressed and felt by the leading figures of the time, the 
pamphleteers, the theorists, writers, and activists who made up American 
political society. The relationship between Britain and America prior to the 
American Revolution means that it will principally be the ideas of major English 
and American theorists whose ideas of freedom will be considered in terms of 
historical influence.  Due to obvious constraints of space and focus, there are 
inevitable gaps; too much may be made of one theorist and not enough of 
another, and some important contributions  overlooked altogether. Nevertheless, 
it is possible to identify a flavour, an essence, a number of basic tenets, which 
comprised the American concept of freedom at the end of the eighteenth century 
and which fed into the competing interpretative paradigms referred to.   
Section II below focuses upon the ideas of a few early prominent theorists. 
These have been selected not only for their undoubted contribution to the debate 
about the nature of freedom in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but 
also for their considerable influence upon American political thought, namely: 
John Locke, Richard Price, Edmund Burke, Joseph Priestley, and Tom Paine. This 
is of course by no means an exhaustive list, but the purpose here is to identify 
strands of thought about freedom as articulated by the most prominent and 
influential theorists, rather than an attempt to describe the contributions of all 
those who participated in the debate about what, ideally, it meant to be free at 
the time of the American Revolution and beyond.  
Section III refers to the ideas of freedom embodied in the republican virtue  
tradition, especially those of the seventeenth century Commonwealthmen such 
as Algernon Sidney as well as later theorists such as John Trenchard and Thomas 
Gordon. This republican, or civic humanist, interpretation of Revolutionary 
ideology is the subject of considerable controversy in the historiography of the 
Revolution and the founding. The main elements of that controversy are 
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considered and evaluated in Section IV. Section V summarises the conclusions 
that can be reached about interpretative paradigms of the founding doctrine, and 
the nature of freedom embedded within them.  
 
 
II THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN FREEDOM – EARLY 
MAJOR  THEORISTS 
 
As mentioned earlier, the theorists discussed in this section are by no means an 
exhaustive list of those whose ideas concerning freedom influenced the founders 
of the Republic. No consideration for example has been given to the ideas of 
William Godwin or his wife Mary Wollstonecraft (whose A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman: with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects (1792) sold widely 
in America), John Wilkes or James Burgh, or, perhaps most notably, Adam 
Smith. This is not because their ideas were not important or influential, but 
because they do not bear so directly upon the American ideal of freedom as some 
other theorists. Each of the theorists considered in this section contributed ideas 
concerning freedom that fed into the two main interpretative paradigms of the 
founding discussed in Section IV.  
America had long had its allure even before the struggle for independence. 
‘In the beginning, all the world was America’ claimed John Locke (1632–1704).5 
Sometimes thought of as the ‘father’ of the Enlightenment, Locke’s long term 
influence upon American political thought was immense. Jefferson, for example, 
repeatedly declared his philosophic allegiance to Locke, from whom he derived 
not only some of his political theory but all the beginnings of his theory of 
knowledge.6 The language of what is now called Lockean liberalism was 
                                                
5 Cited in Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World,(London: Allen Lane, 
2000), p. 402. 
6 Henry F. May, The Enlightenment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 293. 
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especially evident in the rhetoric of the revolutionary period. James Otis’s The 
Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764), Richard Bland’s An Inquiry 
into the Rights of the British Colonies (1772), and, of course, Thomas Jefferson’s 
Declaration of Independence (1776) are all grounded in the writings of Locke.7 
Locke was an early propagator of empiricism, an advocate of the superiority of 
reason and experience over innate ideas and moral absolutes. In terms of his 
political ideas, his most important work was Two Treatises of Government, 
published in 1689 but written previously largely in response to Charles II’s 
ruthless purge of the Whigs and the Exclusion Crisis which sought to exclude 
James, Duke of York, from inheriting the throne. The Two Treatises attacks the 
monarchical absolutism that had hitherto prevailed, and maintains that man is 
by nature free and equal. This is his condition in the ‘state of nature’ prior to his 
entry, by means of contract, into political society. Locke, a natural law theorist, 
believed that there was a body of laws and rights that transcended human 
regimes that came from God and were discernible through reason – a gift from 
God. That the natural law tradition was a key influence upon American thought 
is apparent in the American Declaration of Independence, which asserts that 
certain truths about man’s fundamental status are ‘self evident’. 
For Locke, man’s civil liberty constitutes part of his moral liberty. He 
constantly counterpoises the life of the autonomous being with the almost less-
than-human life of someone who is a mere instrument of another; the political 
relation of ruler-citizen is contrasted with the sub-political relation of master-
slave. Locke continually uses the word ‘arbitrary’ to characterise the irrational, 
coercive nature of masters and tyrants.8 Liberty consists in being free of the 
arbitrary will of another. In legitimately based civil society we obey only 
                                                
7 Isaac Kramnick, ‘Ideological Background’, in A Companion to the American Revolution, ed. by Jack P. 
Greene and J. R. Pole (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2000), pp. 88–93 (p. 89). The Declaration, in its 
form and phraseology, follows closely certain sentences in Locke’s Second Treatise. Some of Locke’s 
phrases appear in Jefferson’s own writing. See Carl L. Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study 
in the History of Political Ideas (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 37. 
8 ‘Introduction’, in Two Treatises of Government  by John Locke, ed. by Mark Goldie (London, Orion 
Publishing Group, 1998), pp. xv–xliii (p. xxxi).  
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ourselves because we have consented to the laws that, if they are good laws, are 
not restrictions but enlargements of freedom.9 In this regard at least – although 
there are many differences in their respective ideas about freedom – Locke was 
almost at one with Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), who claimed that to demand 
complete freedom in the sense of exemption from laws was absurd. For this, 
according to Hobbes, is to demand a return to the state of nature and a call for 
what is effectively slavery, since it is to ask for that form of liberty ‘by which all 
other men may be masters’ of our lives.10    
Arbitrary power and the nature of tyranny are two strands of concern that 
are constantly evidenced in the work of early theorists of freedom. These 
concerns were very much at the forefront of American thinkers during the 
eighteenth century and Locke is an early exemplar of influential thinking in these 
areas. One of the most controversial features of the Two Treatises at the time was 
the right which Locke suggests a free people have to rebel against their rulers if 
the latter break the trust placed in them and lapse into tyranny. As political 
legitimacy rests upon consent, if the ruler betrays that trust then the ruled had a 
right to rebel.11 A tyrant has no authority and it is tyrants who are the true 
rebels.12 The freedom of the people to withdraw their consent to the way in 
which they are governed and to act against tyranny therefore underpins Locke’s 
ideas of political freedom. 
A parallel theme within Locke’s defence of freedom rested upon his theory 
of property. Locke believed that man has a property in his own person (given to 
him by God) and to this person no body has any right but himself. Likewise, the 
individual is entitled to the product of his labour and in so far as he mixes his 
labour with a natural resource – the land for example – then he is entitled to 
                                                
9 Locke, Two Treatises of  Government, pp. 125–26, 142. 
10 Quentin Skinner, ‘Thomas Hobbes on the Proper Signification of Liberty’ Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society,  40, (1990), pp. 121–151 (p. 147). 
11 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, pp. 226–27, 239. 
12 Dunn, Locke, p. 55. 
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regard the results as his own property.13 The reliance many Revolutionary 
theorists and pamphleteers placed upon Locke’s theory of property (section V of 
the Second Treatise) in developing concepts of individual freedom, and the impact 
of Lockean thought generally upon the Revolutionaries, forms a continuing 
controversy in terms of the historiography of the founding doctrine, and indeed 
attracted the ire of Leo Strauss, the philosopher who exerted the greatest 
influence upon neoconservative thought. Strauss’s view of Locke’s theory of 
property and its impact are discussed in Chapter Four.  
Louis Hartz argues that Locke’s ideas about the nature of freedom and 
property and the rights of the citizen gave rise to a Lockean liberal ideology in 
America that persists to the present. Hartz suggests that America has an 
‘absolute and irrational’ attachment to Locke that is the secret root of many of 
America’s puzzling phenomena, including an isolationist distrust of the wider 
world.14 Hartz argues that the compulsive power of Lockean liberalism is so 
great that it has posed, ironically, a threat to liberty itself. Whatever the truth of 
this claim, Locke’s enormous influence upon American political thought is 
undeniable. It is over his ideas, perhaps more than those of any other theorist, 
that the interpretative battle lines of the founding doctrine, between liberalism 
and the potentially more authoritarian ideology of republican virtue, have been 
drawn.      
Linked closely with Locke’s ideas, and indeed someone who claimed that 
his principles were ‘the same with those taught by Mr Locke’,15 was Dr Richard 
Price (1723–91), a dissenting radical and divine and, alongside Joseph Priestley, 
one of the best known British dissenting friends of the American Revolution. 
Producing a Lockean defence of American independence, he hailed the 
Revolution with ‘heart-felt satisfaction. I see the revolution in favour of universal 
                                                
13 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, p. 128. 
14 Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, p. 9. 
15 Ian Hampsher-Monk, ‘British Radicalism and the anti-Jacobins’, in The Cambridge History of 
Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, ed. by Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), pp.660–683 (p. 671). 
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liberty which has taken place in America; a revolution which opens a new 
prospect in human affairs, and begins a new era in the history of mankind’.16 
Price had the ear of, and was in lengthy and detailed correspondence with, 
Washington, Jefferson and John Winthrop.17  He wrote three successful 
pamphlets on the American Revolution; the first, entitled Observations on the 
Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the 
War with America, written in 1776, sold over sixty thousand copies in six 
months.18 Freedom for Price was sacred: ‘It is the foundation of all honour and 
the chief privilege and glory of our nature’.19 
In Observations, Price suggests that the nature of freedom can be considered 
under four heads – physical, moral, religious and civil – and running through 
each is his conception of freedom as self-direction, or self-government. 
Extraneous power over self directed action amounted to slavery, but moral 
liberty was freedom to pursue a higher self, identified with our rational natures, 
and in this respect Price suggests that freedom falls within Berlin’s ‘positive’ 
definition of the term. It is noteworthy too that Price’s concept of freedom chimes 
closely with that of Rousseau (1712–1778), whose work entitled The Social 
Contract, published in 1762, was often credited with being the intellectual 
mainspring of the French Revolution.  
What Price emphasised was that civil freedom is the highest value of a civil 
society in a similar way to which moral freedom is for the individual. Individual 
freedom is the power to do as one pleases when not bound or restricted by 
ignorance or any of the base desires. To be free is to fulfil the potential of one’s 
higher nature; and to be able to act in accordance with knowledge of right and 
                                                
16 Quoted in Porter, Enlightenment, p. 402. 
17 Bernard Peach, Richard Price and the Ethical Foundations of the American Revolution, p. 11.  
18 Ibid., p. 9. 
19 Cited in Ibid., p. 69. 
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wrong. Knowledge and autonomy are the equally essential components of 
freedom.20   
In his thinking about the justice of the American cause, Price maintained his 
belief in the value of ethical considerations and the fundamental role played by 
reason. The colonists were ‘fighting on their own ground, within sight of their 
houses and their families, and for that sacred blessing of liberty without which 
man is a beast and government a curse’.21 In accordance with his ideas about 
individual freedom comprising self-direction and self-government, Price 
identified civil freedom as the capacity of members of communities to govern 
and make laws for themselves. The appropriate body for fulfilling civil freedom 
through popular self-government was, naturally enough, the elective body of 
legislative representatives, provided it ‘fairly and adequately represented the 
community it served’.22 Agreeing with Locke, however, Price rejected the idea of 
‘the omnipotence of parliament’, all government was ‘in the very nature of it, a 
trust’, subordinate to the powers the community delegated to them and if that 
trust was contradicted they (the government) ‘betray their constituents and 
dissolve themselves’.23   
Importantly, too, Price identified and supported a basic suspicion of the 
nature of government that chimed with American political thought at the time of 
the Revolution and persists today. He identified the British government with 
corruption, intrigue and privilege, and therefore, like most radicals of the day, 
advocated a minimal role for it. Properly considered, it was ‘nothing but an 
institution for guarding against the invasion of properties and lives’; its function 
was to ensure the security in which freedom could flourish.24  
                                                
20 Peach, Richard Price, p. 11. 
21 Cited in ibid., p. 24. 
22 Cited in David Lieberman, ‘The Mixed Constitution and the Common Law’, in The Cambridge History 
of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, pp.317–340 (p. 339). 
23 Cited in ibid., p. 324. 
24 Ian Hampsher-Monk, ‘British Radicalism and the anti-Jacobins’, p. 660. 
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In 1789, at the meeting of the Revolution Society (named in honour of the 
1688 Glorious Revolution), Price preached a sermon that was to prove 
incendiary. Welcoming the French Revolution, Price insisted that the true 
meaning of 1688 was not only religious liberty but the right to dismiss one’s 
governors. America had been set free and France had now turned upon its 
despotic regime. Britain needed to complete the task begun by the men of 1688. 
This sermon inspired Edmund Burke’s great anti-Revolutionary polemic 
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), which in turn provoked a memorable 
response from Tom Paine, amongst others, as discussed below. 
A friend of Richard Price and a fellow radical Dissenter was the scientist 
and Presbyterian minister, Joseph Priestley (1733–1804). An active political 
theorist, Priestley, like other Dissenters, openly supported the American 
rebellion and was severely critical of his government’s policies. Standing firmly 
in the natural law tradition of utilitarianism, Priestley, in his way, represented 
the plain man’s Enlightenment. Truth was simple and accessible, open to all. He 
took for granted the existence of a natural divinely inspired moral order, and 
believed that moral laws had been designed by a benevolent creator to promote 
the happiness of man.25 Unlike Burke, with whom he profoundly disagreed, 
Priestley endorsed new institutions, and fought against the mystification of 
power. Materialism and the new sciences would deliver happiness to society. 
Enlightenment would abet mankind and liberty would deliver enlightenment. 
Priestley saw an intimate connection between the practice and culture of science 
as redemptive agents of a transformed political life, achieved through the 
progress of the intellect. (This view is in marked contrast to the neoconservative 
attitude towards science which prevailed under the Bush administration – see 
Chapter Six). 
 
                                                
25 Margaret Canovan, ‘The Un-Benthamite Utilitarianism of Joseph Priestley’, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 45 (1984), pp. 435 – 450 (p. 437).  
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The paramount values for Priestley were mental autonomy and happiness. 
In a strand of thought that found a strong echo in the Declaration of 
Independence, Priestley claimed ‘Happiness is in truth the only object of 
legislation of intrinsic value, and what is called political liberty is only one of the 
means of obtaining this end’.26 He thus anticipated Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) 
in his view that the proper subject of government was to promote the happiness 
of the greatest number of its subjects, and no prescriptive rights or a priori limits 
should obscure that end.  
What underpinned Priestley’s belief in the value of freedom was a form of 
utilitarianism. He perceived it as not only a natural right – no element of which 
could be ceded without conditions – but also as the most efficient medium 
through which the greatest happiness of the greatest number could be delivered. 
Free thought and religious toleration must promote the greatest happiness 
because they were necessary for human perfection.27 Priestley’s belief in freedom 
was therefore grounded in his view that it was a precondition for moral and 
general progress. Freedom could be justified on instrumental grounds.28 
Priestley, it can be argued, established himself as a seminal influence upon 
the political thinking of his time. His belief in a republican form of government 
and individual freedom chimed closely with that of Price, and indeed Paine. His 
belief in limited government, and his wariness concerning government 
‘meddling’ in the private lives of individuals – governments should only act in 
any affair when it is clear it can do so effectively – found a ready American 
audience as well as appealing to radical English dissent.29 Price, for example, 
stated that in politics ‘he [Priestley] and I are perfectly at one’ and Benjamin 
Franklin, in 1782, continued to express his respect for Priestley and ‘all the honest 
Souls that meet in the London Coffee-House. I only wonder how it happened,’ he 
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wrote, ‘that they and my other Friends in England came to be such good 
Creatures in the midst of so perverse a Generation’.30        
Burke’s influence upon American political thought and the nature of 
freedom are perhaps more difficult to define than that of Locke, Price, Paine or 
Priestley, whose ideas are more easily evident. American anti-Jacobinism 
developed a few years later than its English equivalent, but by the end of the 
eighteenth century, many Americans had moved away from any admiration of 
the French Revolution that, due to its overthrow of tyranny, had initially been 
felt. Although Burke’s views on the French Revolution began, eventually, to find 
some favour with Revolutionary Americans, his attachment to the monarchy and 
other institutions of State made him initially somewhat unsympathetic to 
American sensibilities, despite his qualified support for their cause. Anti-
Jacobinism, to be really effective, had to be built on impeccably republican 
credentials, and Burke, in this respect at least, was no exemplar. And yet Burke is 
important in the development of ideas about the nature of freedom in America in 
two senses. Firstly, by the end of the eighteenth century, Burke was being quoted 
and admired by conservative Americans who saw Britain as the sole hope for the 
survival of freedom,31and his ideas about the role of institutions as guardians of 
liberty began to find an audience. Secondly, Burke put forward a view of human 
nature and society on which conservatives have drawn and to which they have 
appealed ever since.32 Not only did the political right recruit Burke for their 
purposes during the Cold War, but, it may be argued, Burke’s political ideas are 
reflected to a significant degree in some strands of neoconservative thought, as 
discussed in Chapter Four. 
Burke, in contrast to many other supporters of the American Revolution, 
repudiated some of the Enlightenment’s most cherished tenets. He rejected the 
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idea of progress, and was pessimistic about man’s ability to organise society 
through progressive reform. What he devoted his efforts towards was the 
defence of the social purpose of the State, that he believed was underpinned by 
its institutions of property, monarchy, the aristocracy, and the church 
establishment. Rather like Hegel, he viewed the State itself as sacred, something 
to be regarded with pious awe. God willed the state in order to perfect man’s 
virtue.33 There was, in one sense, no progress, simply a process of restoration, a 
revival of ancient principles to new situations.34 He also rejected the notion of 
natural rights, which could only be realised through the utter destruction of 
society, which in turn rested upon what Ian Hampsher-Monk terms ‘painfully 
acquired conventions’,35 a kind of continuing social contract ‘between those who 
are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’.36   
But freedom was contingent upon order. If he was admiring of America’s 
struggle Burke was withering in his attacks on the French Revolution. The 
French version of liberty was ‘liberty without property, without honour, without 
government, without morals, without order, without security of life’.37 In order 
to gain liberty the French had forfeited order and had thus lost what they set out 
to gain. Burke understood liberty to be a consequence of civil order and personal 
restraint; in no sense was it to be taken as the theoretical foundation of 
government. Unrestricted liberty spelt disaster. ‘But what is liberty without 
wisdom, and without virtue? It is the greatest of all possible evils; for it is folly, 
vice, and madness, without tuition or restraint’.38   
Although Burke maintained that liberty was a birthright and that all who 
desire liberty deserve it, this too was a qualified right. To have the right to liberty 
men must submit to the rational. ‘Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact 
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proportion to their disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites […] 
Society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed 
somewhere, and the less of it there is within, the more there may be without. It is 
ordained in the eternal constitution of things that men of intemperate minds 
cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters.’39  
The problem of freedom, for Burke, lay in the fact that it entailed the power 
to do good or evil; its essence, (as discussed in the previous chapter) 
presupposed choice. Such a choice could only be available to the rational – the 
irrational may well make the ‘wrong’ choice, leading to misrule and excess. 
Freedom must therefore be combined with government, public force, morality, 
and religion. Civil and social manners must prevail, combined with the solidity 
of property and inequality.40 Freedom must therefore always be balanced by 
order (a notion that appealed strongly to President Bush’s first Attorney General, 
John Ashcroft – see Chapter Six).  
Where Burke appears to resonate particularly with neoconservative 
thought, is in his attitude towards the sublime. In discussing our responses to the 
sublime and the beautiful, Burke suggests that the qualities which arouse our 
sense of the beautiful are excited by the small, the polished, the light, the delicate, 
all of which, in terms of Lockean philosophy, are capable of being known since 
they can give rise to ‘clear and determinate’ ideas.41 More powerful responses are 
produced by the sublime, induced by the vast, the great, the gloomy, and the 
massive. The effect of the sublime is astonishment, admiration, reverence, and 
respect.42 Burke translates these feelings to the political realm. It is the huge 
power that emanates from monarchs and the institutions of State that inspire the 
same kind of awe that man feels before the power of God. Thus it is on the effects 
of the sublime, the awesome and the powerful that political society depends. 
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Mere rationalism fails to motivate the populace; it needs to be inspired, and kept 
in awe. Reason needs to be overwhelmed, and the simplistic rationalisations of 
the individual mind overcome in the interests of freedom, order, and society. 
Clear echoes of these aspects of Burke’s political thought can be detected in, for 
example, the ideas of Irving Kristol and Allan Bloom, which are discussed in 
Chapter Four.  
If Burke had Richard Price in his sights when he wrote Reflections, Tom 
Paine (1737–1809) was most certainly responding to Burke in perhaps his most 
famous work Rights of Man (1791–2). Paine was a great influence upon late- 
eighteenth-century American political thought and was by far the most effective 
prophet of what Henry May calls the ‘Revolutionary Enlightenment’.43 At the 
encouragement of Franklin, whom he met in London, Paine emigrated to 
America in 1774, where he began his career as a revolutionary writer and 
pamphleteer. His greatest contribution, according to Eric Foner, lay in his role as 
the pioneer of a new political language and the expansion of the ‘public 
sphere’.44 Paine’s strength lay in his ability to appeal to ordinary readers, to the 
mass of common people. This was evidenced by the phenomenal sales of his 
pamphlet Common Sense (1776), in which he articulated his Revolutionary 
ideology. Running to twenty-five editions in a year, its influence impressed even 
George Washington, who wrote to a friend: ‘I find that Common Sense is working 
a powerful change here in the minds of many men’.45 
The intellectual core of Paine’s ideology as expressed in Common Sense was 
that the traditional concept that a ‘balanced’ constitution was a prerequisite for 
liberty was a fallacy. The complex constitution of England, claimed Paine, was 
based upon tyranny: that of the King combined with the aristocracy. The 
freedom of England depended upon the virtue of the commons. What liberty 
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there was in England was ‘wholly owing to the constitution of the people and 
not to the constitution of the government’.46 Crucially, Common Sense not only 
advocated independence for the American colonies, but it also advocated a 
republican form of government as the best means of securing liberty. In America, 
Paine argued, institutions should be devised that conform to the true principles 
of liberty, not to inherited privileges and accidents of history. What Paine had 
grasped was that for the first time the people had entered politics as a force, and 
that their participation was not a temporary aberration, but constituted a 
permanent change in the political process.47  
Paine’s political ideas revolved around the best means of securing and 
maintaining freedom for the individual both in terms of conscience and 
membership of civil and political society. Eric Foner has pointed out that Paine’s 
ideas about the nature of freedom were highly reminiscent of the Leveller idea of 
freedom, characterised as ‘possessive individualism’.48 Freedom was equated 
with rights. ‘I consider freedom as personal property’, Paine declared, insisting 
that ‘whenever I use the term freedom or rights, I desire to be understood to mean 
a perfect equality of them’.49   
Paine’s concept of freedom is frequently invoked through the use of 
metaphor. In Common Sense he portrays freedom as being hunted round the 
globe, and finally finding refuge in America. Freedom belongs to the common 
man, not only to the ruling elite: 
 
Freedom is the associate of innocence not the companion of suspicion. She only requires 
to be cherished, not to be caged, and to be beloved is to her to be protected. Her residence 
is in the undistinguished multitude of rich and poor, and a partisan to neither is the 
patroness of all. She connects herself with man as God made him, not as fortune altered 
him, and continues with him while he continues to be just and civil.50      
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Freedom, then, is not in the gift of government, it is the natural right of all 
men. When discussing freedom of conscience, for example, Paine observes that  
in America, unlike England, such freedom is not granted as a favour, but 
confirmed as a right.  
Through Rights of Man Paine attacked Burke’s claim that natural and civil 
rights were incompatible. Alongside Mary Wollstonecraft, whose Vindications of 
the Rights of Men was published in 1790, Paine claimed that far from being 
antithetical ‘every civil right has for its foundation some natural right pre-
existing in the individual’, the enjoyment of which requires protection. As 
Wollstonecraft herself pointed out, natural right was ‘such a degree of liberty, 
civil and religious, as is compatible with the liberty of every other individual […] 
and the continued existence of the social compact’.51 Together they also mounted 
their belief in progress as a counter to Burke’s claims for precedent, attempting a 
generalised deconstruction of the reverence he urged for inherited institutions. 
Precedent for Paine was that ‘vain presumption of governing from beyond the 
grave’, epitomising a further constraint upon freedom.52 
Influential though Rights of Man was, Paine himself was perhaps proudest 
of Common Sense. It was a pamphlet debated and discussed for years after 
American independence was proclaimed, and in the words of Richard Carlile, 
one of Paine’s nineteenth-century admirers, it ‘[made] clear to the humblest 
perceptions the rational road to freedom […] and happiness’.53 Whilst Paine 
foresaw some of the flaws of the democratic system of government, including 
what he described as ‘the despotism of numbers’, he succeeded, in language that 
could appeal to the common man, in dismantling the traditional justifications for 
monarchy and aristocracy.54 He advocated strong effective government, but also 
government that was limited in scope and strictly accountable to its citizens. He 
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was in favour of property, for a free and prosperous society required the widest 
possible spread of private ownership. He supported unbridled freedom of 
assembly and speech but not its licentious abuse.55  
When the American Revolution ended, Paine affirmed that it had 
‘contributed more to enlighten the world and diffuse a spirit of freedom and 
liberality among mankind, than any human event’.56 Paine’s legacy is 
considerable. Henry Collins suggests that although the Declaration of 
Independence was written by Thomas Jefferson, it conveyed, in thought and 
style, the indelible imprint of Common Sense.57 Even today Paine is laid claim to 
by both the political left and right, and his ideas and rhetoric remain influential.58   
 
III THE COMMONWEALTHMEN 
 
Whilst each of the theorists discussed above made significant contributions to the 
foundations of American notions of freedom, there was another tradition of 
thought that American revolutionaries also drew upon, which also influenced 
men like Paine. What brought together a number of disparate strands of thought  
that ran through the hundreds of pamphlets, journals and articles extant in 
Revolutionary America was a group of writers whose ideas overlapped with 
some of those mentioned above, but which were nevertheless distinctive. These 
were known as the Commonwealthmen, so named because the origins of their 
thinking lay in the English Commonwealth period of the seventeenth century. A 
more permanent form of these ideas found expression in the early eighteenth 
century, in the writings of the Real Whigs and opposition theorists. This 
grouping claimed kinship with the luminaries of republican thought of the 
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seventeenth century like Milton, Harrington, Sidney, and others. Whilst the 
colonists identified themselves with these seventeenth-century heroes, they felt 
closer to their successors of the early-eighteenth century, and although, as later 
discussed, this is not an uncontested claim, it was this grouping of writers, 
according to Bernard Bailyn, that shaped the mind of the American 
Revolutionary generation.59 From the writings of the English 
Commonwealthmen, Bailyn suggests, colonial pamphleteers had put together a 
social theory ‘that stressed the eternal opposition of liberty and authority, the 
aggressive nature of power, and the dependence of the common good upon a 
delicate constitutional balance of the one, the few and the many’.60    
These English radicals, men like Robert Molesworth, John Trenchard, 
Thomas Gordon, Henry Neville, and John Toland, continued to study 
government in the spirit of their seventeenth-century forebears. The sacred canon 
revered by them retained enormous revolutionary potential, and included the 
works of Harrington, Nedham, and Milton. The American constitution, as 
Caroline Robbins emphasises, employs many of the devices that the Real Whigs 
vainly besought Englishmen to adopt, including, for example, a demand for 
increased liberty of conscience and an extended franchise.61 
To the colonists, the most popular of this grouping, the promoters of 
extreme libertarianism, were John Trenchard (1662–1723), and Thomas Gordon 
(1692–1750). Together they wrote Cato’s Letters, published between 1720 and 
1723. This indictment of eighteenth-century politics and society which, in 
America was repeatedly published whole or in part, was thought to be held in 
half of all private libraries of colonial America. Referred to frequently in the 
pamphlet literature, the writings of Trenchard and Gordon ranked with the 
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treatises of Locke as the most authoritative statements on the nature of political 
liberty.62 What Gordon and Trenchard argued was that in politics, reliance 
should be placed upon constitutional liberty, freedom of speech, and the virtue 
of the people. 
In both Cato’s Letters and The Independent Whig (the latter also enjoyed a 
wide circulation), the authors stressed their belief that all men were naturally 
good and that citizens became restless only when they were oppressed. Echoing 
Locke, the writers maintained that without the right of resistance men could not 
protect their liberty. Cato paired liberty and equality together and since the 
greatest danger to liberty, and thus to the equality of the people, came from their 
leaders, the people must constantly be on their guard against those who came to 
power and usurped the liberty of the people by stealth.63  
It is the claim of Bernard Bailyn and Caroline Robbins, amongst others, that 
one of the great achievements of the Commonwealthmen was that in 
maintaining a link between the English struggles against tyranny in one century, 
and American efforts for independence in another, they helped to facilitate an 
oppositional politics which provided a harmonising force for other radical and 
dissenting ideas held by the American Revolutionary generation. They kept 
alive, for over a century, through constant restatement, concepts of liberty that 
proved suitable for transplant to the new Republic and which influenced the 
founders.64 It was they who helped to place freedom at the heart of the 
Revolutionary agenda, turning it from a right granted by power to the granter of 
power itself. It was the indispensable starting point for a new form of 
government. As James Madison put it in 1792: 
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In Europe, charters of liberty have been granted by power. America has set the 
example and France has followed it, of charters of power granted by liberty. This 
revolution in the practice of the world may, with an honest praise, be 
pronounced the most triumphant epoch of its history and the most consoling 
presage of its happiness.65 
 
 
Freedom, in the philosophy of the Commonwealthmen, inhered naturally in 
the people and was their individual possession and interest. Freedom served the 
interests of the governed. Those who held power did not speak for it, and, 
importantly, neither did they necessarily serve it. As the English essayist William 
Hazlitt (1778–1830), phrased it: ‘Their [the Commonwealthmen’s] sympathy was 
with the oppressed. They cherished in their thoughts and wished to transmit to 
their posterity those rights and privileges for which their ancestors had died on 
the scaffold or had pined in dungeons or in foreign climes’.66 
The ideas of the Commonwealthmen combined strands of thought derived 
from Aristotle, Cicero and, especially, Machiavelli. Otherwise known as civic 
humanism, it conceived of man as a political being whose realisation of self 
occurs only through participation in public life, through active citizenship in a 
republic. For Revolutionary republicans the public good was the exclusive end of 
government. Government had no other purpose but the welfare of the people. 
But because the State was utterly dependent upon the people, and there could be 
no coercion from above, the laws of a free government had to be obeyed by the 
people for the sake of conscience. True liberty, said Philip Payson in a sermon 
preached in Boston in 1778, was ‘natural liberty restrained in such a manner as to 
render society one great family; where everyone must consult his neighbour’s 
happiness as well as his own’.67 In other words, this form of republicanism rested 
upon the concept of public virtue. In a monarchy, so the argument ran, each 
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man’s desire to do what he wished could be restrained by fear or force. In a 
republic however, each man must somehow be persuaded to submerge his 
personal wants and desires in order to promote the greater good of all. In a clear 
echo of Machiavelli, this willingness of the individual to sacrifice his private 
interests for the good of the community was termed ‘public virtue’ in the 
seventeenth century and it was a concept carried forward by the 
Commonwealthmen and the radical republicans.68 For these Revolutionaries, 
including, for example, Paine, who maintained that public good grew out of the 
private virtue of individuals: ‘the happiness of every individual depended on the 
happiness of society’. ‘Public good’, he went on, ‘is not a term opposed to the 
good of individuals; on the contrary it is the good of every individual 
collected’.69      
These ideas, together with those of the theorists and pamphleteers who 
propagated them, harked back to a classical republicanism (the ‘republican 
virtue’ tradition) which was, claim some historians, a key influence upon 
America’s founding doctrine. As discussed below, the extent of this influence is a 
matter of some dispute, but its relevance in terms of defining some key attributes 
and characteristics of freedom is clear. 
 
IV  REPUBLICANISM AND LIBERALISM 
 
As is apparent from the previous two sections, ideas about the nature of freedom 
were assimilated by the Revolutionaries and the founders from a variety of 
sources and these ideas bled into aspects of the founding doctrine itself. 
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Historians have tended to interpret the fundamental shape and character of that 
doctrine in two ways. These interpretative paradigms are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, although there is a tendency by historians to treat them as 
such. The fact that competing interpretative paradigms exist within the 
historiography of the Revolution and the founding is important, because each 
carries within it an implicit philosophy of freedom that can be subjected to the 
analytical framework established in the previous chapter.  
The promotion of one interpretative paradigm at the expense of another has 
resonances beyond historians. Such interpretations are absorbed by, amongst 
others, contemporary political theorists who wish to influence party or 
government policy and need to ground their ideas in America’s mythic past. The 
interpretative dispute itself may be considered secondary to its contemporary 
significance. The founding doctrine contains a wealth of ideals, values, and 
norms and the appropriation of those values is a political objective. According to 
the historian Steve Pincus, for example, republicanism has been used as a means 
of attacking modern liberal individualism, as well as social democratic and 
Marxist explanatory traditions.70 This is a particularly pertinent point in view of 
the fact that much of neoconservative thought, the subject of the next chapter, is, 
according to at least two neoconservative theorists, grounded in the republican 
virtue tradition. 71 
The traditional interpretative paradigm is that the Revolution and the 
founding embraced a liberal doctrine, reflecting most closely the views of Locke. 
In 1972, however, Robert Shalhope, in his influential essay ‘Towards a 
Republican Synthesis’, referred to above, gave formal analytical and conceptual 
identity to an idea of ‘republicanism’ that, given a new historical analysis, 
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showed itself to be more than merely a form of government as historians had 
hitherto assumed. This republicanism was revealed to be a dynamic ideology 
with moral dimensions that embraced a particular interpretation of freedom. 
Shalhope identified Caroline Robbins’ work, mentioned above, alongside, in 
particular, Bernard Bailyn’s Pamphlets of the American Revolution 1750–76 (1965),72 
as being seminal in the creation of an emerging republican synthesis. Gordon 
Wood’s The Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787 (1969) outlines, according 
to Shalhope, the main characteristics of this synthesis: ‘Republicanism meant 
maintaining public and private virtue, internal unity, social solidarity, and it 
meant constantly struggling against “threats” to the “republican nature” of the 
republic’.73  
 The republican interpretation of the founding assumed a historiographical 
dominance up until at least 1990, and, some would argue, well beyond. The 
intellectual historian Daniel Rodgers, in considering the rise of the republican 
interpretative paradigm, commented:  
 
The concept of republicanism was one of the success stories of the 1980s. A 
generation ago the term – while not unknown – carried no more freight than 
scores of others in the historical vocabulary….By 1990 it was everywhere and 
organising everything, though perceptibly thinning out, like a nova entering its 
red giant phase.74         
 
Rodgers argues that this was a conceptual transformation of a Kuhnian 
scale in terms of its departure from the previously prevailing Hartzian paradigm  
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that placed Locke at its centre.75 What had been so attractive about Locke for the 
Hartzians claims Rodgers, was that in a sense American society was ‘already 
Lockean in its social marrow: individualistic, ambitious, protocapitalist, and, in a 
word, “liberal”. Hartz’s main argument, which was so influential, was that 
America, without the history of feudalism characteristic of Europe, had not had 
to endure a democratic revolution with the potential to end in the excesses of a 
Robespierre or a Lenin. ‘To invoke Locke,’ Rodgers says, ‘was to invoke a 
Revolution marked by rationality and moderation’.76 The emergence of the 
republican synthesis, which, claimed its exponents, represented an ideology 
involving the very character of American society, clearly undermined this 
Hartzian/Lockean explanatory model.   
Joyce Appleby has considered the way historians have interpreted the 
Revolution and the founding, and has also confirmed that what she terms the 
ideological approach of Bailyn, Wood, and J. G. A. Pocock in particular has been 
at the expense of hitherto dominant ‘liberal’ interpretations; this revision 
challenges the notion that liberalism was the defining ideology that inspired the 
founders.77 Appleby points out that Bailyn, in his research of the pamphlets 
produced during the Revolutionary period, concluded that Americans had 
formed their world view – more particularly, their grasp of political reality – 
from the republicanism of the English Commonwealthmen discussed in Section 
IV above. From these writers, colonial pamphleteers had put together a social 
theory that stressed the eternal opposition of liberty and authority, the 
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aggressive nature of power, and the dependence of the common good upon a 
delicate constitutional balance.78   
In considering Pocock’s analysis, Appleby highlighted the fact that he took 
as his starting point the civic humanism of sixteenth-century Florence, and traced 
it through the political clash between the Court and County parties in 
eighteenth-century England to what he considered the replay of that conflict in 
America in the 1790s.79 The Revolutionaries were heir to a Western tradition that 
started at what Pocock termed the ‘Machiavellian moment’ in sixteenth-century 
Florence, where philosophers enunciated the basic principles of a res republica or 
commonweal in which the virtuous man is concerned primarily with public 
good rather than private or personal ends. The ‘Machiavellian moment’ is the 
name Pocock gives to the point where Machiavelli confronted the fragility of the 
republic, realising that in time republics eventually succumbed to corruption.80 
According to Pocock the founders were heir to this ‘moment’ because they too 
faced a crisis in the relations between personality and society, virtue and 
corruption. He argues that the Revolution and the Constitution that followed it 
form the last act of the civic Renaissance and the ideas of the civic humanist 
tradition, namely a blend of Aristotelian and Machiavellian thought which 
claims that man is by nature a citizen whose virtue and reason can flourish only 
in political associations.81 When the British encroached upon American liberties, 
the appropriate language with which to denounce them was that of the neo-
classical tradition, because the virtue and personal integrity of every American 
were threatened by corruption emanating from a source formerly thought to be 
secure.82 This civic humanist or classical republican tradition of thought held 
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within it a collective ideal of freedom for which citizens would be prepared to 
sacrifice their lives and in which individual freedom was less important than 
collective liberty.83  
What animated the founders, according to the historians identified by 
Shalhope, Appleby, and Dorothy Ross amongst others, was this tradition of 
republicanism, born principally in Renaissance Florence (but with elements from 
classical antiquity such as Cicero), and carried forward by the seventeenth 
century radicals such as Milton, Harrington and Sidney in particular, who, under 
the influence of Machiavelli’s thought, adapted it to a specific English context. 
This significantly English variant of civic humanism became, through the early- 
eighteenth-century writings of Trenchard and Gordon (Cato), the true inspiration 
of the Revolutionaries and was at the heart of the founding doctrine.  
 Lance Banning has argued that the centrality of the classical republican 
model extended through the constitutional period, and beyond. Banning claims 
that theories of classical republicanism helped to define an American character, 
and contributed fundamentally to American constitutional thought.84  
 
Most of the inherited structure of eighteenth-century political thought persisted 
in America for years after 1789. And that persistence was not a matter of a 
shadowy half-life of fragmentary ideas. A structured universe of classical 
thought continued to serve as the intellectual medium through which Americans 
perceived the political world, and an inherited political language was the 
primary vehicle for the expression of their hopes and discontents.85 
 
The emphasis of some historians upon the centrality of classical 
republicanism in interpreting the Revolutionary ideology and the durability of 
its influence is, as mentioned above, a disputed claim. Joyce Appleby, for 
example, has countered the republican interpretative paradigm by suggesting 
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that it overlooks the importance of economics and the arrival of a new striving 
individualism. What the republican revisionists had failed to make allowance 
for, by insisting upon the hegemony of a political tradition that had the greatest 
appeal for elites, was a rival mode of thought associated with economic 
development that had particular appeal for the middle classes. After 
independence in particular, economic change impelled a fundamental 
transformation of ideas. The arrival of free markets and the association of trade 
with natural social order made it possible to democratise liberty. By promoting a 
universal law of self-interest, American radicals were able, as well as justifying a 
revolution against an intrusive sovereign, to offer ordinary people an escape 
from the self-denying virtue of their superiors.86 What the rise of a market society 
and the recognition of self-interest brought about, was the opportunity to 
dismantle the customary institutions of control. This possibility gave to 
liberalism the utopian quality that infected men of all ranks, and whilst 
Alexander Hamilton, for example, expressed reservations about an undirected 
market, it was John Stevens, scion of a prominent New Jersey family, who 
expressed the underlying appeal of what Hamilton failed to grasp. In an essay 
written in 1787, Stevens elucidated the ‘important idea’ that America would have 
the honour of teaching mankind, namely that man is actually capable of 
governing himself.87 This statement reflects the fact that the Americans’ claim to 
self-government rested upon both the personal and the political. 
According to Appleby, two abstractions – nature and freedom – formed the 
basis of Americans’ conception of government and both of them owed their 
eighteenth-century reworking to social changes wrought by the market. In this 
free-market society it is the individual who (apparently) makes choices, takes 
risks, and enjoys the consequences of these decisions. Commercial expansion 
increased the number of private transactions; the place of the individual was 
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enhanced through his economic importance; it was the individual who had 
rights to life, liberty and happiness.88 What Appleby is essentially saying is that 
the revisionist accounts of the centrality of classical republicanism (or the 
republican virtue tradition) within Revolutionary ideology leave out the 
celebration of the emerging individual who, because of free-market economics, 
had become the instrument of progress and freedom.         
The de-emphasis of the influence of Locke upon Revolutionary ideology has 
been strongly refuted by Steven M. Dworetz. Whilst Appleby has emphasised 
the importance of economics and the free market as the key to the liberal 
interpretative paradigm, Dworetz argues for the paramount importance of 
Locke. He argues that the revisionists have wrongly interpreted Locke and his 
body of ideas, and converted ‘the guide and prophet of the Revolution’ into the 
Revolution’s ideological enemy. He suggests that with the substitution of 
republicanism for liberalism in the founding ideology 
 
not only would the one doctrine that authorizes constitutional politics and personal 
freedom be purged from the founding, but its place would be filled by a doctrine that does 
not inherently preclude, and may in part be inclined toward, the antithesis of constitutional 
politics and personal freedom, tyranny.89  
 
The core of Dworetz’s case against the republican interpretative paradigm is 
that the revisionist historians simply took Locke at his worst. What had been 
exaggerated by, for example, Leo Strauss, (see next chapter) was Locke’s doctrine 
of property in the Second Treatise. This contained, according to Strauss, the 
hidden essence of Locke’s ‘hedonistic’ political teaching – the classic doctrine of 
‘the spirit of capitalism’.90 Locke became associated with possessive 
individualism, bourgeois excess, and what Dworetz calls ‘the egoistic 
commercialisation of American life’. Lockean liberalism, with its emphasis upon 
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individual autonomy, seemed to be the ideological source of a serious modern 
problem, and the republican interpretation of the founding doctrine began with 
this view of the nature of Locke’s thought. 
This, according to Dworetz, is to miss a key theme in Locke’s thought that 
provides its overarching coherence. He argues that Locke’s entire body of 
thought rests upon ‘belief in a benevolent, rational (not arbitrary) God who 
makes nothing in vain, whose workmanship men are, and whose law of nature 
lays down social and political obligations that are binding upon all 
individuals’.91 This includes legislators as well as others.92 Human political 
arrangements are legitimate only in so far as they accommodate the general 
purposes of God (civil government must, for example, serve the public good and 
not be arbitrary). Dworetz cites John Dunn in support of this claim, the latter 
maintaining ‘the axiomatic centrality of the purposes of God dominates the 
entire intellectual construction [of Locke’s work]’.93 A secular tradition built up 
in which this organising principle was ignored, thus constructing the bourgeois 
Locke so reviled by republican revisionists. 
Repudiating the republican interpretive paradigm, Dworetz asserts that 
Lockean theory supplied the concepts and categories in which the 
revolutionaries articulated their deepest concerns about liberty and property. In 
claiming their defence of these essentials, the revolutionaries did not rely upon 
section 5 of the Second Treatise (‘Of Property’), but upon section 11 (‘Of the Extent 
of the Legislative Power’). The issue in dispute in the Revolution ‘was not the 
right of the subject to appropriate from nature, but the right of the government to 
appropriate the subject’.94 The ‘bourgeois Locke’ of secular tradition was not the 
animating inspiration that the republican revisionists sought to replace by 
‘taking Locke at his worst’. The Revolutionaries instead ‘used Locke’s political 
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theory to do what it does best, that is, to define the inherent moral limits of civil 
authority with respect to liberty and property and to justify resistance and 
revolution when government exceeds, or threatens to exceed, those limits’.95  
Dworetz suggests that republicanism and liberalism coexisted at the 
founding and that American republicanism was distinctly liberal in terms of the 
Lockean components embedded within it.96 With the adoption of the 
Constitution a tension developed between republicanism and liberalism in which 
republican ideology was relegated to mere rhetoric. As Marienstras expresses it, 
‘From then on liberty was generally conceived as the sum of individual rights. 
And the public good was envisioned as the satisfaction of individual self-
interest’.97 Shalhope notes that even Bailyn, in his strong arguments for the 
primacy of the republican explanatory paradigm, does not eliminate Locke’s 
influence but simply places it in a proper context,98 and Marienstras holds that 
the American founders hesitated between these two concepts, as did the 
American people.99 In any event, it would appear, as Dworetz argues, American 
republicanism in the Revolutionary years was of a distinctly liberal hue because 
it was embedded in a political and intellectual tradition that included a vital and 
essential Lockean liberal component. Republicanism and liberalism must have 
coexisted at the founding, and coexistence must have modified both points of 
view.100  
Despite this evident synthesis and convergence of ideas within the founding 
doctrine, it is possible to draw conclusions about which of the explanatory or 
interpretative paradigms described above eventually achieved dominance and a 
lasting hegemonic prominence. There can be little doubt that Bailyn, Pocock, et al 
have amply demonstrated that the neo-Roman or classical republican ideal of 
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freedom was extremely influential during the Revolutionary period and beyond. 
However, there are, as previously mentioned, countervailing voices which 
suggest that this influence waned and was overtaken by events.         
Joyce Appleby contends that economic upheaval brought about a sea-
change in attitudes and opportunities for ordinary Americans in the post- 
Revolutionary period, to the extent that liberalism became the prevailing ideal 
with its vision of freedom as non-interference. The generation of Americans born 
after Independence became what she calls ‘self-conscious shapers of a liberal 
society, even as it was being transformed by the cumulative forces of economic 
advance’.101 Steven Watts, too, has maintained that there is a preponderance of 
evidence that suggests that the decades from 1790 to 1820 encompassed ‘a 
massive, multifaceted transformation away from republican traditions’. ‘This sea 
change’, he continues, ‘involved the consolidation of the market economy and 
society, a liberal political structure and ideology, and a bourgeois culture of self-
controlled individualism’. 102   
A new conception of politics therefore emerged in which a smaller space 
was reserved for the republican ideals of virtue and public service. Enterprise 
became appreciated; the independent man reliant upon his own resources who 
could take advantage of new opportunities in trade and business became the 
ideal. Appleby notes: ‘Commercial advance served as all-purpose evidence of 
American sagacity, acting as a moral and material handmaiden to the first 
generation’s construction of a democratic and liberal society.’103 Instead of a 
world predicated on what Appleby terms the ‘stasis of classical republicanism’, 
which was meant to secure the rule of the virtuous, a world arose in which ‘the 
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protection of property rights in an economy of enhanced productivity and 
greater risk-taking guaranteed the gains of successful market participants’.104 
According to Appleby and others, at a time of dramatic change towards the 
end of the eighteenth century and immediately beyond, the old polity presumed 
to exist in classical thought gave way to a new order in which free bargaining, 
voluntary association, and individual effort became the most important 
features.105 As Margaret Canovan has pointed out, with the decline of the neo-
Roman ideal, much of the heroic tension within this Machiavelli-inspired 
tradition was released. There was a new belief in the possibility of progress; a 
better society could be reached easily, without the need for heroic commitments 
to public service or virtue.106 As she emphasises: 
 
There was no longer any need to watch jealously over the morals and manners of the 
citizens, and to fight constantly against human nature. Opinions and private habits were no 
longer politically important, and could become part of civil liberty precisely because they 
had become politically indifferent, things that could neither make nor mar the state.107   
 
Whilst therefore the tradition of neo-Roman ideas about freedom ran deep, 
as indeed did the ideals of classical republicanism itself, there was a sense in 
which this tradition of thought no longer reflected the emerging reality. Faced 
with these new realities, Appleby suggests, the founders came up with a liberal 
solution to their classical republican problem of balance. Whilst they accepted 
the notion of self-interest as a functional equivalent to civic virtue, they severely 
limited the scope of the government in economic matters. The fear of power 
promoted by republicanism gave way to an American ideology that was 
suspicious of the power of government (following, for example, Priestley and 
Paine in particular), and which placed its faith in a Constitution that protected 
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individual freedom from the power of government. It is this distinction that 
perhaps best illustrates the fundamental differences between the two traditions. 
In the republican virtue or neo-Roman tradition, freedom is seen as something 
that inheres within the function of government, manifested by its laws; in the 
liberal tradition freedom of the individual requires protection from the power of 
the State.  
The view that the republican virtue or neo-Roman tradition (and with it the 
republican ideal of freedom) gave way to the liberal tradition in the post-
Revolutionary period is endorsed by Philip Pettit. He argues that the republican 
notion of freedom was eclipsed at the very moment of its success in the debates 
surrounding the American Revolution. He claims that it was ‘at that moment that 
the notion of freedom as non-interference took over from that of republicanism 
as the dominant political philosophy’.108 Daniel Rodgers interprets Gordon 
Wood’s account of the creation of the republic in a similar way: 
 
out of the Constitution’s side stepped liberalism. By the 1780s in Wood’s account, 
the pull and strain of revolutionary politics, the difficulty of holding to the public 
good as a real tangible essence amidst the clamour of partial interests, had finally 
overcome the republican faith. Wood’s America had ‘broken through’ to a 
modern sense of politics by 1787. 109  
   
Wood does indeed acknowledge the influence of classical republicanism in 
Revolutionary ideology, but argues that this influence was relatively short-lived, 
and the emphasis upon collective or public freedom gave way, following the 
creation of the Constitution, to an emphasis upon the personal freedom of the 
individual.110 
 
In assessing the competing claims of these two interpretative paradigms it is 
reasonable to conclude that whilst the republican virtue tradition was a 
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considerable influence upon the founding doctrine and upon the American 
political class, its influence gave way, in a fairly short period, to a body of 
thought that ran alongside it in many ways, but seemed more congenial and 
appropriate to America’s unique circumstances, namely Lockean liberalism. 
Republicanism was perhaps not the hegemonic paradigm that the revisionist 
historians claimed, neither perhaps was it a tradition, although the term 
‘republican virtue tradition’ is a convenient one. As Daniel Rodgers suggests, its 
key terms were contested, and ‘[f]ormulated as an alternative to a flat timeless 
liberalism, it [republicanism] threatened to end up, by its very parallelisms, 
reifying and reconfirming the liberalism it had been designed to escape’.111 
 It is the ideal of freedom contained within the liberal paradigm therefore, 
upon which the American tradition of liberty was mainly constructed and that 
endured in the years that followed the creation of the republic. The philosophical 
nature of that ideal of freedom together with that embedded within the 
republican virtue tradition is considered in the following section. 
 
V APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
As stated above, the purpose of this section is to identify the nature of freedom 
embedded within the interpretative paradigms previously discussed. The section 
also considers briefly, and in the same analytical context, the ideas concerning 
freedom of the several influential theorists discussed in Section II.   
In assessing the nature of freedom within republican virtue tradition it is 
necessary to refer to its European philosophical roots. As a starting point it is 
useful to examine the philosopher Quentin Skinner’s claim that the neo -Roman 
or republican virtue ideal of freedom can be described, using the distinctions 
established by Isaiah Berlin set out in Chapter Two, as negative in character. It is 
worth noting here that Skinner sees republicanism as the dominant explanatory 
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paradigm in Revolutionary and founding thought and insists that the republican 
virtue tradition contrasts sharply with modern liberal individualism.112 Much of 
the weight of Skinner’s claim hinges upon his interpretation of the ideas of 
Machiavelli, who did most to introduce republican ideas to modern Europe.  
Machiavelli claimed that in order for citizens to enjoy their freedom and to 
live without fear or anxiety, communities must be based on free institutions in 
which all citizens participate. It is only if everyone remains willing to place their 
talents at the disposal of the community that the common good or public interest 
can be upheld and factional interests controlled. Only if this happens can 
individual liberty be secured. Freedom thus becomes a form of public service, 
since devotion to public service is held to be a necessary condition of maintaining 
personal liberty.113  
For Machiavelli personal and public liberty can only be maintained if the 
citizen body as a whole displays the quality of virtue. But most people are not, 
Machiavelli admits, naturally virtuous. If left to their own devices, most citizens 
will place private interests above the public good. If the citizen pursues personal 
ambition, say, he begins to subvert the free institutions of the community, and 
hence personal liberty. The paradox with which we have to reckon, Machiavelli 
repeatedly emphasised, is that ‘the people, deceived by a false image of the good, 
very often will their own ruin’.114 
Machiavelli believed that it is the law which best prevents the individual 
from sliding into corruption. According to Skinner, when Machiavelli  
 
contends that the indispensable means of preventing corruption is to invoke the 
coercive power of the law, he is not merely endorsing the familiar observation 
that the law can be used to make us respect each other’s freedom. He is also 
suggesting that the law can act to liberate us from our natural but self-destructive 
tendency to pursue our selfish interests. It can force us to promote the public 
interest in a genuinely virtuoso style, thereby enabling us to preserve our liberty 
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instead of undermining it. Machiavelli’s further claim, in other words, is that the 
law can and must be used in addition to force us to be free.115 
 
On the face of it, this seems to be a clear concession by Skinner that 
Machivelli is advocating a form of positive freedom encapsulated by Rousseau’s 
famous claim that man can be ‘forced to be free’, containing, as it does, the core 
assumptions about the nature of freedom that Berlin denounced so forcefully. 
Skinnner, however, argues that this is not the case. Machiavelli, according to 
Skinner, bases his argument on two key assumptions. One is his generally 
pessimistic view of human nature, namely that the human tendency to 
corruption is ineliminable. The other is that since corruption is the antithesis of 
virtue, while virtue is indispensable for maintaining both private and public 
liberty, our corruption must somehow be curbed if these liberties are to thrive.116      
The law can be used to coerce and direct us in such a way that even if our 
corrupt desires continue to take precedence, our motivations may be capable of 
being harnessed for the common good. Skinner denies that this is a process in 
which our desires are to be bought in line with some notion of the ‘higher self’ – 
a key component of the concept of positive liberty according to Berlin. We can 
maintain our selfish patterns of motivation and our self-destructive proclivities, 
but the law will channel our behaviour in such a way that the unintended 
consequences of our selfish actions will promote the public interest.117 As Skinner 
notes, ‘We are thereby enabled, by means of the coercive powers of the law, to 
attain the freedom we actually desire and to avoid the conditions of domination 
and servitude that our unconstrained behaviour would otherwise produce’.118 
On the strength principally of his ideas about Machiavelli, therefore, 
Skinner seeks to demonstrate the possibility of constructing a coherent theory of 
social freedom in which the liberty of the individual is connected to the ideals of 
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virtue and public service. Skinner maintains that in the neo-Roman tradition of 
thought, the negative idea of freedom as ‘mere non-obstruction of individual 
agents in the pursuit of their chosen ends, was combined with the ideas of virtue 
and public service’. What Machiavelli’s ideas in this context and the neo-Roman 
interpretation of liberty turn on, according to Skinner, is that ‘the performance of 
public services, and the virtues needed to perform them, both prove upon 
examination to be instrumentally necessary to the avoidance of coercion and 
servitude, and thus to be necessary conditions of assuring any degree of personal 
liberty in the ordinary Hobbesian sense of the term’.119 
 Skinner claims that the reason Machiavelli gives for citizens cultivating the 
virtues and serving the common good is not duty, but that these practices 
‘represent, as it happens, the best and indeed the only means for us “to do well” 
on our own behalf, and in particular the only means of securing any degree of 
personal liberty to pursue their own chosen ends’.120 Duty and interests thus 
coincide. Skinner further emphasises Machiavelli’s belief, with which he appears 
to concur, that all men are evil, and can never be expected to do anything good 
unless they see that it is in their interests to do it: ‘[U]nless [therefore] the 
generality of evil men can be given selfish reasons for behaving virtuously, it is 
unlikely that any of them will perform any virtuous actions at all’.121 
Philip Pettit has, in general, supported Skinner’s analysis. He argues that 
that there was a particular conception of negative liberty that engaged the 
republicans. This was the equation of liberty with full citizenship in a suitable 
society: a society that exemplifies the rule of law. ‘If liberty’, Pettit argues, ‘is 
equivalent to citizenship, and citizenship is constituted by the rule of law,  
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together perhaps with other cultural conditions, so too is liberty’.122 The 
connection between liberty and citizenship means, suggests Pettit, that instead of 
law being regarded as a potential intrusion upon liberty, it is more or less the 
indispensable means by which liberty becomes established. The law is therefore 
the guarantor of liberty – a view certainly held in the eighteenth century by men 
like Burke, as mentioned earlier. This represents what Pettit calls a ‘resilience-
centred’ conception of negative liberty rather than one that is centred on the 
notion of non-interference.123 By this Pettit means a conception in which the law 
provides the individual with an effective protection against interference. Pettit’s 
case rests upon the notion that an individual protected by the law in this way 
enjoys a greater degree of non-interference than an unprotected individual. The 
law therefore protects the idea of negative liberty. 
Notwithstanding the obvious force of these arguments, it seems possible to 
argue that within the heart of the neo-Roman conception of freedom, there in fact 
lurk a number of characteristics or elements that conform to Berlin’s notion of 
positive liberty. A few contrary observations may therefore be ventured on the 
conclusions that both Skinner and Pettit have drawn.  
To begin with, it is difficult to escape the idea that Machiavelli, as the most 
prominent of the neo-Roman theorists, was the holder of what Berlin calls 
(although he does not apply this phrase to Machiavelli) ‘a certain, central vision 
of life, of what it was and what it should be’,124 and that his concept of freedom is 
inimical to that, say, held by Locke and Paine. As explained in the previous 
chapter, and as Berlin clarifies, the substance of their concept of freedom was ‘the 
right to freely shape one’s life as one wishes, variously, richly, and if need be, 
eccentrically’. They accepted, of course, the need to protect other men in respect 
of the same rights, and the need for common security, ‘so that I am in this sense 
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free if no institution or person interferes with me except for its or his own 
protection’.125 This core idea of what might be termed the liberal ideal of negative 
freedom seems an altogether different concept to the one that places the law, 
virtue, and public duty at its heart. 
Locke and Machiavelli held different views about the character of human 
nature, and it is this difference that determines their approaches to the law. 
Locke believed that men were more good than wicked and that they possessed 
certain inalienable rights against society.126 For Locke it was not necessary to 
draw the boundary too far in favour of authority. The law was not understood to 
be a coercive force pushing men towards virtue. This contrasts with the view of 
Machiavelli who, as we have seen, believed that men were naturally corrupt. 
This leads the latter to give the law a far greater prominence and a different role. 
The law for Machiavelli is an instrument of coercion: men are being coerced to be 
virtuous (and thus free, according to Machiavelli) but coercion remains, surely, 
an inhibitor of choice and thus of freedom in Berlin’s negative sense. In the neo-
Roman concept, freedom is not, it seems, ‘freedom to do what is irrational, or 
stupid or wrong’. 127 As Berlin always feared, within the perversion to which 
positive freedom is always liable, the forcing of the empirical self into the ‘right 
pattern’ is liable to be passed off not as tyranny, but liberation.128 
It is obviously the case, as Pettit claims, that the law can ensure the equal 
protection of men from interference and can create the conditions of security in 
which men (and their negative liberty) may thrive, but it always entails a 
reduction in individual freedom, albeit sometimes a necessary one. As Jeremy 
Bentham adamantly maintained, the business of laws was not to liberate, but to 
restrain: ‘every law is an infraction of liberty’.129  The danger in the neo-Roman 
account of freedom is, as Berlin emphasises, the idea that liberty becomes 
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virtually identical with authority, and that authority can be embodied in the law. 
This was a view held by all those who looked upon society as a design 
constructed according to ‘the rational laws of the wise lawgiver, or of nature, or 
history, or of the Supreme Being’.130 The law is not of itself, therefore, as indeed 
Price pointed out (see Section II above), a sufficient condition for liberty. It has to 
be combined with the notion of consent, something upon which the republican 
ideal does not appear to dwell. Furthermore, it is by no means clear how 
citizenship (or ‘full’ citizenship) can in fact be equated with liberty in the way 
that Pettit suggests. It is not the same social good. Liberty cannot, it may be 
argued, be the equivalent of anything except itself. 
When Skinner writes of Machiavelli’s commitment to virtue and its central 
role in the maintenance of liberty, the question surely arises: ‘Whose virtue?’ 
Who defines or decides what is virtuous and what is not? Why should an 
individual surrender his or her own notion of what is virtuous to the State or 
indeed why should an individual be virtuous at all? The idea of a State or 
community (or, worse, an individual) defining the nature of virtue to which, in 
the exercise of public service, all must subscribe, seems to presuppose the notion 
of some kind of harmonious whole, not the vision of a society in which men’s 
values collide or where pluralism and the incommensurability of values are an 
accepted feature and in which Berlin’s concept of negative liberty is grounded. 
Skinner’s interpretation of Machiavelli’s thought suggests that it is not 
impossible for virtue to take on a tyrannical aspect, inimical to the idea, at the 
core of Berlin’s concept of negative freedom, that ‘one of the most valuable 
things in human life is choice, not merely of what is good, but choice itself’.131 
There is also an implicit suggestion here that men can be led or coerced into 
what they ‘really’ want, which, although Skinner denies this, seems to admit of 
the possibility of a divided self, or at least a self that can be coerced to behave 
                                                
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid., p. 26. 
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differently to its ‘natural’ self.  Men may be naturally evil, but they can, despite 
their natures, be led, through public duty, to behave virtuously if they see that it 
is in their interests (the lower self?) to do so. It is possible to suggest that the 
virtues that Skinner believes are instrumentally necessary for us ‘to do well on 
our own behalf’ are an implicit acknowledgement, within the neo-Roman 
concept of freedom that there is in fact a ‘higher’ self which needs to be 
encouraged towards that end. As previously discussed, the idea of a divided self 
is a characteristic of Berlin’s notion of positive freedom. 
The precise nature of the neo-Roman concept of freedom in terms of Berlin’s 
definitions is therefore open to interpretation. At the very least it seems that its 
negative nature is by no means certain, and that it does indeed exhibit certain 
positive traits. John Pocock makes the point that in the republican ideal, human 
personality is ‘perfected in citizenship’, and that within the Machiavellian 
doctrine ‘the ideal of virtue is highly compulsive’.132  Indeed Pocock directly 
refutes both Skinner and Pettit in their claim that the republican virtue tradition 
embraces the ideal of negative liberty:  
 
The republican vocabulary employed by the dictators, rhetoricians and 
humanists articulated the positive conceptions of liberty: it contended that homo, 
the animale politicum, was completed in a vita activa practiced in vivere civile, and 
that libertas consisted in freedom from constraints upon the practice of such a 
life.133   
 
The potentially compulsive aspect of the neo-Roman or civic republican 
ideal is highlighted by, for example, Steven Dworetz who maintains that 
‘liberalism, whatever its vices, is […] the only doctrine that instinctively requires 
political constitutionalism and the freedom associated with it, while civic 
republicanism, whatever its virtues, lacks internal theoretical constraints upon 
                                                
132 Cited in Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine,  pp. 52, 190. 
133 J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in 
the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 40–41. 
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the use of political power’.134 Within the neo-Roman ideal of republicanism (the 
republican virtue tradition), the enforcement of virtue, it can be argued, becomes 
the responsibility of the State, and appears to take priority over the freedom of 
the individual. This is obviously a position which is incompatible with Berlin’s 
notion of negative freedom.    
By contrast, what is evident is that in terms of Berlin’s distinctions about the 
nature of freedom, it is liberalism in which negative liberty is embedded. As the 
analytical framework established in Chapter Two makes clear, negative freedom 
in the sense of non-interference is firmly located within the liberal paradigm, and 
can be regarded as an intrinsic element of liberalism itself.  
As one of the principal architects of liberalism Locke can easily enough be 
said to embrace the negative concept of freedom. But what might be said of the 
other great influences upon the American founding discussed in Section II?  
Price’s thought, with its notions of moral liberty and a ‘higher nature’, seems to 
chime most closely with the concept of positive liberty and the republican virtue 
tradition. Priestley, too, in the general tenor of his thought, seems close to the 
Commonwealthmen, and hence to the same tradition and concept of freedom. 
Burke, whose anti-Revolutionary views clearly do not place him within the 
republican virtue tradition, does nevertheless, with his suspicion of choice and 
emphasis upon the need for freedom to be tempered by order and virtue, appear 
to embrace a concept of liberty that is positive in character.   
Although almost as influential as those of Locke, Paine’s ideas are perhaps 
not easy to define in the same terms, but arguably sit more comfortably within 
liberalism than the republican virtue tradition. Daniel Rodgers describes him as 
‘a man furiously thinking his way through the events around him, but either he 
had no clear hold on the language or republicanism was not the one he was 
speaking’.135 Interestingly, too, Paine seems to have himself made a distinction 
                                                
134 Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine, p. 38. 
135 Rodgers, ‘Republicanism: The Career of a Concept,’ p. 27. 
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between negative and positive influences in terms of the differentiation he makes 
between the public and private realms. Joyce Appleby has highlighted this 
differentiation of society and government in Paine’s Common Sense: ‘Society is 
produced by our wants and government by our wickedness, the former 
promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively 
by restraining our vices’.136 What Paine is doing here, according to Appleby, is 
reducing the virtues of republicanism to simple policing while elevating free 
association to a new moral plane.137 
Commenting on this Paine quotation and Appleby’s observations relating 
to it, David Wootton suggests that although Paine’s choice of the terms ‘positive’ 
and ‘negative’ may be a coincidence, ‘we are not misrepresenting him if we 
describe him as saying that positive liberties are pursued within civil society, 
negative liberties protected by government’.138 He agrees with Appleby that 
Paine is engaged in a ‘stunning deflation’ of classical republicanism. Wootton 
maintains that this aspect of Paine’s thought remains invisible to the republican 
revisionists: ‘[The revisionists] pay insufficient attention, both to the distinction 
between society and government, private and public (they assume that virtue is 
both a private and public quality), and to that between positive and negative 
liberties (they assume that in a world dominated by ideas of virtue, positive 
liberties are of primary importance)’.139 It can therefore be argued that, like 
Locke’s, Paine’s thinking about the character of freedom does not reflect the 
republican virtue tradition, and aligns more closely to Berlin’s concept of 
negative liberty.  
 
 
                                                
136 Cited in Joyce Appleby, ‘Republicanism and Ideology’, American Quarterly, 37, (1985), 461– 473 (p. 
470).  
137 Ibid. 
138 David Wootton,(ed.), Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society 1649–1776 (Stanford, Calif.: 





This chapter has demonstrated how, at the time of the founding of the republic, 
ideas about freedom, its value, proper form, and expression within political 
society, were drawn from a number of sources and theorists. It has also 
considered the emergence in the historiography of the founding doctrine two 
competing interpretative paradigms. On balance, it would appear that whilst the 
republican virtue tradition was a significant factor in influencing aspects of the 
founding doctrine, this gave way in the period of economic change that followed, 
to a dominant liberal ideology from which emerged the American tradition of 
liberty. The ideas of Price, Priestley, and the Commonwealthmen, became less 
significant in the longer term than the ideas of Locke in particular, and, in some 
senses, Paine. The nature of freedom embedded within both liberalism and the 
republican virtue tradition has been considered in the light of the analytical 
framework established in the preceding chapter (i.e. elements of Isaiah Berlin’s 
thought about the nature of liberty) and establishes that it is within the ideology 
of liberalism that Berlin’s concept of negative liberty is most accurately reflected 
and nourished. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that the concept of 
liberty implicit within the republican virtue tradition contains characteristics that 
may reasonably be said to be consistent with Berlin’s notion of positive liberty 
and liable to the perversion about which he warns.  
It is therefore argued that a proper reflection of the American tradition of 
liberty, which is predominantly grounded in Lockean liberalism, requires an 
adherence to the negative concept of liberty, the characteristics of which were 
outlined in the previous chapter. To appeal to that tradition and yet embrace a 
different philosophical concept of liberty to that which is embedded within it is 
at best inconsistent, and at worst it may betoken a betrayal of the tradition itself.  
Chapter Four which follows, explores the connection between the 
republican virtue tradition and the ideology of neoconservatism, and in 
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particular the interpretation of freedom which they hold in common. How this 
interpretation of freedom is evidenced in areas of policy is the focus of Chapters 
Five and Six. This enables conclusions to be drawn as to the extent to which the 
Bush administration embraced a concept of liberty inconsistent with the tradition 
of liberty to which it so frequently appealed.  
 
 
   ------------------------------------------------------ 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FREEDOM AND  




neoconservatism is […] a re-sanctification in everyday life of the core values of 





















                                                




The influence of the neoconservatives and neoconservative ideas upon the Bush 
administration is highlighted in Chapter One. The purpose of this chapter is to 
consider briefly the roots of neoconservatism, its main characteristics, and, 
specifically, to identify the philosophical nature of freedom which lies embedded 
within it and its similarities with the republican virtue tradition discussed in the 
previous chapter. This task is undertaken by considering some of the relevant 
ideas of three prominent theorists whose thought can be said to have shaped 
neoconservatism as it is understood today, namely, the political philosophers 
Leo Strauss and Irving Kristol, and the academic and philosopher Allan Bloom. 
Whilst these theorists were not necessarily particularly active in political terms, 
their ideas were inherited by those who were to become so, and who became 
prominent in the Bush administration and the political and media networks that 
surrounded it.   
The most prominent early neoconservatives were a small group usually 
named as Irving Kristol and his wife, the historian Gertrude Himmelfarb; the 
writer and sociologist Daniel Bell; the politician and scholar Daniel Moynihan; 
Norman Podhoretz (editor of the neoconservative magazine Commentary and 
later recipient of the Congressional Medal of Freedom from President Bush in 
2004); his wife, the journalist and co-founder (with Donald Rumsfeld) of the 
Committee for the Free World, Midge Decter; plus a few intellectual friends. 
Some were former left-wing radicals who, during the period of the Cold War and 
in particular during the 1960s and 1970s, became vehemently anti-communist. 
What triggered the change appears to have been the cultural upheavals of the 
1960s, in which bourgeois values, which Kristol and others cherished as the 
bulwark of civilisation, came under sustained attack, manifested in particular by 
the anti-Vietnam war movement. Kristol wrote of being motivated by ‘student 
rebellion and the rise of the counterculture, with its messianic expectations and 
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its apocalyptic fears’.2 Kristol drew close parallels between the student 
revolution of the 1960s, the forced ‘withdrawal’ from Vietnam, and 
developments in the cultural world, whose energies ‘were channelled into what 
is now called “postmodernism”’, which he believed to be a kind of academic 
irrationalism amounting to nihilism.3 As chaos appeared to reign in the 
universities, the neoconservatives began to identify the previously 
unacknowledged virtue that they believed existed in values such as stability and 
continuity. Nathan Glazer for example, a sociologist who taught at Harvard and 
Unirvesity of California, Berkeley during this period,4 identified, as part of this 
turn to the authority and the value of ritual and tradition, a ‘discovery’ of Jewish 
religious observance amongst some of his fellow neoconservatives.5         
This cultural conservatism was matched by a hawkish position in terms of 
foreign policy. Because of their previous left-wing radicalism, early 
neoconservatives felt they understood communism better than most (and 
certainly better than protesting students), and understood too the subsequent 
need for military strength to protect American interests abroad. They therefore 
expressed a proprietary interest in toughness on communism, and generally 
reflected an expansionist Wilsonian strand of foreign policy thinking 
underpinned by unequivocal support for Israeli nationalism. In domestic policy 
terms, the early neoconservatives were critical of President Johnson’s Great 
Society programmes, especially initiatives such as affirmative action that 
favoured ethnic minorities who, they felt, should be able to find their way 
without federal interference. Whilst neoconservative thought was gradually 
transformed into an ideology that embraced a wider spectrum of issues, 
                                                
2 Irving Kristol, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea, p. 31. 
3 Ibid., p. 118. 
4 Glazer was a one-time assistant editor of the neoconservative magazine Commentary and also one of the 
‘New York Intellectuals’ often credited with ‘founding’ the neoconservative movement. This group, which 
included  Kristol, Irving Howe, and Daniel Bell, attended the City College in New York together during the 
1950s.  
5 Nathan Glazer, Q and A session at ‘Libertarian Hawks or Cultural Communitarians? Neoconservatism 
and the Legacy of the New York Intellectuals’, conference at Birkbeck College, London, 24 – 25 May, 
2006. 
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succeeding generations of neoconservatives shared most, if not all, of these basic 
tenets. It is also arguable that in terms of foreign policy, the neoconservative 
network that was so influential upon the Bush administration was a by-product 
of the Cold War.6 It is worth noting, for example, that Richard Perle, later of 
Bush’s Defence Advisory Board, was, from 1969–1979, a top foreign policy 
adviser to Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson, a strong hard-line anti-communist 
Democrat. Perle is quoted as approving Jackson’s enthusiasm for building 
missile defence, and his scepticism about détente and the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT).7 Such sentiments sit easily with the later unilateralist 
Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war, which drove much of his foreign policy and is 
discussed later in the thesis.    
 Over the birth of neoconservatism, and indeed its later full growth, hovers 
the pervasive influence of Leo Strauss, who taught at the University of Chicago 
from 1949 until 1969. He died in 1973. Strauss’s influence over many early 
neoconservatives seems to have been considerable. Both Irving Kristol and 
Gertrude Himmelfarb have acknowledged his influence, and Allan Bloom, one of 
his students, introduced Strauss’s ideas to a number of students who 
subsequently went into politics or ended up in Washington. These included, for 
example, Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of State in the Bush administration); 
Francis Fukuyama (historian and columnist); Abram Shulsky (intelligence 
analyst in the Office of Special Plans, within the Pentagon under Bush’s Secretary 
of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, a unit that was headed up by fellow 
neoconservative Douglas Feith); Alan Keyes (prominent Republican and one-
time Ambassador to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
under Ronald Reagan), and the political theorist Kenneth Weinstein. This 
movement was part of a pattern. As Irving Kristol pointed out in 1995, Strauss’s 
original students had produced another generation of political theorists who left 
                                                
6 John Gray, Black Mass, p. 127. 
7 Perle cited in Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. 
Robert Oppenheimer (London: Atlantic Books, 2008), p. 438.   
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academe in favour of politics. Dozens of those who followed or were influenced 
by Strauss in the 1960s and 1970s joined the federal government to initiate a new 
political outlook.8 
A number of political associations were established that had their roots, one 
way or another, in the ideas generated from the University of Chicago and which 
comprised the neoconservative network during the Bush administration. Many 
occupied positions of influence both within the administration and in what 
might be described as the ‘commentariat’. Wolfowitz, for example, was professor 
to Lewis Libby, Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser to Vice President 
Cheney; Norman Podhoretz’s son John was a regular contributor to the 
neoconservative Weekly Standard (founded by William Kristol, son of Irving), 
became editorial-page editor of the New York Post and took over the editorship of 
Commentary in January 2009. Gary Schmitt, also a disciple of Strauss, became an 
executive director of William Kristol’s previously mentioned neoconservative 
think tank Project for the New American Century (PNAC).(See Chapter One). 
PNAC was the offspring of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). This latter 
organisation, also mentioned in Chapter One, once a fairly conventional 
conservative think tank, was transformed by Irving Kristol in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s into an energetic institute for the development of neoconservative 
doctrine, promoting laissez faire economics, the militarisation of foreign policy, 
and the dismantling of the welfare state. Other luminaries from the University of 
Chicago included David Brooks, former writer for the Weekly Standard who 
became a columnist for the New York Times; Werner Dannhauser, a former 
protégé of Strauss who left academia to take on the editorship of Commentary 
after the retirement of Norman Podhoretz; and Robert Kagan, also of the Weekly 
Standard and the son of leading Yale University Straussian, Donald Kagan.9  
Through these last journals in particular, the neoconservatives expressed, from 
                                                
8 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, p. 68  
9 Ibid.,  p. 67. 
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the 1980s onwards, a distinctive set of cultural and political beliefs from those of 
what they perceived to be the ‘liberal establishment’. Hostility to individual 
liberty was among the most prominent of these beliefs, along with support for 
religion as a guide to morals and an engine of State power.10 
If fears about cultural stability and hawkish anti-communism were amongst 
the original motivations of many early neoconservatives, those who came under 
their influence, the next generation as it were, quickly adopted foreign policy as 
their chosen field of influence. They became entrenched in the Republican party 
during President Reagan’s term of office (1981–1989), and from that time on 
created a policy establishment, through the journals and institutions mentioned 
above, that had the ‘consistency and coherence of a shadow government’.11 
Many of its essential policies – as David Bromwich points out – including ‘force 
projection’ in the Middle East, and continued pressure on Russia despite the fall 
of communism, were already in place in 1996, when Paul Wolfowitz was the 
leading foreign policy adviser to Republican party presidential nominee, Robert 
Dole.12 A more detailed assessment of neoconservative strategies in the areas of 
foreign affairs and defence is set out in Chapter Five. 
 
II NEOCONSERVATIVE THOUGHT 
 
The above section provides an outline of the origins of neoconservatism and 
details of some of the main protagonists, together with a brief summary of their 
ideas. However, in order to place the neoconservative interpretation of freedom 
in a fuller context, it is necessary to attempt a more detailed analysis of what 
constitutes neoconservative thought. 
                                                
10 David Bromwich , ‘The Co-President at Work’, New York Review of Books, 20 November 2008 
<http:/www.nybooks.com/articles/22060> [accessed 14 April  2009]. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid. 
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On the face of it, neoconservatism holds a good many values in common 
with those of traditional conservativism, notably those articulated by Edmund 
Burke (see Chapter Three), which include a belief in the value of tradition and 
strong institutions that help preserve the objective moral order, the privileging of 
religion in society, and a limited State. In so far as neoconservatives favour 
corporate power, private enterprise, and the maintenance of market freedoms, as 
well as holding a general mistrust of democracy, neoconservatism also has a 
good deal in common with neoliberalism. There are, however, some profound 
differences between neoconservatism and both traditional conservatism and 
neoliberalism which are worth highlighting.  
Traditional conservatism has tended to reject the idea of the perfectibility of 
man, believing instead that human nature is unchanging and unalterable, a mix 
of good and evil, neither of which can be wholly eradicated. Whilst conservative 
thinkers have acknowledged the essential role of human reason, they believe that 
in the modern world, reason has been overvalued, leading to failed social 
programmes and expectations that cannot be fulfilled.13 Furthermore, the notion 
that man knows enough to discard tradition and build some kind of utopia based 
upon reason is a dangerous fantasy. Russell Kirk, a major twentieth-century 
theorist of American conservatism, warned, ‘Pure arrogant reason, denying the 
claims of conscience, leads to a wasteland of withered hopes and crying 
loneliness.’14  
Neoconservatism, however, especially from the 1980s onwards, appears to 
have adopted something of a utopian stance, rejecting the long-cherished belief 
of conservatives in the imperfectability of man and opting instead for a militant 
faith in progress. 15 This is in marked contrast to the ideas of say, Locke, or Paine, 
or even Burke, each of whom, in casting their influence upon the founders, 
                                                
13 Melvin J. Thorne, American Conservative Thought Since World War II: The Core Ideas (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, Inc., 1990), p. 25.  
14 Kirk, cited in ibid., p. 26. 
15 Gray, Black Mass, p. 33. 
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tended to view government as a means of coping with human imperfection 
rather than as an instrument for re-creating society or man in general. The 
philosopher John Gray links this utopianism to the neoconservative alliance with 
Christian fundamentalism (referred to later in this thesis as the ‘Christian right’), 
which took place during the 1980s. These ‘theo-conservatives’ believe that evil 
can be defeated and that the many of the world’s conflicts, especially in the 
biblical lands, are preludes to Armageddon, ‘a final battle in which the struggle 
of light and dark will be concluded’.16 This obsession with evil is reflected in 
some of the rhetoric of the Bush administration, in particular by President Bush’s 
remark made three days after 9/11 : ‘our responsibility to history is already clear: 
to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil’.17  To a traditional conservative, 
or indeed any non-fundamentalist theologian, the idea that it is possible to ‘rid 
the world of evil’ is likely to run counter to their beliefs, suggesting that it is 
indeed possible to perfect man (in this case through the force of American arms). 
Such a claim also neglects the obvious point that the problem of evil in the world 
has preoccupied Christian theologians for centuries and evaded simplistic 
solutions.18    
What Gray terms ‘the belligerent optimism’ of the neoconservatives, with 
its strong nationalist implications, also resembles elements of the Romantic 
movement of the late eighteenth century, and translates into the kind of moral 
monism of which Berlin was so critical. The belief that animated the 
neoconservatives above all from the 1980s onwards was that humanity would, or 
perhaps should, evolve towards a universal civilisation that mirrored the 
                                                
16 Ibid., p. 34. 
17 President George W. Bush, ‘Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance’, 14 September, 2001 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-2.html> [accessed 14 May 2009]. 
18 St Augustine, for example, saw evil as a defect in human nature, a consequence of the fall of man, linked 
to the idea of original sin, whilst Irenaean theodicy holds that evil is necessary for human moral and 
spiritual development and is part of God’s plan. Further discussion of this point is outside the scope of this 
thesis, suffice to say that within Christian theology, the nature and place of evil in the world is subject to 
continual debate. See, for example, Margaret R. Miles, The Word Made Flesh: A History of Christian 
Thought (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 102, and Beth Davies-Stofka, ‘Christianity, Suffering 
and the Problem of Evil’, Patheos < http://www.patheos.com/Library/Christianity/Beliefs/Suffering-and-
the-Problem-of-Evil.html> [accessed 5 September 2010].  
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political and economic systems of the West, preferably that of the United States. 
As the influential neoconservative Michael Ledeen expressed it, ‘We do not wish 
to be part of the outside world, but we do wish to change it, to democratize it, to 
make it more like us’.19 The idea that Western values and institutions would 
prevail as history, in its Hegelian guise, marched along an inevitable road of 
progress led by America, became a deeply embedded element of neoconservative 
thought, and is discussed further in the following chapter. 
Neoconservatism veers away from pure neoliberalism in terms of its 
concern for an overarching morality as a necessary social glue to keep the body 
politic secure. Neoconservatism holds fears about both the free market itself, and 
unbridled individualism expressed through the choices that individuals make in  
lifestyle, sexual orientation, modes of self-expression, and so on. These choices 
threaten the fabric of society, bonds of solidarity are weakened, and anarchy 
threatens. Neoconservatism can be understood in some ways as a reaction 
against moral permissiveness which ‘seeks to restore some higher-order values 
that will form the stable centre of the body politic’.20  
The antidote to this threatened chaos of individual interests is an emphasis 
upon militarisation that acts as a coercive force. The academic David Harvey 
suggests that for this reason neoconservatives are more likely to highlight 
threats, real or imagined, both at home and abroad to the integrity and stability 
of the nation. In this way a sense of moral purpose is restored, a climate of 
consent is created, and coercion towards a stability based upon cultural 
nationalism and moral values is achieved. Neoconservatism, like neoliberalism, 
advocates economic market freedoms, but is uneasy about its effects, as the next 
section of this chapter elucidates. It therefore favours an authoritarian, 
hierarchical, and even militaristic means of maintaining law and order.21 
                                                
19 Michael A. Ledeen, Freedom Betrayed: How America Led a GlobalDemocratic Revolution, Won the 
Cold War, and Walked Away (Washington D.C.: The AEI Press, 1996), p. 3. 
20 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 83. 
21 Ibid., pp. 82–83. 
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Like Irving Kristol, whose ideas are discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter, the neoconservative theorist Mark Gerson suggests that many of the 
apparently disparate themes of neoconservativism – concern with order, 
continuity, the authority and value of tradition – derive from a current of 
thought not reducible either to conservatism or any variant of liberalism, but are 
grounded in the republican virtue tradition, the character of which was 
discussed in the previous chapter. Gerson suggests that  
 
The republican virtue tradition has always stressed that political liberty requires 
the moral foundation of a virtuous citizenry; that political virtue includes both the 
capacity for association and an active concern for the common good; and that these 
virtues in turn are nurtured by participation in a free community.22          
    
According to Gerson, many of the important themes of neoconservative 
thought ‘cease to appear inchoate, opportunistic, or merely eclectic, when they 
are placed in the historical context of the republican virtue tradition’.23 In 
embodying that tradition, neoconservatism stakes out its commitment to virtue 
in the way that Melanie Phillips suggests in the epigraph to this chapter. Gerson 
reinforces this commitment by emphasising that freedom is to be regarded not as 
an end in itself, but as a servant of virtue, and that social institutions ‘must work 
to inculcate virtue and prepare man to live the good life both in private and in 
the public sphere’.24 
Neoconservatism can therefore be seen as a distinctive ideology, sharing 
some strands of thought with traditional conservatism and neoliberalism, but 
essentially preoccupied with cultural and political stability and moral values. 
Rooted in the republican virtue tradition, it has adopted a strand of utopianism 
that can be located within radical elements of Enlightenment thought. Above all, 
neoconservatives are ideological determinists; they are truly committed to the 
                                                
22 Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision, p. 9. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 24. 
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notion that ideas rule the world and the crucial role of intellectuals in the 
shaping of history. The following chapters of this thesis illustrate how that role 
was fulfilled under the Bush administration. 
 
III NEOCONSERVATIVISM AND FREEDOM 
 
Within the broad context of neoconservative thought outlined above, this section 
seeks to illuminate more clearly the neoconservative interpretation of freedom by 
considering the ideas of three of the movement’s most prominent early theorists.  
As mentioned previously, the roots of neoconservative political philosophy 
are usually traced back to the ideas of Leo Strauss (in particular), Irving Kristol, 
and, to a lesser extent, to Allan Bloom. That Strauss was a clear and pervasive 
influence upon neoconservative thought is beyond dispute,25 and whilst it may 
be something of a distortion to claim that Strauss’s teachings provided any kind 
of a blueprint for a neoconservative political agenda, the number of Straussians 
who achieved prominence in Washington’s political circles and who subscribed 
to the neoconservative cause, is certainly beyond coincidence. As Mark Lilla 
expressed it, a ‘genuine connection seems to exist in the United States between 
Strauss’s self-proclaimed disciples and a highly partisan faction in American 
public life’.26 
The term ‘Straussians’ describes both Strauss’s immediate students and 
those who were drawn to his ideas. The influence over his students, whom he 
referred to as ‘the young puppies of his race’,27 seems to have been considerable. 
He gave the impression that he had discovered the highest form of knowledge 
and that his students were part of an elect body that included some of the 
greatest minds in history. They were separate, superior to their fellow students, 
                                                
25 See for example Leo Strauss, the Straussians, and the American Regime, ed. by Kenneth L. Deutsch and 
John A. Murley (London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.,1999). 
26 Mark Lilla, ‘The Closing of the Straussian Mind’.  
27 Ibid. 
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‘impelled’, as Strauss put it, ‘to turn with passionate interest, with unqualified 
willingness to learn, toward the political thought of classical antiquity. We are 
impelled to do so by the crisis of our time, the crisis of the West’.28    
The ‘crisis of the West’ was the foundation of Strauss’s thought. He rejected 
the ideas of progressivism and historicism in which standards of justice and right 
are considered in terms that are relative to their time and place. Modernism itself 
was suspect, a project that threatened to undermine the very foundations of the 
West.  Significantly, in terms of the focus of this section, Strauss believed ‘that at 
the root of modernity is the view that there is nothing independent of humanity 
which is superior in dignity to human artifice; the design of politics is rooted in 
human freedom and not divine or natural necessity’.29 The West had lost 
confidence, and this loss of confidence was derived in part from what Strauss 
called ‘the experience of history’, that is, the belief that that there are many 
different cultures each of which must be regarded as the legitimate equal of the 
other – the West being no different in this respect to any other culture. In this 
multicultural milieu the West has become ‘uncertain of purpose’30 and in the 
ensuing crisis we are ‘forced to turn towards the thought of classical antiquity’.31 
In contrast to historicism and positivism – the twin forces of decline to which he 
was so opposed – Strauss taught ‘the immutability of moral and social values’. 32  
For Strauss, the ‘great tradition’, i.e. the alliance between ancient Greek 
philosophy derived from Socrates, and the revealed prophetic religions derived 
from the Hebrew Bible, which created the West, was threatened in the first 
instance by Machiavelli, through his anti-idealistic new thinking about political 
                                                
28 Cited in Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, p. 92. 
29 Kenneth L. Deutsch, ‘Leo Strauss, the Straussians, and the American Regime’, in Leo Strauss, the 
Straussians, and the American Regime, pp. 51–58 (p. 51).  
30 Cited in Steven B. Smith, Reading Leo Strauss, p. 186. 
31 Cited in Halper and Clarke, America Alone, p. 66. 
32 Catherine and Michael Zuckert, The Truth About Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy and American 
Democracy (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 4. 
 113 
philosophy.33 What was both threatening and objectionable about Machiavelli’s 
thought was his affirmation of the supremacy of reason in the affairs of men. 
Machiavelli asserted the competence of reason to rule if properly regulated by 
desire for glory.34 The modern claim to the supremacy of reason would, 
according to Strauss, have been rejected by pre-modern philosophers who 
always kept in view recalcitrant human nature. Strauss maintained that 
Machiavelli had no significant impact upon the American founding in that its 
reliance upon the hereditary Rights of Man and moral theory denied  
Machiavelli’s underlying theme that the good end justifies every means.35  
Strauss believed that there is in human history, an enduring conflict 
between reason and revelation, the latter exemplified by the prophetic religions. 
This conflict is resolved in modernity by dispensing with revelation, and in the 
modern project enunciated by Machiavelli, ‘philosophy is to fulfil the function of 
both philosophy and religion’.36 By this he means, according to Strauss, that 
reason will provide man with his worldly goods and modern philosophy 
becomes anti-theological by endorsing a rejection of man’s traditional aim to 
somehow transcend the world under guidance from the Hebrew biblical God.  
Strauss set out these views in Thoughts on Machiavelli, (1957), which 
explained, inter alia, that Machiavelli was essentially a ‘teacher of evil’ by ‘linking 
the outset of modernity and the manner in which modern forms of thinking 
undermine civilization’.37 In addition, Machiavelli’s texts were defined by 
‘hidden writing’. The idea that a writer’s thoughts were expressed ‘between the 
lines’ was an idea that Strauss drew from his study of the writings of 
Maimonides. Strauss claimed to have recognised that Maimonides concealed his 
true thoughts behind oblique and hidden references and that the clues to 
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uncovering the true meaning of his thought were deliberately planted in the 
text.38 From this idea Strauss developed the concept of ‘esotericism’ and applied 
it to the entire philosophical tradition. He makes the contentious claim that there 
existed in the past ‘a peculiar type of literature in which the truth about all 
crucial things is presented exclusively between the lines’ for fear of the 
intolerance of revealed religion.39  
This idea that the great works of philosophy were all in some way endowed 
with a hidden teaching which only the initiated can discover may have given rise 
in the followers of Strauss to the perception that they too are in some way part of 
an elect, set apart from the rest of society or indeed mankind in general. The 
students of Strauss seem to have regarded themselves as having ‘a privileged 
knowledge that the people who were not students of Strauss do not have’.40 
What Strauss terms ‘the truth’ may ‘be accessible only through certain old 
books’,41 and the clear implication is that the truth will be inaccessible to those 
who lack the necessary philosophical skills and a knowledge of the secrets of 
esotericism. The idea that there is, in principle, something which can be 
identified as ‘the truth’ is of course very much at odds with the tenor of Berlin’s 
thought, especially in relation to pluralism. 
At first sight, the idea that there might be any form of linkage between the 
world of intelligence gathering and Strauss’s ideas about hidden meanings in 
ancient texts appears fanciful. But it may help to explain the Bush 
administration’s attitude towards intelligence and illustrates Strauss’s pervading 
influence. His central contention there was an unbridgeable gap between 
revelation and reason rendered the latter something of a false god. Realities were 
revealed rather than discovered through the deployment of empirically based 
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research which dominated the modern project. As discussed later, at the heart of 
the Bush administration there was not only a reliance upon ‘faith-based 
intelligence’ (intelligence which was produced by ‘revelation’ and which rejected 
countervailing information based upon dispassionate research), but, as discussed 
in Chapter Six, a significant retreat from empiricism itself.  
The concept of elites is also integral to the thought of Strauss and his 
notions about esotericism and the place of the modern philosopher generally. 
Strauss conceives the city (a term derived from antiquity) as being divided by 
different types of men: the wise (the philosophers), the gentlemen, and the 
vulgar. The wise are the lovers of harsh unadulterated truth. The gentlemen are 
not necessarily wealthy, but have ‘had an opportunity to be brought up in the 
proper manner’.42 The vulgar are the many lovers of wealth or pleasure, who are 
slothful and indolent.43 The philosophers, perceiving this division, and never 
forgetting the gulf that separated them from the rest, knew that they represented 
a grave threat to the city because of the damage which can be done to a society in 
which the non-philosophers begin doubting the city’s orthodox or fundamental 
opinions.44 The need to avoid the corruption of the masses justifies both the 
esotericism through which true meaning is concealed in the writings of 
philosophers, but also what Strauss terms their ‘noble rhetoric’ through which 
their true beliefs are also concealed. Philosophers have a duty not to upset the 
decent opinion on which society rests. ‘A political teaching’, writes Strauss 
‘which addressed itself equally to decent and indecent men would have 
appeared to them [the ancients] from the outset as unpolitical, that is, as 
politically or socially irresponsible’.45 Strauss claimed that in the ancient world 
philosophers held it to be a duty to satisfy society that they are not atheists, that 
they do not undermine or subvert the city. The gentlemen, who are idealistic, are, 
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when properly educated in a liberal manner, ready to be taken by the hand by 
‘the philosopher’ who will teach them about ‘the limits of politics’. The basics of 
this lesson are that the just society is improbable and that the ‘gentlemen’ should 
rule conservatively, knowing that ‘the apparently just alternative to aristocracy 
open or disguised, will be permanent revolution, i.e. permanent chaos in which 
life will not only be poor and short but brutish as well’.46  
It is not difficult to detect in these aspects of Strauss’s thought certain facets 
which might appeal to those who left academe and became active political 
neoconservatives – a journey aptly described by Mark Lilla as being ‘from 
Athens to Washington’.47 The idea of a somewhat secretive elite who, having 
been given a glimpse of the truth, assume that as ‘philosophers’ they have a duty 
to underpin the bonds that bind society together such as religion and the law, 
whilst not necessarily believing in them themselves, and exercising a covert rule 
over the ‘gentlemen’ (those who publicly rule), has a certain resonance in terms 
of the activities of the neoconservatives who rose to prominence under the 
administration of President Bush. There is also an important implication for the 
interpretation of freedom within these aspects of Straussian thought. There is a 
clear assumption that mass democracy is a bad thing,48 that the people cannot be 
trusted with the truth, and that there is a group of people – the unelected 
‘philosophers’ – who have privileged knowledge about what is best for ‘the city’ 
even if the mass of the people do not know it themselves. Beneath the surface 
seems to lurk the claim that a person’s actual desires may be mistaken, that they 
can be manipulated in the name of their true selves toward what is good for the 
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city which is of course what they would really desire if they only knew better, i.e. 
what the philosophers know.  
The suspicion that Strauss’s thought embraces a totalitarian strand cannot 
be entirely dispelled. Shadia Drury, for example – certainly a somewhat fierce 
critic – has claimed that what Strauss really believed in was ‘the covert tyranny 
of the wise’.49 Furthermore, Strauss seemed opposed to the very idea of an open 
society and nurtured a belief in the possibility of human perfection: ‘An open or 
all-comprehensive society will exist on a lower level of humanity than a closed 
society which through generations has made a supreme effort toward human 
perfection’.50This is the very philosophical framework which embraces the 
possibility that men can be led or coerced toward a perfection (the nature of 
which is to be decided, presumably, by those who are privileged to know what is 
best) and that is therefore liable to interpret freedom in its positive sense.       
 A more revealing clue as to the place and nature of freedom within 
Strauss’s thought can be found in his views concerning Hobbes, and, to a lesser 
degree, Locke. For Strauss, Hobbes is the key figure in the modern project. 
Hobbes is represented by Strauss as a rebel against the tradition of Western 
political thought as expressed in the ideas of Socrates, Plato, Cicero, Aristotle, 
Seneca, Tacitus, and Plutarch.51 Hobbes was indeed unique in his belief that 
political society should be formulated in accordance with what he (Hobbes) 
believed to be the true nature of human beings, in which the prime driver was 
the satisfaction of pleasure. This was in contrast to the idea that political society 
should be constructed around some as yet unrealised, or unrealisable, ideal of 
human nature. Human nature, as Hobbes perceived it, was no threat to political 
society and he maintained that the hedonist conception of the good is the natural 
foundation of politics. As Drury points out, the ancients regarded the community 
as more than the sum of individuals and, as described earlier in this chapter, the 
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classical republican ideal required an individual’s interests to be sacrificed to the 
good of the whole.52 
Hobbes’s belief that good political order can be constructed with flawed 
human material and that political society can ensure the satisfaction of human 
appetites represented a significant break with this tradition. For Strauss, the 
notion that individuals need not be prepared to sacrifice their interests for the 
community, and that private interests can be advanced by being part of political 
society, is one of the ideas that will prove to be the ruin of Western civilisation. 
The second and linked idea, which Strauss also attributes to Hobbes, is the 
notion that a technological society would provide a successful means to the 
realisation of the end of modern politics, namely, the maximum satisfaction of 
desires. This suggestion of a conquest of nature runs directly counter, in Strauss’s 
view, to the wisdom of the ancients, who knew that mastery over nature cannot 
replace mastery over oneself.53 This view may in part help to explain the 
neoconservative hostility towards science discussed in Chapter Six. 
Strauss acknowledges the centrality of Locke’s thought in the founding 
doctrine, but it gives him no great pleasure to do so. What really interests Strauss 
about Locke is the latter’s ideas concerning property and his justification of the 
right of property accumulation. For Strauss this shifted the centre of the moral 
universe away from nature and towards individual creativity as the source of all 
value. ‘Not resigned gratitude and consciously obeying or imitating nature, but 
hopeful self-reliance and creativity became henceforth the marks of human 
nobility’, Strauss writes of the Lockean revolution.54 Instead of being a cause for 
celebration, this is a cause of contemporary dissatisfactions. Strauss viewed 
Locke as a ‘hedonist’ who ‘emancipated man from all the bonds set by nature as 
well as all social and political arrangements that are not the outcome of our free 
                                                
52 Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss, p. 135. 
53 Ibid., p. 139. 
54 Smith, Reading Leo Strauss, pp. 171–72. 
 119 
agreement or consent’. 55 The result is an aimless search for pleasure; the world is 
‘disenchanted’ and ‘life is the joyless quest for joy’.56 For Strauss, Locke’s ideas in 
which the end of society is not ‘excellence’, but ‘commodious living’ were 
thoroughly modern. They had the effect of entrenching modernity and making 
Hobbes’s ideas respectable.57  
These summarised Straussian critiques of Hobbes and Locke reveal a 
particular attitude towards political society and the nature of freedom within it. 
It is indeed the case that Hobbes accepted the flawed nature of man, but he did 
not believe that made political society impossible. It did, however, require a form 
of social contract in which the sovereign is ceded almost unlimited power by the 
citizenry. There is a neat fit between Hobbes’s two most paradoxical tenets: his 
belief in the unbounded and various desires of individuals, and his advocacy of 
political authoritarianism. It was his view that only an all-powerful sovereign 
could guarantee to control the unpredictable and individualist nature of man. 
What is revealing in Strauss’s view of Hobbes is the notion that the latter’s 
acceptance of the flawed nature of man is mistaken, the start of the doomed 
modern project. What Strauss appears to suggest is that it is not the role of 
political society (or ‘the city’) to accept the nature of man, but to change it. This is 
redolent of the features of classical or neo-Roman republicanism in which civic 
virtue is placed at a higher level of importance than individual freedom. In 
addition, the notion of the ‘mastery of the self’, which obviously appeals to 
Strauss, also carries with it the implication that the self is divided; that there is a 
higher self that needs to master the appetites and desires of the lower self.  As 
discussed above, the self that is master of itself is rarely the actual empirical self, 
with all its idiosyncrasies, embarrassments, etc. In positive accounts of freedom it 
is typically an abstract self, an exemplar of rational humanity, indistinguishable 
from any other. In this view, the root of freedom that lies in the differences 
                                                
55 Smith, pp. 171–72. 
56 Cited in ibid. 
57 Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss, p. 145. 
 120 
amongst individuals, and in the conflicts among the goods they pursue, has 
disappeared.  The critique of Locke insofar as he is accused of leading society 
away from ‘excellence’ also begs questions about the nature of ‘excellence’ and 
whose ideas of what it comprises should prevail and why.  
All of these features of Strauss’s thought therefore seem to suggest that he 
favoured the concept of positive freedom as defined by Berlin; that he believed in 
some form of universalism (the truth) and that the role of society, and indeed 
society’s rulers, was to coerce man toward virtue (or excellence), the nature of 
which is the privileged knowledge of the elites. As Strauss himself expressed it: 
‘True liberals today have no more pressing duty than to counteract the perverted 
liberalism’ which contends “that just to live, securely and happily, and protected 
and unregulated, is man’s simple and supreme goal” and that ‘forgets quality, 
excellence or virtue’.58 The conditions described in the first half of the sentence 
are clearly those in which Berlin’s notion of negative liberty can flourish. It is the 
attempts by governments to coerce men towards the objectives described in the 
second half of the sentence that are so liable to produce the perversion of liberty 
about which Berlin warned.   
Unsurprisingly, Strauss was critical of Berlin’s essay ‘Two Concepts of 
Liberty’, regarding it, according to Kenneth Hart Green, not as enlightening but 
as ‘a characteristic document of the crisis of liberalism’. This crisis of liberalism 
‘is due to the fact that [it] has abandoned its absolutist basis and is trying to 
become entirely relativistic’.59 Strauss believed that the fatal flaw in Berlin’s 
argument arises in essence from his already compromised aim, which is to 
establish ‘an impossible middle ground between relativism and absolutism.’60 It 
is doubtful that Berlin would have recognised this as his aim, compromised or 
otherwise, and indeed there is nothing in the text of the essay that suggests he 
                                                
58Cited in Deutsch,  ‘Leo Strauss, the Straussians, and the American Regime’,  p. 52.  
59 Kenneth Hart Green, in ‘Introduction: Leo Strauss as a Modern Jewish Thinker’, in Jewish Philosophy 
and the Crisis of Modernity: Essays and Lectures in Modern Jewish Thought, by Leo Strauss, ed. by 
Kenneth Hart Green (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 1–84 (p. 80). 
60 Ibid.  
 121 
had such an aim at all. His declared objective was to answer, as he put it, ‘the 
central question of politics – the question of obedience and coercion’.61 In trying 
to answer the various facets of this question, Berlin constructed an analysis that 
recognised the imperfectability of man, and refuted the dangerous notion that 
there exists a set of absolute values or some kind of universal truth that all men 
must be taught to acknowledge. This does not seem to be a compromising of 
liberalism but an articulation of its essence.    
Berlin disagreed with Strauss’s doctrines ‘in principle’. He thought that 
Strauss’s theory of esotericism was fanciful and ‘wrongheaded’, and his 
(Strauss’s) rejection of the post-Renaissance world as hopelessly corrupted by 
positivism and empiricism ‘bordered on the absurd’. Asked about Strauss’s 
critique of modernity Berlin’s response was: 
 
I have little sympathy with it. He did try to convert me in many conversations 
when I was a visitor in Chicago, but he could not get me to believe in eternal, 
immutable, absolute values, true for all men everywhere at all times, God-given 
Natural Law and the like. He [and his disciples] appear to me to believe in 
absolute good and evil, right and wrong, directly perceived by a kind of a priori 
vision, a metaphysical eye – by the use of a Platonic rational faculty which has 
not been granted to me. Plato, Aristotle, the Bible, the Talmud, Maimonides, 
perhaps Aquinas, and the other Scholastics of the Middle Ages, knew what was 
the best for men. So did he [Strauss], and his disciples claim this today. I am not 
so privileged.    
   
He went on:  
Perhaps there is a world of eternal truths, values, which the magic eye of the true 
thinker can perceive – surely this can only belong to an elite to which I fear I 
have never been admitted.62  
 
Many of Strauss’s ideas were echoed strongly by Irving Kristol and Allan 
Bloom. Irving Kristol, who identified Strauss among his chief influences,63 shared 
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the latter’s distrust of modernity. He also, following Strauss, blamed Machiavelli 
for the modern project and the debasement of political virtues,64 and claimed that 
liberalism itself was a mistaken political ideal responsible for the ills of the 
present, in particular a decline in the importance placed upon the values 
engendered by religion and tradition. In a revealing essay entitled ‘My Cold 
War’ (1995), Kristol wrote: 
  
What is wrong with liberalism is liberalism – a metaphysics and a mythology 
that is woefully blind to human and political reality. […] There is no ‘after the 
Cold War’ for me. So far from having ended, my cold war has increased in 
intensity, as sector after sector of American life has been ruthlessly corrupted by 
the liberal ethos.65  
 
What Kristol, and others who helped develop the neoconservative ideology 
were struggling with as they railed against relativism, the counterculture of the 
1960s, postmodernism, and what Kristol called ‘the dominance of a form of 
nihilism’,66 was the relationship between traditional morality, rooted in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, and unrestricted free-market economics. Their anxiety 
seems to have been, in part at least, induced by the awareness that capitalism 
undermined the very virtues that had built it in the first place and were required 
to underpin it. As David Graham and Peter Clarke point out, ‘Kristol does not 
accept that a capitalist system produces the morality needed to sustain it’.67 For 
Kristol and others, on the contrary, the free market had an inbuilt tendency to 
subvert traditions; free people failed to exercise their freedom in ways that 
promoted virtue, causing turbulence in terms of both culture and morality. This 
is something of a disabling paradox: neoconservatives wish to liberate market 
forces yet lament their effects. Kristol expressed the dilemma thus: ‘What if the 
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“self” that is “realised” under the conditions of liberal capitalism is a self that 
despises liberal capitalism, and uses its liberty to subvert and abolish a free 
society?’.68   
Kristol grounded elements of his political thought in the republican virtue 
tradition, which emphasised the responsibilities of self-government rather than 
entitlement rights or the fairness of institutional arrangements. For Kristol, 
certain forms of authoritarianism were superior to degraded democracies – 
which at times he seemed to believe America was becoming – and he shared the 
sentiment of his mentor, Leo Strauss, that the state was responsible for shaping 
and reinforcing the moral virtue of its citizens.69 The way in which these ideas 
were manifested in aspects of the Bush administration’s policies is referred to in 
particular in Chapter Six. 
The value system that Kristol sought to sustain and transmit is manifested 
within bourgeois society. For this to be achieved, the right kind of person needs 
to be produced. ‘We are bourgeois’, said Kristol, adding: 
 
It is bourgeois society that produces the kinds of people who make a free market 
work and who make capitalism acceptable […] The first job of a civilization is to 
produce a certain kind of person. What we are looking for is an intellectual way 
of connecting the free market with an attitude towards life that is not economic 
but derived from religion, or at least from traditional values….A free market, in 
and of itself, doesn’t tell you what kind of person to produce. A free market 
involves only the exercise of self-interest within a limited sphere, namely the 
economy. But you need an ethos that tells you how to raise your children, 
whether you should marry or stay married, whether you should be loyal to your 
friends or to your government.70          
 
The free market then, fails to secure the loyalty to religion and traditional 
values that Kristol regarded as essential, and liberal individualism, he believed, 
cannot be relied upon to deliver the right kind of bourgeois citizen. 
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For [liberal individualism] to work, it needs a certain kind of people, with a 
certain kind of character, and with a certain cast of mind. Specifically, it needs 
what David Riesman calls ‘inner-directed’ people – people of firm moral 
convictions, a people of self-reliance and self-discipline, a people who do not 
expect the universe to be offering them something for nothing – in short, a 
people with a non-utopian character even if their language is shot through with 
utopian clichés. The kind of person I am describing may be called the bourgeois 
citizen. He used to exist in large numbers, but now is on the verge of becoming 
an extinct species. He has been killed off by bourgeois prosperity, which has 
corrupted his character from that of a citizen to that of a consumer.71 
   
What becomes apparent in Kristol’s ideas is the same belief in traditional 
values and the virtues of organised religion that underpinned much of Strauss’s 
thought. Without them, freedom is likely to corrupt, evidenced by the changes 
wrought in the cultural world. What Kristol abhorred was twentieth-century 
culture’s tendency, as he saw it, to embrace the very qualities that tended ‘to 
disestablish the family as the cultural institution of human society, the citadel of 
orthodoxy’, namely alienation, and indignation and outrage at orthodoxy of all 
kinds.72 Man is not seen in the Kantian sense that inspired Berlin, as an end in 
himself, but merely as a cog in the kind of society that Kristol wants. The right 
kind of cog/person must be ‘produced’ to contribute towards a higher end. This 
is an end which of course men would choose if they were enlightened, but do 
not, presumably, because of ignorance or blindness.  
Kristol implicitly (as does Bloom, see below), makes the claim that he knows 
what are in men’s best interests, a crucial characteristic of the perversion to 
which positive liberty is prone.  The plurality of choice that underpins Berlin’s 
ideal of negative liberty becomes for Kristol part of the problem of modern 
society. In the light of such views, it is not surprising to note that for Kristol, the 
legacy of freedom located within the founding doctrine, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, is viewed as something of a mixed blessing. Referring to Adam 
Smith and the Founding Fathers, Kristol wrote: ‘After two hundred years, their 
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[the Founding Fathers’] system of natural liberty has, by its very success, 
reopened fundamental questions as to the good life and the good society, and the 
meaning of life itself, which they felt no need to address themselves to’ (my italics).73 
That the founders may well have deliberately placed their faith in a non-coercive 
ideal of freedom in which men could flourish in whichever way they choose 
appears not to have occurred to Kristol.  
Kristol claimed that neoconservatism provided traditional conservatism 
with an intellectual dimension that went beyond economics and reflected upon 
on the roots of social and cultural stability. This was the fertile ground cultivated 
by Allan Bloom, a student of Leo Strauss, in his important work The Closing of the 
American Mind (1987) that arguably can be read as a popularisation of some of 
the complex positions held by Strauss himself. In the writings of Bloom it is also 
possible to detect the same unease with the manifestations of the free market as 
is evident in the thought of Kristol. What Bloom identified as the main source of 
concern is the tension between the demands of the free market and the culture it 
produces, what he called the dualism in contemporary American life.74 Like 
Kristol, Bloom was also highly critical of liberalism, seeing it as responsible for 
encouraging what he believed to be an irresponsible degree of pluralism and a 
multiplicity of ways of life and values, so preventing the emergence of a 
‘collective consciousness’.75 The central complaint, once again, is the 
pervasiveness of relativism and the perception that, as with Strauss, a belief in 
natural rights has given way to what he calls ‘openness’. Natural rights, and the 
historical origins of American society are forgotten in a new culture that is open 
to all kinds of men, all ideologies, all kinds of life-styles. Bloom argued that in 
such a culture where there are no shared goals or vision of the public good, the 
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possibility of the social contract is undermined.76 Openness only teaches that 
cultural values are relative and destroys ‘the West’s universal or imperialistic 
claims, leaving it to be just another culture’.77 Sharing Strauss’s belief in the crisis 
of the West, Bloom believed that deprived of this cultural imperative, the West 
will collapse. 
Like Strauss, Bloom lamented the disappearance of an aristocracy78 and the 
decline of family values, the present ‘dreariness’ of whose spiritual values 
‘passes belief’.79 The family is the transmitter of traditions to which societies 
must cleave, guided by the right kind of books: 
 
The family requires the most delicate mixture of nature and convention, of 
human and divine, to subsist and perform its function. It feeds on books, in 
which the little polity – the family – believes, which tell about right and wrong, 
good and bad, and explain why they are so.80 
  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Bloom saw the Bible as a unifying force in society, 
‘as the very model for a vision of the order of the whole of things’. Revealing his 
commitment to a universal, single version of ‘the truth’, he goes on: ‘With [the 
Bible’s] gradual and inevitable disappearance, the very idea of such a total book 
and the possibility and necessity of a world explanation is disappearing.’81  
Perhaps an even more obvious clue to the character of Bloom’s thought is 
his attitude towards Rousseau, whom he quotes with apparent approval. Bloom 
claimed that Rousseau argued that ‘a people’ will not automatically result from 
individual men’s enlightenment about their self-interest; a political deed is 
necessary. He cites Rousseau’s The Social Contract on the role of the legislator 
who must 
 
                                                
76 Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind, p. 27. 
77 Ibid., p. 39. 
78 Ibid., p. 89. 
79 Ibid., p. 57. 
80 Ibid., p. 57. 
81 Ibid., p. 58. 
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so to speak change human nature, transform each individual, who by himself is a 
perfect and solitary whole, into part of a greater whole from which that 
individual as it were gets his life and being; weaken man’s constitution to 
strengthen it; substitute partial and moral existence for the physical and 
independent existence which we have all received from nature. He must, in a 
word, take man’s own forces away from him in order to give him forces which 
are foreign to him and which he cannot use without the help of others. The more 
the natural forces are dead and annihilated, the greater and more lasting the 
acquired ones, thus the founding is solider and more perfect; such that if each 
citizen is nothing, can do nothing, except by all others, and the force acquired by 
the whole is equal or superior to the sum of the natural forces of all the 
individuals, one can say that the legislation is at the highest point of perfection it 
can attain.82    
 
Bloom admitted that changing human nature seems a brutal and nasty 
thing to do and that Rousseau’s ideas therefore faded in popularity, but this 
retreat signalled a denial, over time, that there was such a thing as human nature. 
Man becomes not a natural being but a culture being. Rousseau maintains, 
according to Bloom, the tension between nature and the political order. The role 
of the legislator is to force the two into a kind of harmony. Bloom suggested that 
all Rousseau was doing was arguing that Hobbes and Locke fell short in their 
desire to secure equal natural rights in civil society because ‘self-interest is not 
enough to found political morality on’.83 Universality and a singular culture, 
characteristic of Rousseau’s thought, have given way to cultures, respect for 
which Bloom seemed to see as incompatible with respect for human or natural 
rights. 
This evident empathy with Rousseau’s ideas and his interpretation of them 
are perhaps not surprising. Even so, what Bloom overlooks, perhaps deliberately, 
is the treacherous undertow in the current of Rousseau’s thought, which Berlin  
highlighted.84 Rousseau, according to Berlin, believed that ‘everything could be 
discovered by mere unobstructed observation of nature, of actual three-
                                                
82 Cited in Ibid., p. 189. 
83 Ibid. 
84 For complete understanding of Berlin’s views on Rousseau see Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, in Freedom and its 
Betrayal, pp. 27–49. 
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dimensional nature, of nature simply in the sense of objects in space – human 
beings and animals and inanimate objects’.85 Rousseau launched the mythology 
of the real self, in the name of which it is permissible to coerce people. He was 
responsible for the ‘monstrous paradox’  
 
whereby liberty turns out to be a kind of slavery, whereby to want something is 
not to want it at all unless you want it in a special way, such as that you can say 
to a man: ‘You may think that you are free, you may think that you are happy, 
you may think that you want this or that, but I know better what you are, what 
you want, what will liberate you,’ and so on.86 
       
Whilst this is a criticism of Rousseau, rather than Bloom, nothing could 
better encapsulate the underlying assumptions about the nature of freedom 
which can be detected in the latter’s thought. Bloom knows which universal 
values need to be applied, which ‘great books’ should be read, and which form of 
ideology should be followed. Those who argue for relativism in culture, 
pluralism in ideas or fail to see the Bible as relevant to their lives, are simply 
unaware of what they really need and want. The implication in Bloom’s thinking, 
as Berlin reveals in that of Rousseau, is that if they really knew what they 
wanted, such people would of course be liberated in some higher, deeper, more 
rational, more natural sense. This is the route by which, as Berlin pointed out, 
freedom becomes perverted so as to mean and become its opposite. 
 
IV CONCLUSIONS  
 
Whilst it is not possible to undertake an exhaustive review of neoconservative 
thought, it is nevertheless reasonable, having considered the ideas of three of its  
most influential theorists, to draw a number of conclusions about its nature and 
the interpretation of freedom that is embedded within it. As explained above, 
                                                
85 Ibid., p. 48. 
86 Ibid. 
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neoconservativism is a radical ideology. It departs from traditional conservatism 
in a number of key areas and in recent years appears to have embraced a strand 
of utopianism that traditional conservatism eschews. Although it embraces the 
capitalist free market, which encourages bourgeois values, it is at the same time 
uneasy with the unbridled individualism to which the free market gives rise. As 
a counterweight to what it perceives as the threat of relativism and nihilism to 
which unlimited individual choice gives rise, it seeks to encourage a set of values 
based upon family, cultural nationalism, and religion. Its stance is fundamentally 
authoritarian, militarist, and redolent of the moral monism that suggests there 
must exist some final objective answers to human dilemmas. It is mistrustful of 
mass democracy and believes it is the role of elites to both define what 
constitutes virtue and encourage society towards its achievement.  
 Most importantly, in the context of this thesis, neoconservatism is shown to 
be grounded in, or at least share a great deal of common ground with, the 
republican virtue tradition. The writings of neoconservative theorists, certainly 
those discussed in this chapter, are all consistent with this tradition in which the 
place of virtue is central. As the previous chapter demonstrated, the republican 
virtue tradition did not achieve any lasting hegemony, despite its influence in the 
early years of the Republic. The question of whose idea of virtue should prevail, 
and how men are to be led or coerced towards it, is the unanswered question that 
perhaps led to the demise of the republican virtue tradition and the rise of 
Lockean liberalism, as post-Revolutionary Americans became more comfortable 
with the idea of government of the self. It was also evident from the last chapter 
that the ideal of freedom embedded within the republican virtue tradition closely 
mirrored many of the characteristics located within Berlin’s concept of positive 
liberty. The interpretation of freedom embraced by neoconservatism can 
therefore be similarly defined.  
Using the same analytical paradigm in respect of the more detailed ideas of 
the three prominent neoconservative theorists discussed in Section III reinforces 
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this general conclusion. Straussian ideas rest upon notions of absolute values and 
the belief that elites are best placed to lead men towards a virtuous society. There 
is a strand of elitism and authoritarianism in his thinking, as well as a belief that 
‘mass democracy’ is flawed. For Strauss and for Kristol and Bloom, the ideal 
political society is not one that treats man as an end in himself, and creates the 
conditions in which the individual can exercise maximum choice (the conditions 
of negative liberty), but a society in which men are led, or perhaps even coerced 
towards eternal and absolute truths, for the sake of their ‘true’ or ‘better’ selves.    
Much of the thought of Strauss, Kristol, and Bloom therefore, reveals a 
rejection of many of the values and conditions that Berlin believed enabled 
negative liberty to flourish. Their disdain for the modern project, of man as he is, 
rather than as he should be, together with their pronounced unease with free 
market outcomes, led these founding neoconservatives towards a concept of 
freedom that Berlin identified as being positive in nature. The underlying 
common ground amongst them is the notion that genuine freedom is the 
opportunity to pursue the good, that all true goods are compatible with one 
another, and are the same for everyone. In such a society there would indeed be 
little conflict in values, ideals, or interests. There would be a harmony of free 
rational wills, similar to the way that Rousseau visualized it in his notion of the 
General Will. The implication of this illiberal vision is that moral, social, or 
political conflict is a symptom of unreason, immorality, or error. Conflict in these 
areas is diagnosed as being in some way inherently pathological, a view which 
for Berlin was always to be detected in totalitarianism. 
This is, therefore, a deeply significant divergence from the ideal of freedom 
that, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, became rooted in the American 
tradition: one that was negative in character and nature. How the domination of 
the neoconservative vision of freedom was manifested in policy terms, and how 
deeply it diverged from the American tradition, are the main focus of the 
chapters that follow.  
 131 
CHAPTER FIVE: FREEDOM AS FOREIGN POLICY  
 
I would think it a great misfortune for humanity if liberty had to take the 
same form in every place.1 
 
 
The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our 
country. From the Fourteen Points to the Four Freedoms, to the Speech at 
Westminster, America has put our power at the service of principle. We 
believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty is the 
direction of history. […]  And as we meet the terror and violence of the 
world, we can be certain the author of freedom is not indifferent to the fate 















                                               
1 Alexis de Tocqueville cited in Hugh Brogan, Alexis de Tocqueville:The Prophet of Modern 
Democracy (London: Profile, 2006), p. 272. 
2 President George W. Bush, ‘President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and the Middle East’, 
Remarks at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy’, United States Chamber 
of Commerce,Washington D.C., 6 November, 2003. 




The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate, using the analytical framework 
previously referred to, the way in which the foreign policy of the Bush 
administration revealed the nature of its interpretation of freedom, both in 
terms of the policy goals themselves and in the way in which it set about 
achieving them. In order to achieve this objective, the chapter considers the 
early foreign policy influences that later coalesced into what became known 
as the ‘Freedom Agenda’; the overarching ‘war on terror’ that translated these 
policy ideas into an action programme; some aspects of the Iraq war; and 
lastly, but by no means least, the use of torture as an instrument of State 
policy. This is, of course, by no means a complete review of the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy in all theatres of activity, but these are 
important examples that illustrate the nature of the administration’s 
interpretation of freedom.    
The foreign policy of the Bush administration may be regarded as the 
ultimate expression of the neoconservative world view. It was the 
embodiment of what the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr warned against when 
writing about the moral dilemmas America faced whilst opposing 
communism in 1952. With prescient aptness he warned against ‘our dreams of 
managing history’ and the temptations of ‘preventive war’. ‘A democracy’, he 
wrote, ‘can not of course engage in explicit preventive war. But military 
leadership can heighten crises to the point where war becomes unavoidable’.3   
Although it cannot be argued that the Bush administration constituted a 
‘military leadership’ as such, the extreme patriotism that it helped to generate, 
and the apocalyptic tone that enveloped public discourse following the events 
of 9/11, led to the so-called ‘war on terror’ and the implementation of long-
cherished neoconservative militaristic policies. These policies reflected, to no 
small extent, the strands of radical, religious, and utopian Enlightenment 
                                               
3 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1954),  
pp. 3, 146.  
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thought referred to in Chapter Four. It is the belief that evil can be eradicated, 
and the notion that human life itself can be altered, and even perfected, in the 
American image which can most clearly be discerned within various strands 
of the Bush administration’s foreign policy, as well as a Hegelian 
interpretation of history. Such notions, whilst clearly part of the Western 
tradition, have, as John Gray points out, always been prone to lead to 
violence, and the idea of  ‘taking humanity by force’, although hardly new, 
invariably ends in the catastrophes to which the twentieth century was all too 
frequently the witness.4  
Such ideas also reflect a view that freedom in the foreign policy context 
is something which can, as Anthony Burke expresses it, be ‘waged’.5 Freedom 
is not only a value America is bound to deliver to the rest of the world by 
example – something that Tom Paine clearly believed and which is a notion of 
historical destiny deeply embedded within the American tradition. It is also a 
value towards which other nations may be, or, in the neoconservative view, 
should be, coerced. The Bush administration’s interpretation of freedom, as 
embodied in its foreign policy, was, it may be argued, tainted by power and 
self-interest. Freedom was conflated with American pre-eminence and 
hegemony, driven by patriotic self-regard, becoming a kind of ‘unfreedom’ 
which sought to destroy its enemies, and which gloried in its power. In short, 
it was an embodiment of the idea of freedom that is the very antithesis of 
Berlin’s notion of negative liberty which, as Chapter Three demonstrated, is 
located within the pluralism of the American tradition. President Bush sought 
to use freedom as a cornerstone of his foreign policy, attempting to use the 
value embedded within America’s past to serve a future that his 
administration would fashion. To a limited extent this theme could be 
detected prior to the events of 11 September, 2001 but it was at that point that 
it became linked to the neoconservative foreign policy agenda and the 
discourse of freedom began to take shape. In a 2.30 p.m. address at an air 
                                               
4 Gray, Black Mass, p. 35. 
5 Anthony Burke, ‘Freedom’s Freedom : American Enlightenment and Permanent War’, Social 
Identities, Vol. 11, Issue 4, July 2005, pp. 315–340 (p. 316). 
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force base in Louisiana, where he was taken after the initial attacks, President 
Bush declared: ‘Freedom itself was attacked this morning by a faceless 
coward. And freedom will be defended’.6 In those two sentences the President 
identifies the State and his presidency with an ideal. Freedom resides within 
the State of America; in a sense it is the state, the state defines it. It is not 
merely a value capable of different philosophical interpretations, it is an 
absolute good which is embodied in America and which is America’s to 
defend. How the discourse of freedom was developed within the context of 
foreign policy and its traditional meaning distorted is the overarching theme 
of this chapter. 
 
II THE ORIGINS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S 
FOREIGN POLICY 
     
Before considering the development of the freedom discourse in the context of 
the Bush administration’s foreign policy, it is useful to consider, briefly, some 
of that policy’s political, philosophical, and indeed cultural origins, 
particularly as reflected in neoconservative thought.  
Whilst the neoconservative view of America’s place in the world did not 
reject an imperialist stance, and took for granted America’s rightful pre-
eminence, it is mistaken to see the foreign policy of the Bush administration as 
simply a continuation of a well-understood ‘realist’ foreign policy architecture 
that had been adhered to by most previous administrations, Republican and 
Democrat. What differentiated the Bush foreign policy, as moulded by the 
neoconservatives, was not simply a view that foreign policy must, above all, 
be designed to protect America’s strategic interests, or belief in the rightful 
pre-eminence of American power. Rather, it was a conviction that America 
had the right, perhaps even the duty, to use American power to change the 
world into a political, military, and economic configuration which best suited 
                                               
6 President George W. Bush, ‘Remarks at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana – 9/11’ 11 September 
2001 <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911barksdale.htm>  
[accessed 24 September 2010].  
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its interests. This was not simply a posture of self-defence; it adopted and 
articulated, perhaps for the first time, the doctrine of pre-emption, which was 
grounded in the idea of stemming and reversing American decline. Strauss’s 
cultural ‘crisis of the West’ translated, as it were, into military and foreign 
policy terms.  
The years of President Clinton’s presidency (1993–2001) in particular, 
were seen by the neoconservatives as fostering this declinism and their 
Washington think tanks, particularly PNAC articulated early versions of the 
characteristics of what was to become Bush foreign policy. Perhaps the 
earliest was Paul Wolfowitz’s Defence Planning Guide (a draft of which was 
leaked to the press in 1992), which spoke of the US intention to maintain ‘full 
spectrum dominance’ over all other countries on earth.7 More overt evidence 
of neoconservative thinking appeared in July 1996, when Robert Kagan and 
William Kristol published an article in Foreign Affairs entitled ‘Towards a Neo-
Reaganite Foreign Policy’. The neoconservative authors of this article argued 
for was what they termed ‘benevolent global hegemony’ in which pre-
emption was an enabling element. Highlighting the themes of decline and 
weakness the article stated: 
 
In a world in which peace and American security depend on American power and 
the will to use it, the main threat the United States faces now and in the future is its 
own weakness. American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown 
of peace and international order. The appropriate goal of American foreign policy, 
therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as possible. To achieve 
this goal, the United States needs a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military 
supremacy and moral confidence.8 
  
Arguing for what it termed ‘moral clarity’ – clearly a reference to the 
moral relativism which the neoconservatives had long believed to be a cause 
of American decline and weakness – the article went on: 
                                               
7 Ashley Dawson and Malini Johar Schueller, ‘Introduction’ in  Exceptional State: Contemporary U.S. 
Culture and the New Imperialism, ed. by Ashley Dawson and Malini Johar Schueller (London: Duke 
University Press, 2007), pp. 1–21 (p. 17). 
8 Robert Kagan and William Kristol, ‘Towards a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, July 
–August 1996, reprinted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=276> [accessed 12 March 
2009]. 
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American foreign policy should be informed with a clear moral purpose, based on 
the understanding that its moral goals and its fundamental national interests are 
almost always in harmony. The United States achieved its present position of 
strength not by practicing a foreign policy of live and let live, nor by passively 
waiting for threats to arise, but by actively promoting American principles of 
governance abroad – democracy, free markets, respect for liberty.9 
 
Instead of an acceptance of the natural rivalries between values and 
cultures – the basis of pluralism – this paragraph illustrates clearly the desire 
for a single moral order, defined as a harmony between ‘moral goals’ and 
American national interest.  
The idea of pre-emption was raised again in January 1998 in a letter from 
the PNAC to President Clinton. This letter argued that the then current 
method of monitoring Iraq was inadequate and failed to deal with the 
probable manufacture and possible use by Saddam Hussein of weapons of 
mass destruction. The only strategy that should be pursued was the removal 
of Saddam Hussein’s regime, by any possible means including military 
action, and this should be the principal aim of American foreign policy. The 
letter suggested: ‘If we accept a course of weakness and drift, we put our 
interests and our future at risk.’ Appealing for unilateral action the letter also 
warned: ‘American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided 
insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council’.10The letter was signed 
by a number of people who later found themselves in a position to influence 
and shape American foreign policy, including Elliott Abrams, John Bolton, 
Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.  
More general foreign policy and defence sentiments were expounded in 
a paper produced by the PNAC in September 2000 entitled Rebuilding 
America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New Century, which 
echoed similar themes. It expressed the view that as the US faced no global 
rival, America’s grand strategy ‘should aim to preserve and extend this 
advantageous position as far into the future as possible’. This was a ‘unipolar 
moment’ in which the opportunity should be seized in the coming century to 
                                               
9 Ibid. 
10 PNAC, ‘Letter to President Clinton on Iraq’, 26 January 1998 
<http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm> [accessed 2 April 2009].  
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preserve and enhance an ‘American peace’ and construct an unchallengeable 
military dominance. According to the paper there were four core missions for 
American forces: defence of the homeland; the ability to fight multiple 
simultaneous wars; the capacity to perform constabulary duties associated 
with shaping the security environment in critical regions; and the 
transformation of US forces to exploit the ‘revolution in military affairs’.11 
Whilst the paper called for an increase in armed forces and the maintenance 
of nuclear superiority, which again supported the idea of underlying 
American ‘weakness’, the emphasis was more upon the opportunity which 
presented itself to secure an American hegemony – an ‘American century’ in 
fact. It is noteworthy that the document appears to recommend an invasion of 
Iraq:  
 
While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need 
for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the 
regime of Saddam Hussein.12    
 
The sense of opportunity in neoconservative thinking at this time may 
well have been a reflection of the influential views expressed by the historian 
Francis Fukuyama in his celebrated essay entitled ‘The End of History?’, 
published in National Interest (founded by Irving Kristol), in the summer of 
1989.13 In this article, which contained an acknowledgement to Allan Bloom 
(under whom he studied) and over which Fukuyama has since expressed 
some reservations, he argued that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
liberal democracy has triumphed as the universal ideology that will prevail in 
the long term. It is the condition to which most, perhaps even all, nations will 
aspire. The Western idea, as he expressed it, had no viable challengers.14 In 
reaching these conclusions, Fukuyama drew to some extent upon Alexandre 
Kojève, the Russian-born philosopher with whom Leo Strauss had maintained 
                                               
11 PNAC, ‘Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New Century’ 
<http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf> [accessed 14 March 2009].  
12 Ibid., p. 14. 
13 Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, in National Interest, Summer 1989 
<http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm> [accessed 14 June 2009].  
14 Ibid. 
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a long intellectual engagement and correspondence.15 Kojève sought, in the 
1930s, to restore the reputation of Hegel as the philosopher who proclaimed 
history to be at an end following Napoleon’s defeat of the Prussian army at 
the Battle of Jena in 1806. This victory is interpreted as signalling the triumph 
of the ideals of the French Revolution.  
Fukuyama seems to have considerable sympathy with Hegel’s view of 
the nature of history. He suggests approvingly that Hegel, unlike ‘later 
historicists whose historical relativism degenerated into relativism tout court,  
believed that history culminated in an absolute moment – a moment in which 
a final, rational form of society and state became victorious’.16 Hegel is, 
apparently, the philosopher who ‘most correctly speaks to our time’ and 
Fukuyama clearly agrees with the notion which he attributes to Hegel, that 
‘the contradictions that drive history exist first of all in the realm of human 
consciousness, i.e. on the level of ideas […] ideas in the sense of large unifying 
world views that might best be understood under the rubric of ideology’.17  
That Fukuyama should be sympathetic to Hegel’s view of history is 
perhaps unsurprising, as in important ways it echoes elements of 
neoconservative philosophy, particularly as applied to foreign affairs. Hegel 
is one of the influential philosophers whom Berlin deemed to be hostile to 
human liberty and whose ideas have impacted upon modern times. 
According to Berlin, Hegel’s concept of history is that of progress through a 
series of jumps in which conflicts between nations and institutions are 
inevitable, each leap leading to a new synthesis. Sometimes individual heroes 
bring these leaps about – Napoleon, Caesar, Alexander the Great – but unless 
there is friction and upheaval of the kind these figures caused, there is no 
progress.18 History is not a smooth progression. There are crimes and 
tragedies but those are all part of its objective march; to condemn some parts 
of it and praise others is merely an indulgence in subjective moods. History is 
                                               
15 Nicholas Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue: Unveiling Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of American Foreign 
Policy, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008),  p. 117.  
16Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Berlin, ‘Hegel’in Freedom and its Betrayal,  pp. 74–104 (p. 84). 
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what Hegel calls the ‘slaughter-bench to which the happiness of peoples, the 
wisdom of States and the virtue of individuals have been brought as 
sacrifices’.19  
For Hegel, history is the universe on the march, working to an 
intelligible pattern, an irresistible force which acknowledges no moral codes 
or principles; what is right or wrong is what history promotes or rejects. 
History, for Hegel, makes demands and condemns those who fail it. Hegel, in 
Berlin’s view, uses and admires the imagery of power, the movement of force 
for its own sake, which Hegel sees as the divine process itself, ‘crushing 
whatever is to be crushed, enthroning those whose hour to dominate has 
struck’.20 As Joshua Cherniss expresses it in an introduction to Berlin’s 
Political Ideas in the Romantic Age, which also perhaps provides a prescient 
critique of the character of neoconservative foreign policy: 
 
Hegel, in Berlin’s mind, was on the side of the victors and dismissed the victims; his 
thought provided a justification for bullying and a glorification of strength. Hegel’s 
brand of historicism seemed to Berlin to share one of the greatest deficiencies of 
Enlightenment progressivism: an exultant faith in the march of progress which 
ignored its costs, and a denial of the reality of suffering and loss which encouraged 
its callous infliction.21 
 
Berlin was as suspicious of the idea that history, in some mysterious 
way, confers on us ‘rights’ to do this or that, as he was of the monistic 
assumption – often noticeable within the freedom discourse of the Bush 
administration – that all genuine questions are in principle answerable, and 
that there is one true possible solution. The idea that men should consider 
themselves a chosen instrument of history, carrying out its behests, and  
therefore entitled to claim our obedience accordingly (as, arguably, President 
Bush did) is for Berlin simply a way of avoiding the burden of moral choice. 
                                               
19 Cited in ibid., p. 90. 
20 Ibid., p. 95. 
21 Joshua L. Cherniss, ‘Isaiah Berlin’s Political Ideas: From the Twentieth Century to the Romantic 
Age’ in Isaiah Berlin’s Political Ideas in the Romantic Age: Their Rise and Influence on Modern 
Thought, ed. by Henry Hardy (London: Pimlico, 2007) pp. xxi–lx (p. l). 
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Historical necessity is false, we cannot know the future, and such a notion 
undermines the crucial concept of a choice of ends, and hence freedom itself.22     
As the Bush administration’s foreign policy played out in the wake of 
9/11, echoes of a Hegelian view of history can be detected in the rhetoric 
deployed to advance the administration’s case.23 In the late 1980s and the 
1990s, the neoconservatives clearly believed that it was they who were to be 
‘enthroned’ and America’s ‘hour to dominate’ (see Berlin quotation above) 
had struck. Flushed perhaps with their perceived success at having ‘won’ the 
Cold War through their support of President Reagan’s muscular anti-
communism, an opportunity to secure a neoconservative foreign policy in the 
coming decades was keenly awaited.  
A further influence upon neoconservatives at this time was Samuel 
Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations (1992)24 and Raphael Patai’s The Arab 
Mind (1973).25 Both in their respective ways reinforce the central claims made 
by Edward Said in his well-known work, Orientalism (1978). Said defined 
Orientalism as the ‘corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing 
with it, teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism is a Western 
style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient’.26   
Orientalism embodies the notion of ‘the Other’, which is an important 
element in the way societies construct a self-identity. Each age and society re-
creates its ‘Others’ and continually reinterprets the differences from ‘us’. The 
objection to Orientalism for Said wasn’t only that it is  
 
just the antiquarian study of Oriental languages, societies and peoples, but that as a 
system of thought it approaches a heterogeneous, dynamic, and complex human 
reality from an uncritically essentialist standpoint; this suggests both an enduring 
Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring Western essence, which 
observes the Orient from afar and, so to speak, from above.27   
 
                                               
22 Berlin, ‘A Letter to George Kennan’, in Liberty, pp. 336–344 (pp. 341–42). 
23 See for example the epigraph to this chapter. 
24 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 
1992). 
25 Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind, revised ed. (New York: Hutherleigh Press, 2002). 
26 Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 
p. 3. 
27 Ibid., p. 333. 
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In its extreme form, this Orientalism, predicated on power, renders 
contact between unequal cultures precarious, and no exchange is entirely 
innocent, containing as it does assumptions about superiority and inferiority. 
Halper and Clarke point out that neoconservatives draw upon the Orientalist 
assumption that the domination of the Orient by the West is normative. The 
delivery of Western political values to a region, (using coercive measures if 
necessary) that would otherwise not attain them, ‘draws on this belief that 
Western culture […] and American culture are both superior to non-Western 
political and cultural systems’.28   
In The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington argues that, in the new post-Cold 
War world, the rivalry of the former super powers is replaced by the clash of 
civilizations. The most dangerous conflicts of the future will be between 
peoples of different cultural identities.29 He highlights the absolute 
distinctions to be drawn between the East and the West in terms of culture 
and traditions, and the overwhelming responsibility of the United States ‘to 
preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of Western civilization’.30 A 
future global war, though improbable, could, he thinks, come from the 
‘escalation of a fault line war between groups from different civilizations, 
most likely involving Muslims on the one side and non-Muslims on the 
other’.31 The Arab Mind, a work excoriated by Said, focuses principally upon 
‘traditional components of the Arab personality’.32 Its very title suggests that 
it is possible and even desirable to reduce a set of cultural ideas and 
circumstances to a single concept. Although acknowledging differences 
between various Arab countries, it refers to such apparent constants as 
‘Muslim fatalism’, the importance of ‘face’ and ‘shame’ together with notions 
such as the ‘Arab temperament’ and ‘Arab thought processes’.33 This work 
was apparently used by some within the military as a definitive training text 
                                               
28 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, p. 270. 
29 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 28.   
30 Ibid., p. 311. 
31 Ibid., p. 312. 
32 Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind, p. 328. 
33 Ibid., pp. 328–30. 
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on ‘the Arabs’ and is described by the writer and academic Malini Johar 
Schueller as ‘consistent with Orientalist representations of the oversexed, 
irrational, traditional Arab male’.34 Both of the works referred to above have 
been credited with influencing the neoconservatives and speak to their vision 
of American leadership and dominance.  
Such influences also emanated from other sources and took the form of 
expert advisers. Writing in August, 2003, Said lamented the fact that the Iraq 
war was being fought by the United States on thoroughly ideological 
grounds, ‘but disguised for its true intent, hastened and reasoned for by 
orientalists who betrayed their calling as scholars’.35 According to Said, the 
major influences on the Pentagon and the National Security Council ‘were 
men such as Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami, experts on the Arab and 
Islamic world who helped the American hawks to think about such 
preposterous phenomena as the Arab mind and the centuries-old Islamic 
decline which only American power could reverse’.36 Bernard Lewis, a friend 
of Vice President Cheney, is a prominent historian and political commentator 
on Middle East issues and has been called ‘perhaps the most significant 
intellectual influence behind the invasion of Iraq’, a war he supported on the 
basis that would provide the ‘jolt’ needed to modernise the Middle East.37 
Lewis, who is a winner of the AEI’s Irving Kristol Award, argued that the 
West is now in the last stages of a centuries-old struggle for dominance with 
Islamic civilization, in which 9/11 was an opening salvo. Ajami, also an 
academic, and a frequent author of articles on Middle East affairs, is a well-
known defender of the Iraq war and was often cited by Vice President Cheney 
and Paul Wolfowitz (a friend) as an authoritative academic source of support 
for its policies. Speaking in August 2002, for example, the Vice President, 
referring to the anticipated invasion of Iraq, said, ‘As for the reaction of the 
                                               
34 Malini Johar Schueller, ‘Techno-Dominance and Torturegate: The Making of U.S. Imperialism’, in 
Exceptional State, pp. 162–190 (p. 172).  
35 Edward W. Said, ‘A window on the world’, Guardian, 2 August  2003 
<http:www.guardian.co.uk/books/2003/aug/02/alqaida.highereducation> [accessed 14 May 2009]. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Jacob Weisberg, ‘Party of Defeat: AEI’s Weird Celebration’, Slate Magazine, 14 March 2007 
<http://www.slate.com/id/2161800/> [accessed 16 May 2009].  
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Arab ‘street’, the Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after 
liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are “sure to erupt in joy in the 
same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans”’.38  
Ajami was an advocate of the projection of American power across the 
Middle East. Writing early in 2003, he suggested that ‘Above and beyond 
toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein and dismantling deadly weapons, the 
driving motivation of a new American endeavour in Iraq and in neighbouring 
Arab lands should be to modernize the Arab world’. Iraq was merely a 
starting point. What was needed was ‘a reformist project that seeks to 
modernize and transform the Arab landscape’.39 Beyond Iraq ‘lies an Arab 
political and economic tradition and a culture whose agonies and failures 
have been on cruel display’. Ajami, according to Said, was a convert to the far 
right and had espoused Zionism and American imperialism without 
reservation. Both Lewis and Ajami are condemned by Said as being 
‘virulently and ideologically anti-Arab’ and were the administration’s two 
major expert advisers.40   
As shown above, there were a number of key political, philosophical, 
and cultural influences, many of which were reflected in neoconservative 
opinion, that helped to shape foreign policy under the Bush administration. 
Most importantly, the policy hinged upon the notion of an unchallengeable 
United States dominance to achieve and maintain power over the rest of the 
world, massive technological supremacy in military hardware, and control of 
space and cyberspace. The neoconservative advocacy of a global missile 
defence system to secure a basis for ‘US power projection around the world’41 
illustrates a readiness to use power and force as the basic framework of 
foreign policy strategy. It was designed to bring about a shift from a passive 
                                               
38 Vice President Dick Cheney, ‘Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention: Remarks 
by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention’  
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives,gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html> [accessed 13 
March 2009]. 
39 Cited in George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Strauss and 
Giroux, 2005), p. 51. 
40 Edward W. Said, ‘Israel, Iraq, and the US’, ZNet <http://www.zmag.org/znet/view Article/11562> 
10 October 2002 [accessed 14 February 2009].  
41 PNAC, ‘Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New Century’. 
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hegemony (declinism) to active dominance, from the politics of consent and 
diplomacy (weakness) to the exercise of forceful coercion. The whole was 
underpinned by a Hegelian view of history and an incipient Orientalism 
which viewed the Islamic world as a monolithic entity without any 
appreciation, in Said’s words, of ‘the nuance of its plurality, internal 
dynamics, and historical complexities.’42 A narrative was being created in 
which the notion of a single homogenous enemy began to take shape. For the 
neoconservatives the events of 9/11 provided an opportunity to impose 
Western values upon a decaying civilization by, if necessary, the use of 
overwhelming force. The neoconservatives’ assumption that they could 
forcibly deliver democracy to a region incapable of achieving its own reforms 
draws precisely upon the belief that Western culture, and American culture in 
particular, are superior to non-Western political and cultural traditions. 
 As previously mentioned, once again the neoconservatives would feel 
as many did at the end of the Cold War: like vindicated prophets. The 
difference was that on this occasion they would be able to shape foreign 
policy from inside the government. This time, a view expressed in 1996 by the 
neoconservative Michael Ledeen (a former holder of the Freedom Scholar 
chair at the A.E.I. and one time consultant to the National Security Council)  
became the prevailing orthodoxy within the Bush administration 
 
Our national interests cannot be defined in purely geopolitical terms because we seek 
to advance ideals. Therefore, our foreign policy must be ideological, designed to 
advance freedom […] In these days of multicultural relativism, it is unfashionable to 







                                               
42 Edward W. Said, ‘The Clash of Ignorance’, The Nation, 4 October 2001  
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said> [accessed 5 November 2009]. 
43 Michael A. Ledeen, Freedom Betrayed, p. 146.  
 145 
III THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND ASSOCIATED DISCOURSE 
 
The response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade 
Centre and the Pentagon became, virtually immediately, a narrative 
constructed by the Bush administration as a ‘war on terror’. This was not 
simply a physical attempt to bring the perpetrators, al-Qaeda, to justice, but 
an attempt to enlist America in a metaphysical war against the concept of 
‘terror’ and indeed ‘evil’ itself. The rallying call, the battle cry as it were, was 
the idea of freedom. In one of the earliest responses to the attack, the future 
shape of the discourse that would dominate foreign policy in the years to 
follow became apparent as President Bush, speaking from the Oval Office on 
the afternoon of the attacks said ‘America was targeted for attack because 
we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world’.44 
In his speech to a Joint Session of Congress on 20 September 2001, 
President Bush expanded on the metaphysical nature of the battle ahead. 
America was a country ‘called to defend freedom’, night had fallen on ‘a 
different world […] where freedom itself is under attack’, and ‘enemies of 
freedom committed an act of war against our country’.  America’s enemies, he 
proclaimed, ‘hate our freedoms’ and ‘every necessary weapon of war’ would 
be used to defeat ‘the global terror network’. Those who were not with us, he 
said, ‘were with the terrorists’, thus setting a tone that allowed little room for 
nuance or shades of grey in the public discourse to follow. In Foucauldian 
terms such a statement had the effect of an unconscious discursive structuring 
that set the boundaries of debate. The survival of freedom itself apparently 
rested upon America’s willingness to wage a victorious war, as the President 
concluded: ‘The advance of human freedom – the great achievement of our 
time and the great hope of every time – now depends on us’.45       
The discourse is, even at this early stage, being framed in such a way 
that America’s love of freedom is identified as the reason it has been singled 
                                               
44 Cited in James Bovard, Terrorism and Tyranny, p. 318. 
45 President George W. Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, 20 
September 2001 
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out for attack. ‘They have attacked America because we are freedom’s home 
and defender’, the President said on 14 September 2001.46 Later, on 4 March 
2002, in a speech at a Minnesota high school, he confirmed the same 
sentiment: ‘when they find a nation that‘s willing to defend freedom, they try 
to attack it’.47 On 11 July 2002, at a fundraiser in Minneapolis, he said, ‘What 
we stand for is freedom, and they hate freedom. And therefore they hate us’.48  
No al-Qaeda spokesperson has ever maintained that the 9/11 attacks were 
anything to do with a hatred of ‘freedom’, but such an imagined hatred 
became a key component of the emerging freedom discourse. 
By conflating freedom with America, the rhetoric of the President at this 
time implied that since freedom is its greatest virtue, America was being 
attacked for being virtuous. This line of thought suggests that because 
America is being reviled – by those who hate freedom – it is even more 
virtuous. It is through the discourse of freedom that America can define its 
enemies and its friends. This theme of a world divided between good and evil 
became clearer in the months that followed 9/11. ‘Either you love freedom or 
you stand against the United States of America’, the President said in June 
2002.49   And again, perhaps even more starkly: ‘Either you’re with us or 
you’re with the enemy; either you’re with those that love freedom or you’re 
with those that hate innocent life’.50  
This sense of the war on terror representing an apocalyptic clash of 
values rather than being simply a range of measures to be adopted to counter 
a tactic deployed by a fanatical terrorist organisation is reflected vividly in the 
language used by President Bush in his State of the Union address delivered 
                                               
46 President George W. Bush,‘President’s Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance’, 14 
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on 29 January 2002. This speech reviewed the progress of the war against al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) and can be regarded as 
the speech in which the global war on terror was presented to the public as an 
overarching foreign policy strategy. Reflecting, perhaps unconsciously a 
Hegelian view of history, the President declared: ‘History has called America 
and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to 
fight freedom’s fight.’51 It was in this speech, crafted by David Frum, that 
North Korea, Iran and Iraq, together with ‘their terrorist allies’, were 
described as constituting an ‘axis of evil’ which threatened the peace of the 
world.   
What this kind of value-laden language did, as the political scientist and 
terrorism expert Louise Richardson pointed out, was ‘to accept al-Qaeda’s 
language of cosmic warfare and respond accordingly, rather than respond to 
al-Qaeda based on an objective assessment of its resources and capabilities’.52 
But for neoconservatives such as David Frum and Richard Perle, who helped 
to shape both the foreign policy itself and the freedom discourse that 
accompanied it, terrorism did indeed represent an apocalyptic threat. Whilst  
international terrorism, despite 9/11, constituted a minute threat to US 
citizens and kills not many more people world-wide than the number of 
people who drown yearly in bathtubs in America,53 they saw the threat to 
America and freedom as cosmic, with the lives of millions of Americans at 
stake. Writing in 2004, they felt able to suggest the ultimate comparison:  
 
For us, terrorism remains the great evil of our time, and the war against this evil, our 
generation’s greatest cause […] There is no middle way for Americans: It is victory or 
holocaust.54 
 
                                               
51 President George W. Bush,‘The President’s State of the Union Address’, 29 January 2002. 
52 Cited in Max Rodenbeck, ‘How Terrible Is It?’, New York Review of Books, 30 November 2006, p. 
38.  
53 John Mueller, Overblown. How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security 
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The Bush administration and the neoconservative elements within it saw 
that as well as being (in their view) a cosmic danger, the advent of al-Qaeda 
presented an opportunity to change the political climate along with the 
foreign policy landscape. When the twin towers fell, political and cultural 
commentators insisted that it represented something new, a historical marker 
following which the world would never be the same again. It was also seized 
upon as an opportunity to condemn what was perceived as - following the 
Straussian ‘decline of the west’ trope – a latent decadence in the American 
way of life. For example, David Brooks, the conservative cultural 
commentator, noted that even the most casual observer of the pre-9/11 
domestic scene, including al-Qaeda, ‘could have concluded that America is 
not a serious country’,55 and Francis Fukuyama complained that the previous 
decade’s ‘peace and prosperity encourage[d] preoccupation with one’s own 
petty affairs’.56 Brooks went on to claim that ‘the fear that is so prevalent in 
the country [was] a cleanser, washing away a lot of the self-indulgence of the 
past decade’. ‘Revivifying fear’, according to Brooks, ‘would now supersede 
crippling anxiety, replacing a disabling emotion with a bracing passion’.57 As 
Corey Robin suggests, there was, in the cultural commentary of the time, a 
sense that the events of 9/11 restored moral purpose to America, and that – in 
a no doubt unconscious echo of the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher 
Adam Ferguson – the warrior culture was the true basis of political life. 58 A 
culture of peace and prosperity was perhaps, after all, unworthy of American 
traditions. Whilst President Bush, eagerly proclaimed himself a ‘war 
president’, writers, as Robin notes,  
 
repeatedly welcomed the galvanizing moral electricity now coursing through the body 
politic: an electricity of public resolve and civic commitment, fuelling a more 
considered gravitas […] and a culture of patriotism […]. With its shocking spectacle of 
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death and subsequent fear, 9/11 offered a dead or dying culture a chance to live 
again.59  
 
How it was to live again, it became clear as the discourse emerged, was 
through the re-sacralizing of freedom, a harking back to the nation’s founding  
value.60 ‘Freedom and fear are at war’, said President Bush,61 and freedom, 
fear and terror were to be ever linked together in this discourse. Freedom and 
terror (with the latter’s subliminal link to fear) were presented as alternatives, 
the polar ends of a political spectrum, locked into a titanic struggle in which 
the very life of the nation, and perhaps ‘good’ itself, was at risk. To invoke 
terror was to invoke fear, the antidote to which was freedom, which 
embodied the good. Thus did the administration reduce the complexities of 
foreign policy and its response to al-Qaeda to a stark choice between good 
and evil. ‘Either you are with us’, said the President, ‘or you are with the 
terrorists’.62  
The moral philosopher Peter Singer has noted the tendency of President 
Bush to see the world in terms of good and evil. Between his inauguration 
and June 2003, President Bush referred to the existence of evil in no less than 
319 speeches, or about 30% of the total. As Singer notes, the President used 
the word most frequently as a noun rather than an adjective, which suggests 
that rather than thinking about evil deeds or people, he thought about ‘evil as 
a thing, a force, something that has real existence, apart from the cruel, 
callous, brutal or selfish acts of which human beings are capable’[italics in 
source].63 In rhetoric deployed by the President, American freedom (good) 
would defeat terrorism (evil), and he felt himself to be the instrument of that 
victory. As he told his political adviser Karl Rove after 9/11, ‘I’m here for a 
reason’.64 
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This is the utopianism of which John Gray wrote: a belief that evil can be 
removed from the world, a conjoining of neoconservative thought with that of 
the Christian right, in which some kind of Armageddon is foreseen and ‘the 
struggle of light and dark will be concluded’. As Gray points out, in the 
utterances of President Bush and members of his administration following 
9/11 the utopian current in Enlightenment thought, which imagines human 
progress as a continuum, and the religious traditions of the Christian right, 
which anticipates imminent catastrophe, were fused.  (The conflation of 
neoconservative values and those of the Christian right is discussed further in 
the following chapter.) In blending the secular belief in human progress and 
the triumph of freedom with elements of apocalyptic religion, the war on 
terror discourse combined several of America’s most powerful traditions.65 
That President Bush spoke to, and indeed shared this apocalyptic vision of the 
events of 9/11 and the nature of the struggle ahead is born out by his use of 
biblical references and also his remarks in 2003 to Palestinian Prime Minister 
Mahmoud Abbas that ‘God told me to strike at al-Qaeda and I struck them, 
and then he instructed me to strike at Saddam, which I did’.66 A small but 
revealing detail of this mind-set is well illustrated by the fact that in 2003, 
during the Iraq war, assistants to the Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, 
took to sending information folders to the President with a photograph and a 
biblical text stuck to the front cover, presumably to reinforce the notion of a 
holy war. For example, above a picture of Saddam Hussein, a quotation was 
added, ‘It is God’s will that by doing good you should silence the ignorant 
talk of foolish men’, (I Peter 2. 15), and a picture of US tanks rolling under 
Saddam’s victory arch in Baghdad was accompanied by the caption, ‘Open 
the gates that the righteous nation may enter. The nation that keeps faith.’ 
(Isaiah 26. 2) 67    
                                               
65 Gray, Black Mass, pp. 115, 120. 
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In addition to the task of destroying evil, the ‘war on terror’ also 
presented more secular opportunities for the neoconservatives. For the most 
part they believed, following Fukuyama, that with the end of the Cold War 
and the discrediting of Marx, global democratic capitalism was the end point 
of history. Some version of Western institutions would eventually be accepted 
everywhere and the triumph of free markets was an integral element of the 
secular ideology of universal human progress which the neoconservatives 
embraced. A universal economic and political system was coming into being, 
but it could not be achieved without the exercise of American power. 
American pre-eminence and the export of Western concepts of market 
capitalism and democracy upon the troublesome Middle East and elsewhere 
would become American foreign policy. As neoconservative Joshua 
Muravachick wrote in Commentary in September 2003: 
 
Not only did the neocons have an analysis of what had gone wrong in American 
policy, they had also stood ready with proposals for what to do now: to wage war on 
the terror groups and to seek to end or transform governments that supported them, 
especially those possessing the means to furnish terrorists with the powerful 
wherewithal to kill even more Americans than on September 11. Neocons also 
offered a long-term strategy for making the Middle East less of a hotbed of terrorism: 
implanting democracy in the region and thereby helping to ferment a less violent 
approach to politics. 68 
           
The neoconservatives were advocating the notion of pre-emptive war, 
which was duly adopted by the Bush administration.  Nor was this to be a 
war of limited goals, at least if Richard Perle’s attitude was representative of 
the neoconservatives within the administration. Speaking of the war on terror 
he commented: 
 
No stages. This is total war. We are fighting a variety of enemies. There are lots of them 
out there. All this talk about first we are going to do Afghanistan, then we will do 
Iraq…this is entirely the wrong way to go about it. If we just let our vision of the world 
go forth, and we embrace it entirely and we don’t try to piece together clever 
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diplomacy, but just wage a total war … our children will sing great songs about us 
years from now.69 
 
 
If the war on terror had hitherto occupied something of a metaphysical 
space in the public consciousness, it now found more tangible expression in 
policy terms. In his speech to the United States Military Academy, West Point 
on 1 June 2002, President Bush set out briefly the doctrine of pre-emptive war 
by the use of such phrases as ‘If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we 
will have waited too long.’ And ‘the war on terror will not be won on the 
defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and 
confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, 
the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act’. 
Americans were warned to be forward-looking and resolute, ‘to be ready for 
pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our 
lives’.70 
The doctrine of pre-emption was fleshed out in a more formal way in the 
National Security Strategy of September 2002. This document aimed at setting 
out the goals that the neoconservatives had long advocated: pre-emptive 
military action against hostile states and terrorist bodies; the maintenance of 
unchallengeable American military supremacy; the preservation of the right 
of unilateral action; and the promotion of democracy and human rights. 
Ostensibly this is a document that sets out the basis of defence within a 
foreign policy context. But it is clearly more than this. Described by the 
neoconservatives Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol as a document which 
sought to ‘minimize the gap between ideals and interests, between morality 
and power’,71 it launched American power on the world in the name of 
freedom. Introducing the document, President Bush stated that the United 
States, in defending America ‘will use this moment of opportunity to extend 
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the benefits of freedom across the globe’, concluding: ‘Today, humanity holds 
in its hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over all its foes’.72 
Freedom now assumed a novel character: it was considered not so much as a 
shield, but as a sword to defeat the forces of evil; not as the absence of 
coercion in Berlin’s sense of negative liberty, but as coercion, the unbridling of 
American power. Freedom becomes as Anthony Burke phrased it ‘something 
that America brings to the world, for itself and from within itself. It is not a 
space in the world to which it submits, which binds it or presents any limits, 
moral, political or ethical’ [italics in source].73 Couched in the language of fear 
and warning of ‘exponentially more casualties if terrorists acquired and used 
weapons of mass destruction’, the Strategy asserts the doctrine of pre-
emption: 
 
The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a 
sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the 
threat of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to 
defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s 
attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States 
will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.74  
    
In the run-up to the Iraq war, the Bush administration had established 
the philosophical and strategic grounds upon which it could act. An invasion 
of Iraq would be a key manifestation of the use of pre-emptive force in the 
‘war on terror’ and help the spread of freedom. As this section has shown, a 
number of convictions and preconceptions underpinned the administration’s 
approach to the Iraq war. These included a Hegelian conviction that it was 
working with the ‘tide of history’ and that a universal economic system was 
coming into being. The administration held a number of beliefs about the 
nature of the Arab world and the inherent superiority of Western and 
American values. Neoconservative commentators stoked the view that war 
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was, in some sense, a way of halting American decline and re-energising a 
soft and decadent culture. 
In words written many years before, but which highlight the dangers of 
the monist cast of thinking adopted by the neoconservatives and the 
administration in the run up to the Iraq war, Berlin observed:  
  
It is a terrible and dangerous arrogance to believe that you alone are right: have a 
magical eye which sees the truth; and others cannot be right if they disagree. This 
makes one certain that there is one goal & only one for one’s nation or church or for 
the whole of humanity & that it is worth any amount of suffering (particularly on the 
part of other people) if only the goal is attained […] nothing is more destructive than 
a happy sense of one’s own – or one’s nation’s – infallibility which lets you destroy 
others with a quiet conscience because you are doing God’s […] or the superior race’s 
[…] or History’s work. 75  
 
The Iraq war would illustrate the extent to which the Bush 
administration did indeed believe it was in possession of a ‘magical eye’. 
 
IV ‘OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM’ 
 
The first major military act in the war on terror was the war in Afghanistan, 
designed to pursue and punish al-Qaeda for the events of 9/11. The meaning 
of an attack on freedom was released from metaphor and translated into 
tangible military action against the enemies of the United States. Although 
this war was of course important, it did not depart in any unexpected way 
from the kind of response that may have been conducted by a less ideological 
or more ‘realist’ administration. It can reasonably be argued that the United 
States had, after all, suffered an attack on its own soil, and was legitimately 
seeking to defend its interests, at least initially. ‘Operation Enduring 
Freedom,’ therefore, whilst couched in the rhetoric of ‘terror’ and ‘freedom’ 
discussed above, is not the most obvious foreign policy enterprise to illustrate 
the neoconservative agenda, or the freedom discourse with which this thesis 
is concerned. The Iraq war, however, can be considered the centrepiece of the 
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Bush administration’s foreign policy and the war on terror, and illustrates the 
radical nature of the doctrine of pre-emption and dominance which 
characterise it.  
The Iraq war demonstrated, in a tangible way, the manner in which the 
Bush administration constructed a discourse of freedom behind which it 
could conduct its policy of pre-emptive war and unilateral regime change. It 
also served to demonstrate how, in that process, it adopted an interpretation 
of the meaning of freedom that ran counter to the American tradition. This 
section does not provide a detailed analysis of the Iraq war itself; it is only 
concerned with those aspects that illustrate, or reflect upon, the themes 
already referred to.   
Whilst an invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein were   
neoconservative articles of faith, they had no real traction in policy terms 
within the administration until the events of 9/11 provided the 
neoconservatives with the opportunity they had long sought. Within minutes 
of the attack, Paul Wolfowitz, then deputy secretary of defence, told aides that 
he suspected Iraqi involvement. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, 
ensconced in the National Military Command Centre, was trying to assess 
whether in addition to striking at Osama bin Laden, the situation was ‘good 
enough to hit S. H. the same time’.76 David Frum, one of President Bush’s 
neoconservative speechwriters, who had taken shelter in the offices of the 
AEI, contacted Richard Perle who urged that the President makes clear that 
he holds responsible ‘not just terrorists, but whoever who harbours those 
terrorists’. President Bush himself apparently asked Richard A. Clarke, his 
counter-terrorism adviser on the NSC to ‘see if Saddam was involved. Just 
look. I want to know any shred’.77  
Paul Wolfowitz pressed his case for regime change in Iraq so strenuously 
at a Camp David meeting on 15 September, 2001, that the White House Chief 
of Staff, Andrew Card had to admonish him.78 The network of 
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neoconservatives within the administration – which included Richard Perle, 
Chairman of Donald Rumsfeld’s Defence Advisory Board; I. Lewis ‘Scooter 
Libby (the Vice-President’s chief of staff); Stephen J. Hadley, another protégé 
of Wolfowitz’s who chaired the NSC’s deputies committee; and Zalmay 
Khalilzad, also a protégé of Wolfowitz’s and an assistant to National Security 
Adviser, Condoleeza Rice – were able to generate what has been termed by 
the writer Colin Campbell ‘unrestrained ideological entrepreneurship’ within 
the administration urging the invasion of Iraq.79 Ideological entrepreneurship 
becomes ‘unrestrained’, Campbell suggests, when ‘the selection of appointees 
allows for pockets of officials who share strongly held programmatic 
commitments and when the administration does not sufficiently test those 
advocates’ views through countervailing ones’.80  
The drumbeat for a pre-emptive war against Iraq therefore began almost 
immediately after the events of 9/11, which would accord with the 
neoconservatives’ foreign policy vision. Regime change in Iraq now suddenly 
presented the opportunity for a positive act in the war on terror which could 
be woven into the discourse, using the fear of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and America’s traditional commitment to freedom as twin selling 
points with the public. The defence of freedom and the need to deliver it to a 
benighted Middle East, together with the search for security combined to 
provide a wide moral platform from which to launch a pre-emptive attack. 
Regime change in Iraq, however, was merely part of the wider agenda, 
discussed above, of transforming the Middle East and extending the reach of 
American power. This was underscored by the military writer Andrew 
Bacevich, who observed that Douglas Feith, Under Secretary for Defence 
Policy (2001 – 2005) had declared that the US couldn’t afford to have Saddam 
step down peacefully. In Bacevich’s view,  
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allusions to Saddam as a new Hitler notwithstanding, they [the neoconservatives] did 
not see Baghdad as Berlin but as Warsaw – a preliminary objective. There is no 
question that the neoconservatives saw Iraq not as an end in itself but as a means to a 
much larger end of transforming the whole of the Middle East.81 
 
This approach became crystallised in the ‘Bush Doctrine’, which was 
discernible in the President’s West Point speech of 1 June 2002.  Commenting 
on this ‘Doctrine’ and its implications, Kaplan and Kristol wrote: 
  
Nor […] will America’s duty be discharged when Saddam is toppled, or even when 
Iraq subsequently has a decent government. The Bush Doctrine has regime change in 
Iraq as its focal point, but it but it provides guidance and a mission for American 
foreign policy as a whole.82 
 
The issue of WMD was the chosen means by which this ‘focal point’ of 
the Bush Doctrine was to be pursued. The extent to which the administration 
ever truly believed that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD, and that, if he did, 
their possession constituted a threat to the United States, is a matter of 
contention which outlasted the duration of the Bush administration itself. But 
that the issue of WMD acted as a vehicle upon which regime change, which 
was a key element of ‘America’s mission’, could be conveniently loaded, 
whilst not proclaimed publicly as the casus belli, is clear.  As Paul Wolfowitz 
told an interviewer after the fall of Baghdad, WMD was the lowest common 
denominator. ‘The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the US 
government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could 
agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction.’83     
Even so, a case had to be made that the United States was an unwilling 
party to an inevitable war against Iraq and that it was in no sense a war of 
choice. On 28 January, 2003, in his State of the Union address, the President 
made the case for pre-emptive war using the potent mix of terror, fear, and 
freedom noted above.  Iraq had failed to disarm despite UN resolutions; it 
had accrued WMD; there was an ‘advanced nuclear weapons development 
program’; and the only possible use Saddam could have for the stockpiled 
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chemical and biological weapons was to ‘dominate, intimidate or attack’. 
[Saddam] sheltered al-Qaeda, and ‘Secretly, and without fingerprints, he 
could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop 
their own’. Referring to the events of 9/11, the President said, ‘Imagine those 
19 hijackers with other weapons, and other plans – this time armed by 
Saddam Hussein. It would take just one vial, one canister, one crate slipped 
into this country to bring a day of horror’. If Saddam did not fully disarm, ‘for 
the safety of our people, and for the peace of the world’ military intervention 
would follow. But America was still unwilling. ‘If war is forced upon us, we 
will fight in a just cause […] if war is forced upon us, we will fight with the 
full force of the United States military‘. Even if unwilling, America would ‘go 
forward with confidence, because this call of history has come to the right 
country’. Freedom is then invoked in an almost quasi-religious way: ‘we will 
bring to the Iraqi people food, and medicines, and supplies and freedom’. 
And then the final benediction: ‘Americans are a free people, who know that 
freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation. The 
liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to 
humanity.’84 Liberty might be God’s gift but, nevertheless, the United States 
was its deliverer.  
This presidential speech set out the themes which would continually be 
repeated in similar form throughout the early period of the war by members 
of the Bush administration, although with different emphases. These were 
that Saddam Hussein definitely possessed WMD, that possession of these 
weapons was a threat to the region and to the United States, that there were 
known links with al-Qaeda (and Saddam was therefore implicated in the 
events of 9/11), that the United States was drawn into war unwillingly, and 
that in taking military action the United States was answering history’s call 
and acting in accordance with God’s will. Above all, it was delivering 
freedom to a people who were unable to bring it to themselves.   
Much of the administration’s case for war hinged, as is well known,  
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upon intelligence that was subsequently revealed to be false, even though 
Iraq’s possession of WMD was stated with complete certainty by  
administration members.85 If dogma can properly be defined as the insistence 
that the unseen is really there, it was dogma, or perhaps more accurately 
‘faith’, that controlled the administration’s approach to the search for WMD. 
One of the reasons why this approach was adopted was undoubtedly mistrust 
within the administration, and amongst neoconservatives in particular, of 
empiricism. This mistrust was combined with a need to make the intelligence 
fit the policy, and to that end wilful distortion often took place.86 
Hans Blix, for example, the executive director of the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), charged 
with establishing whether or not Iraq still possessed WMD (and whom the 
administration sought to undermine even before his mission started),87 cites 
Paul Wolfowitz as distorting a UN finding that various chemical and 
biological agents were ‘unaccounted for’ in the absence of any credible 
information about what happened to a given quantity, when he described it 
as evidence that ‘Baghdad retains chemical and biological weapons and is 
producing more’ [emphasis added].88 Blix makes the same point concerning 
an article by Stuart A. Cohen, the acting chairman of the National Intelligence 
Council, when the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s weapons of 
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mass destruction was published. The article, published on 30 November 2003, 
stated that the estimate ‘judged with high confidence that Iraq had chemical 
and biological weapons. These were essentially the same conclusions reached 
by the United Nations….’[emphasis in original]. In fact, complains Blix, 
Cohen had assumed that anything ‘unaccounted for’ existed.89  An article in 
the International Herald Tribune (November 19, 2003), quotes an intelligence 
official, reviewing the handling of intelligence on Iraq as saying ‘The absence 
of evidence that Iraq had destroyed its chemical and biological weapons 
appeared to have been interpreted by intelligence agencies as evidence that it 
still possessed them.’90   
The retreat from empiricism, particularly in the field of intelligence, is 
linked to the ideas of Leo Strauss discussed in Section III of Chapter Four. An 
influential article published in 1999 by Abram Shulsk and Gary Schmitt 
invoked Strauss’s ideas about the hidden meaning of texts to attack the 
traditional methods of US intelligence gathering as naïve. Although 
recognising that Strauss never wrote about intelligence matters, they argue 
that some of his insights into the hidden meaning of texts and the way in 
which different political systems operate demonstrate the limited use of social 
science in intelligence work.  Shulsky, who studied under Strauss, suggested 
that the latter’s notion of the hidden meaning in texts 
 
alerts one to the possibility that political life may be closely linked to deception. 
Indeed it suggests that deception is the norm in political life, and the hope, to say 
nothing of the expectation, of establishing a politics that can dispense with it is the 
exception.91 
 
As Shulsky interprets Strauss, not only was deception at the heart of 
politics, but Strauss thoroughly rejected the idea that politics could be 
understood by ‘an empirical method that observed behaviour, tallied it, 
calculated correlations between particular actions and particular features of 
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the context in which they occurred, and so on’.92 Whilst this may be true, it 
does not mean, as John Gray points out, that facts can be dispensed with, or 
that the way in which evidence is used is unimportant.93 The neoconservative 
scepticism about empiricism – reflecting Strauss’s ideas about the tension 
between reason and revelation – seem to some degree to have been adopted 
by those neoconservatives connected to the gathering of intelligence in the 
run-up to the Iraq war. A further strand of Straussian thought was reflected 
by the neoconservatives in so far as much of the certainty projected about 
WMD and impatience with doubters suggested that only they were in a 
position to know the truth about Iraq. Furthermore, the impression was 
sometimes given (as in the Wolfowitz quotation above) that if disinformation, 
or indeed deception, was involved in selling the war to the ‘vulgar’, this was 
an inevitable part of political life which might also be justified in virtue of 
their elite position.    
The neoconservatives’ approach to intelligence was demonstrated in 
several ways. One was the establishment in the Pentagon of the Office of 
Special Plans (OSP) in September 2002. This unit was created by Paul 
Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld, and led by Douglas Feith, who was brought 
in by his friend and former boss, Richard Perle. The man charged with 
directing operations was the author of the essay discussed above, Adam 
Shulsky, a former Perle aide who had studied under Strauss. For this unit 
secrecy was not merely necessary but ‘metaphysically necessary’.94 Rather 
than rely upon the conventional methods of the established intelligence 
communities (the CIA and the Defence Intelligence Agency), which it sought 
to discredit, the OSP, brought Strauss’s ideas of hidden meaning and 
deception into play in the analysis of intelligence and ‘stovepiped’ its analyses 
direct to the White House. There it was seized upon by other neoconservative 
allies, particularly the Vice President’s Chief of Staff, I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, 
and Condoleezza Rice’s NSC director for the Middle East, Elliot Abrams, as 
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well as others dispersed at key points throughout the administration. In 
effect, the intelligence ‘product’ with its claims about WMD and Saddam’s 
links to al-Qaeda, circumvented the normal requirements of vetting through 
the interagency process, in which, as Packer expresses it, ‘the unconverted 
would have been among the participants and might have raised objections’.95 
The part ‘faith’ played in intelligence analysis is borne out by the 
experience of Greg Theilmann, former director of the Strategic, Proliferation 
and Military Affairs Office at the State Department’s Intelligence Bureau who 
resigned in September 2002, on the grounds that intelligence was being 
distorted by the administration for political reasons. He claimed in an 
interview:  
 
The main problem was that senior administration officials have what I call faith-
based intelligence. They knew what they wanted the intelligence to show.  They were 
really blind and deaf to any kind of countervailing information the community could 
produce.96  
 
The author and political journalist Ron Suskind reported in an article 
published in October 2004 on a variation of this approach, which 
encompassed not just intelligence, but reality itself. Having published an 
article with which the White House was displeased, he had a meeting with a 
Bush adviser that told him something which Suskind believed got to the very 
heart of the Bush presidency: 
 
The aide said that guys like me were ‘in what we call the reality-based community,’ 
which he defined as people who ‘believe that solutions emerge from your judicious 
study of discernible reality’. I nodded and murmured something about 
enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. ‘That’s not the way the 
world really works anymore,’ he continued. ‘We’re an empire now and when we act, 
we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality – judiciously, as 
you will – we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and 
that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors … and you, all of you, will be 
left to just study what we do.’97 
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The road to war, then, was characterised by a determination to 
implement the neoconservative foreign policy agenda of re-ordering the 
Middle East by the use of force, and an equal determination to ensure that the 
intelligence was made to fit the policy, whilst ignoring inconvenient facts. 
What counted here was faith, the certainty that the administration was right, 
that it was fulfilling, in a Hegelian sense, history’s call. Evidence did not 
matter; the President and the administration knew the truth by means of 
revelation, and in order to fulfil their objectives they could even create their 
own reality, perhaps the ultimate expression of Straussian elitism. In a sense it 
succeeded. In a February 2003 poll, 72% of Americans believed that Saddam 
Hussein ‘was personally involved in the September 11 attacks’ whereas less 
than 10% believed it in the first weeks after the attacks.98 Lack of evidence, as 
the administration realised, was no barrier to belief.   
    The decision to invade Iraq, therefore, was largely driven by faith and 
revelation, and characterised by impatience with inconvenient facts and 
evidence. The discourse of freedom, which enveloped the invasion, was an 
expression of this mind-set, a belief that an American idea of freedom could 
be brought to a people, a nation, whose culture and history were all but 
unknown, by means of coercion and force, and that, crucially, in this 
deliverance of freedom, the United States was fulfilling a destiny determined 
by both history and God. In the President’s speech to the United Nations of 12 
September, 2002, he again linked Iraq to al-Qaeda, (a link for which no 
evidence was ever found), and said, ‘Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great 
moral cause and a strategic goal’. Freedom is again presented as the antidote 
to fear; ‘We must choose between a world of fear and a world of progress. We 
cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather’.99  The day before, on 
the anniversary of the events of 9/11, in his carefully choreographed speech 
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beneath the Statue of Liberty which was illuminated from below by 
searchlights mounted on floating barges, the President, referring to the ‘great 
struggle’ ahead, said, ‘Our generation has now heard history’s call, and we 
will answer it’. But history was also subject to divine direction: ‘I believe there 
is a reason that history has matched this nation with this time.’ In a world 
view that seemed to acknowledge a form of determinism, the US had been 
selected to deliver freedom to Iraq: ‘We fight, not to impose our will, but to 
defend ourselves and extend the blessings of freedom.’100 
Crucially, freedom can also be identified and conflated with American 
military dominance and power. In a Fourth of July speech in 2002, the 
President announced, ‘Once again history has called America to use its 
overwhelming power in the defence of freedom. And we’ll do just that.’101 
Referring to victories that had already been achieved in the war on terror, in 
his State of the Union address in January 2002, the President said ‘We have 
shown freedom’s power. And in this great conflict […] we will see freedom’s 
victory.’102 
The war itself began on 20 March 2003. ‘Freedom’s victory’ was to come 
at a very heavy price, especially for the Iraqi people.103 Whether, as predicted 
by President Bush in July 2003, the Iraqi people ever found out that because of 
US action ‘the word freedom and America are synonymous’ seems 
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doubtful.104 But the idea that freedom was being delivered to Iraq had to be 
maintained, even when what was being delivered seemed almost a form of 
tyranny, a people being coerced for their own good towards something that 
they would want if only they knew what the invaders knew, which was what 
was best for them. It was an apposite expression of Berlin’s idea of positive 
freedom. This entire paradox, in which the US claims to be delivering 
freedom through the overwhelming force of arms, can perhaps be captured 
by the remarks of a single US Army officer, one Lt. Colonel Nathan Sassaman. 
Having commanded a battalion that enclosed an entire Iraqi town with 
barbed wire he observed: ‘With a heavy dose of fear and violence, and a lot of 
money for projects, I think we can convince these people that we are here to 
help them’.105   
For freedom to maintain its mythic status in the context of the invasion it 
needed to be sustained through the careful presentation of potent images, and 
in this respect the administration was assisted by a compliant media. In the 
early days of the occupation the administration was keen to maintain in the 
minds of Americans the notion that freedom was being delivered to a grateful 
Iraqi people. This was especially apparent when the statue of Saddam 
Hussein was toppled on 9 April 2003, but even this episode somehow 
reflected the false prospectus upon which the war was based, since the 
possibility exists that it was a far from genuine event. Secretary of Defence 
Donald Rumsfeld likened the toppling, which ultimately needed the help of 
an American tank, to ‘the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Iron 
Curtain’.106  
The networks, eager to show the veracity of the administration’s promise 
that Americans would see liberated Iraqis celebrating in the streets, showed 
some version of the statue-toppling every 4.4 minutes on average from 11 
a.m. to 8 p.m. on Fox News, and every 7.5 minutes on CNN.107 However, as 
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Frank Rich revealed, all was not what it seemed. Tom Shales of the 
Washington Post noticed with some scepticism that ‘of all the statues of 
Saddam Hussein scattered throughout the city, the crowds had conveniently 
picked one located across from the hotel where most of the media were 
headquartered. This was either splendid luck or brilliant planning on the part 
of the military’.108 When the Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media took a 
closer look, its researchers found that wide-angle shots showed the square 
was never more than a quarter full, but that the American network coverage 
kept to tight shots and during the two-hour toppling process the wider-angle 
shots began to disappear. A senior producer of Aljazeera TV even suggested 
that the ‘topplers’ were not Iraqis but young men brought in by the 
Americans especially for the purpose.109  
It cannot be known for certain whether or not this was a staged event to 
support the message of freedom being delivered to a grateful people. It was 
however, a sufficiently potent image for the President to refer to it in his 
famous speech delivered on the USS Abraham Lincoln on 1 May 2003, with 
the misleading words ‘Mission Accomplished’ used as a banner backdrop.  In 
this speech, which celebrated the victory in Iraq of US military forces and 
those of its allies, the images of fallen statues became a representation of the 
American delivery of freedom. Referring to the military, and, by implication, 
the United States, he said, ‘Because of you the tyrant has fallen and Iraq is 
free.’ He went on: ‘In the images of fallen statues we have witnessed the 
arrival of a new era. In the images of celebrating Iraqis we have also seen the 
ageless appeal of human freedom.’ The President sought legitimacy for the 
war by placing himself alongside other presidents in the tradition of liberty 
expressed at the founding: ‘Our commitment to liberty is America’s tradition, 
declared at our founding, affirmed in Franklin Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, 
asserted in the Truman Doctrine and in Ronald Reagan’s challenge to an evil 
empire.’ In a phrase that conflated American interests with the freedom it was 
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delivering, he added, ‘American values and American interests lead in the 
same direction. We stand for human liberty.’110      
Another potent image designed to sustain the mythic image of freedom 
for the American public, but which revealed perhaps more than intended 
about its coercive nature, was the footage of the capture of Saddam, again 
endlessly replayed on the TV networks.  Malini Johar Schueller has claimed 
that the neoconservatives envision the body politic as masculine, ‘a powerful 
empire of right undergirded by technical supremacy’. The footage of the 
capture of Saddam metaphorically encapsulates that dominance by 
highlighting the dinginess of Saddam’s hideout and his meek acquiescence to 
the doctor who searches him for lice and examines his mouth with latex 
gloves. US mastery with its masculine technological superiority is complete 
over an ‘incoherent, demasculinized, and bestialized adversary (the footage 
not released included photos of Saddam being kicked by soldiers)’.111 
According to Schueller, the footage demonstrated that Saddam 
 
constituted a metonym for the dictatorial nation that had to be occupied in order to 
be liberated, bombed in order to be cleansed of weapons […]. As a forty-four year old 
Iraqi engineer remarked, ‘I hate this man to the core of my bones. Just seeing him 
sitting there makes the hairs on my arms stand up. And yet, I can’t tell you why, I feel 
sorry for him, to be so humiliated. It is as if he and Iraq have become the same 
thing.’112           
 
The capture of Saddam, and the heightened levels of destruction and 
suppression of the populace, illuminate a concept of absolute dominance, a 
key part of the neoconservative creed which was reflected in documents such 
as PNAC’s Rebuilding America’s Defenses and the National Security Strategy, 
2002, referred to earlier. An example of these heightened levels of suppression 
and destruction is provided by the Second Battle of Fallujah in March 2004. In 
reprisal at the killing of four security contractors, the city was blasted by F-16 
jets and by AC-130 Spectre planes which pumped 4000 rounds a minute into 
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selected targets. The city’s largest hospital was destroyed by bombs, and more 
than 400 Iraqis were killed.113 The US military later admitted to using Mark 77 
incendiary bombs (the successor to napalm) and white phosphorous. This is 
the ‘techno-dominance’ of which Schueller speaks, a supremacy ‘which makes 
for a definition of the national body politic as force, power, precision and 
control – a hypermodern, punitive empire both causing and dependent on the 
paralysis and destruction of the Other’.114  
The kind of freedom that the US was attempting to deliver to Iraq, as 
represented by the images mentioned above, and the scale of military 
suppression of the population, clearly demonstrate its coercive nature. In that 
sense it was the antithesis of negative liberty. This perception of a powerful 
nation imposing its will upon another weak one in the name of freedom was 
further corroborated in the economic field, where the administration sought 
to impose a free market or neo-liberal model often at variance with Iraqi 
traditions. Iraq was not simply to be helped to recover; the state the 
administration sought to build was of a particular kind. A report drafted by 
the Treasury and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), 
entitled Moving the Iraqi Economy from Recovery to Sustainable Growth (May 
2003), set out the steps designed to launch the country as a test case for 
exporting the neo-liberal economic model to the Middle East. The plan, 
supported by Paul Wolfowitz, contained key goals such as privatising state-
owned assets, including oil, creating a stock exchange and a new Iraqi 
currency.115 
Not all of the proposed reforms came about, but the general direction of 
intent was established. For example, Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) from May 2003 until June 2004, when limited 
Iraqi sovereignty was restored, set about subsidy elimination, a well-
established feature of the Iraq economy. The resulting cuts in subsidies to 
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fertilizers and pesticides increased Iraq’s dependence upon food imports and 
aggravated unemployment and poverty.116 In an effort to increase oil revenue, 
transnational oil companies were contracted to engage in the development, 
rehabilitation, production and distribution work that would previously have 
been undertaken by the Iraqi state oil company. One such contract to Kellogg 
Brown and Root, a Haliburton subsidiary, of which Vice President Cheney 
was a former Chief Executive, was awarded on a no-bid basis even before the 
occupation took place.117 The new free market values were to be internalised 
so as to avoid the impression that policies were being imposed, even though, 
in effect, they were. In October 2003, Thomas Foley, director of private sector 
development for the CPA, said the goal was to change Iraq’s state-led 
economy into a ‘fully thriving capitalist economy’.118 The internalisation of 
values seems to have been at least partially successful, at least as far as the oil 
industry is concerned. At the end of June 2009, Iraq formally auctioned eight 
contracts for six oil fields and two largely undeveloped gas fields, although 
even that process was not unopposed by those in the Iraqi parliament who 
were sceptical about foreign involvement in Iraq’s greatest natural resource.119  
CPA orders allowed for complete foreign ownership of businesses (with 
the exception of the natural resource, banking and insurance sectors), and 
allowed the transfer of all profits abroad. Up to six foreign banks were 
allowed to operate until the end of 2008, and it was decreed that, in an 
attempt to bind the hands of a successor sovereign Iraqi government, there 
should be no limit to the number thereafter.120 The neo-liberal economic 
model was imposed by the CPA without any attempt to consult the Iraqi 
people as a whole and the only opinion poll conducted (by the International 
Republican Institute, a US government funded organisation concerned with 
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the promotion of ‘freedom’ throughout the world) found that 65% of Iraqis 
favoured a larger economic role for the state, and only 5% a smaller role.121  
It is arguable that the Iraq war, with its massive levels of destruction and 
loss of life, constituted an act of coercion almost without limits.  It was the 
imposition of one nation’s will upon another in the name of freedom, which, 
in the process, just as freedom itself was perverted, destroyed much of which 
it ostensibly came to save. As mentioned above, even Iraqi culture was not 
immune to the effects of the occupation. A renowned Iraqi musician, Naseer 
Shamma, expressed it in a way which sums up what, in cultural terms, the 
war meant for the Iraqi people. 
 
The U.S. has simply erased whole segments of what the Iraqis hold dearest; libraries 
have been burnt, and so has culture – the soul. Americans like to do that: to encroach 
on a people and destroy its identity.122 
 
What was important in the Iraqi war for the Bush administration was not 
Iraqi identity; it was the identification of the Bush administration with 
freedom, which was America’s ‘historic mission’. As Michael A. Ledeen, 
Freedom Scholar of the AEI, and one time consultant to the National Security 
Council and the Departments of State and Defence, wrote: 
 
Creative destruction is our middle name, both within our own society and abroad. 
We tear down the old order every day, from business to science, literature, art, 
architecture, and cinema to politics and the law. Our enemies have always hated this 
whirlwind of energy and creativity, which menaces their traditions (whatever they 
may be) and shames them for their inability to keep pace. Seeing America undo 
traditional societies, they fear us for they do not wish to be undone. They cannot feel 
secure for as long as we are there, for our very existence – our existence, not our 
politics – threatens their legitimacy. They must attack us in order to survive, just as 
we must destroy them to advance our historic mission.123 
 
The imposition of freedom through destruction (thus ensuring its 
perversion) was part of the neoconservative ideology with which, as has been 
shown, the Bush administration found common cause. 
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V TORTURE AS AN ‘ENGINE OF STATE’ 
   
The phrase ‘torture as an engine of state’ was first used by William Blackstone 
in his Commentaries on the laws of England in the sixteenth century, by which 
he meant the use of torture by the state as an extra-legal tool.124 This section  
considers what lay behind the use of torture by the State, as an extra-legal 
instrument of the Bush administration’s war on terror. The thesis is not 
concerned with the numerous and well-documented individual examples of 
torture and abuse inflicted upon detainees by U.S. Forces, agencies, or foreign 
surrogates that have been recounted at length elsewhere.125 Many aspects of 
the torture policy are therefore well known and not in dispute. It is generally 
accepted to be the case, except by the architects of the policy, that, in the 
words of Eric Holder, the Attorney General appointed by President Obama in 
2009: 
 
Our government authorized the use of torture, approved of secret surveillance 
against American citizens without due process of law, denied the writ of habeas 
corpus to hundreds of accused enemy combatants and authorized the procedures 
that violate both international law and the United States Constitution.126 
  
The principal focus of this section is therefore not upon the practical 
outcomes of these policies, but upon the mind-set, indeed the ideology, that 
underpinned them. In short, how the defence of freedom came to rely upon 
measures more usually associated with tyranny. 
It is worth outlining briefly the means by which the Bush administration 
sought to unpick or evade the legal constraints on the use of torture by US 
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Forces which had hitherto prevailed. As is well documented, following 9/11 
there were a large number of memoranda flowing between the Justice 
Department, the State Department, the Defence Department, and the White 
House that pertained to the interrogation of detainees. The most famous of 
these was the so-called ‘torture memo’ dated August 1, 2002, from Jay Bybee 
of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Justice Department to then White 
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales.127 This memo, which was subsequently 
withdrawn in December 2004, redefined torture so as to make it all but 
impossible to commit, and is often regarded as the point at which the 
administration’s deliberate deployment of torture as a tool in the war on 
terror began. In this memo it was argued that that torture required the intent 
to inflict suffering ‘equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious 
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even 
death.’ Mental suffering had to ‘result in significant psychological harm’ and 
‘be of significant duration, e.g. lasting months or years’.128 Additionally, the 
memo argued, the President, as Commander-in-Chief had inherent powers to 
order any interrogation technique he chose. The President, in this 
interpretation, could not be fettered by any laws or treaties, including the 
Convention Against Torture ratified by the US in 1994; he was, to all intents 
and purposes, above the law.  
However, previous legal advice given to the President paved the way for 
this defining ‘torture memo’. Internal memoranda written in early 2002 by 
John Yoo in the OLC and David Addington, the Vice President’s legal 
counsel, concluded that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al-Qaeda or 
Taliban suspects or persons suspected of links with them. Douglas Feith, the 
neoconservative Under Secretary of Defence, argued in a memo to Secretary 
of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, later shared with the President, that terrorists 
did not deserve the protection of the Geneva Conventions and it would defile 
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those Conventions to extend its rights to such disreputable warriors.129 The 
President was accordingly advised by his legal counsel, Alberto Gonzales 
(although the real author was later revealed to be Addington), on 25 January 
2002, that he did not have to comply with the Geneva Conventions or other 
customary international laws in handling ‘illegal enemy combatants’. Indeed, 
the relevant prohibitions on coercive interrogation techniques and the use of 
torture were dismissed as ‘obsolete’. One of the ‘positives’ of determining that 
the Conventions did not apply, argued Gonzales, was that it ‘substantially 
reduce[d] the threat of domestic criminal prosecution under the War Crimes 
Act’.130 The President formally decided on 7 February, 2002 that the U.S. 
would abandon its commitment to abide by the Geneva Conventions in the 
war on terror ‘as a matter of policy’– not law. ‘The U.S. Armed Forces’, 
declared the President, ‘shall continue to treat detainees humanely’ so long as 
it was consistent with ‘military necessity’.131 ‘Military necessity’ did not apply 
to the CIA, which enabled it to argue that it had full legal cover to treat 
prisoners in inhumane ways provided such treatment stopped short of 
torture.132    
A sense of unlawful purpose appears to underpin much of the legal 
advice sought by the administration regarding the treatment of prisoners, 
and, as David Cole argues, the OLC lawyers ‘contorted the law to authorize 
precisely what it was designed to forbid’.133 The memo from John Yoo at the 
OLC dated December 28 2001 to William J. Haynes at the Department of 
Defence, together with his memo dated 13 March 2002 to the same addressee, 
determined, inter alia, that the jurisdiction of the US courts did not apply to 
prisoners held outside the United States, e.g. Guantánamo Bay or 
Afghanistan, that the President as Commander-in-Chief had the power and 
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authority to transfer prisoners of war to other nations, and that the Torture 
Convention cannot apply to prisoners held outside the United States.134  
The result of this legal advice, which in effect cast prisoners taken in the 
‘war on terror’ outside the law, was to create a climate of lawlessness which 
stretched from prisons in Afghanistan to Iraq, from Guantánamo Bay to secret 
CIA prisons around the world, the so-called ‘black sites’. And yet the 
administration was reluctant to give any impression of having dispensed with 
the law or indeed that it condoned the use of torture. Time and again the 
President hung on to the notion of the country’s virtue, inseparable from its 
love of freedom. On 26 June 2003, on the International Day in Support of 
Victims of Torture, the President claimed ‘The U.S. is committed to the 
worldwide elimination of torture, and we are leading this fight by example’. 
Dismissing Amnesty International’s Report of 25 May 2005 on the human 
rights abuses at Guantánamo Bay (the report described the facility as ‘the 
gulag of our times’), the President said ‘I’m aware of the Amnesty 
International Report, and it’s absurd. It’s an absurd allegation. The United 
States is a country that […] promotes freedom around the world.’135 On 5 
October 2007, responding to a New York Times report that the Justice 
Department had secretly authorised harsh interrogation techniques for terror 
suspects as late as 2005, the President stated ‘This government does not 
torture people. We stick to US law and our international obligations.’136 Even 
more emphatically, in a speech in December 2005, the Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice asserted: 
 
The United States does not permit, tolerate or condone torture under any 
circumstances. Moreover, in accordance with the policy of this administration, the 
United States has respected – and will continue to respect – the sovereignty of other 
countries. The U.S. does not transport, and has not transported, detainees from one 
country to another for the purpose of interrogation using torture. The U.S. does not 
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use the air space or the airports of any country for the purpose of transporting a 
detainee to a country where he or she will be tortured.137  
 
Rice was able to make such a statement by sheltering behind the legal 
advice that had been provided. Waterboarding was not defined as torture 
under the Bybee memo of 1 August 2002, and indeed that advice, as 
previously mentioned, made torture virtually impossible to commit. It was 
important to her, as it was to the President, that all US treatment of detainees 
was perceived as lawful, even the CIA activities which included 
‘extraordinary rendition’ whereby detainees were transported for 
interrogation to sites in countries such as Poland, Romania, and 
Afghanistan.138 In his speech of 6 September 2006, in which he acknowledged 
the existence of a separate CIA programme through which the US had been 
holding and questioning without charge large numbers of prisoners for years,  
the President admitted that the interrogation procedures had been ‘tough and 
they were safe and they were lawful’. He repeated: ‘The United States does 
not torture. It’s against our laws, and it’s against our values’. Again, he 
appealed to America’s virtue, its love of freedom: ‘Like the struggles of the 
last century, today’s war on terror is, above all, a struggle for freedom and 
liberty. The adversaries are different, but the stakes in this war are the same. 
We’re fighting for our way of life and our ability to live in freedom.’139   
The President and the administration as a whole stuck to the position, in 
public, that the treatment of prisoners remained lawful and American values 
remained intact. It was, after all, impossible to admit that in the war on terror 
the superior claims of the moral opposite of evil, namely American freedom, 
rested upon the widespread use of torture and the abuse of prisoners. The 
tradition of liberty to which the administration appealed could not support 
such a position. But, crucially, the neoconservative interpretation of freedom 
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could indeed accommodate a culture of torture and abuse, if only at an 
unacknowledged level. The fact that this culture was unacknowledged is also 
consistent with a further key component of Straussian thought. Strauss, as 
previously noted, did not believe that the people could be trusted with the 
truth 140and was opposed to the very idea of an open society. In his political 
landscape it is ‘the philosophers’ who have privileged knowledge about what 
is best for ‘the city’, even if the mass of the people do not know it themselves. 
A significant number of neoconservatives in key positions within the Bush 
administration seemed to have reflected, albeit unconsciously, this Straussian 
strand of thought in which elites know best what is good for the state, thus 
contributing to the culture of denial surrounding the nature of interrogation 
methods used on detainees.  
The paradox that lay between the administration’s claims to be 
defending freedom and the methodology used to pursue this objective was 
clearly exposed by the photographs of abused prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison 
in Baghdad, which came into the public realm in April 2004.  As is well 
known, there were photographs of a female guard holding a kneeling, naked 
Iraqi man by a dog leash, and naked prisoners piled on top of one another, 
behind which smiling military personnel look on. A guard is shown to be 
forcing a hooded prisoner to simulate oral sex with another prisoner, and, 
most iconic of all, an Iraqi prisoner is shown precariously perched on a box 
with a sandbag over his head, electrical wires attached to his hands.  
These scenes of coercion and abuse were a microcosm of what was 
occurring in the string of prisons that the US had created in its war on terror. 
As well as the territorial war being waged to assert American hegemony, a 
war was being waged on the more metaphysical territory of the bodies 
suspected of terrorism or insurgency. Scenes like these, as well as acts of 
torture such as waterboarding, represented the ultimate assertion of 
American power. Pain and humiliation are being inflicted in order to bend the 
victim to the will of the representatives of the US. In the Abu Ghraib 
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photographs the victims were being represented as images of persons whose 
lives were not worth living in relation to those whose lives must be defended. 
The photograph of the ‘Man on the Box’ was appropriated by Western 
commentators in order to condemn torture, perhaps because the hooded 
figure closely resembled the tortured Christ in Christian iconography. But it 
was perhaps an Iraqi who saw a truer meaning. An Iraqi street artist placed 
the photograph of the ‘Man on the Box’ next to his sketch of the Statue of 
Liberty caught in the act of pulling a lever that would send a fatal electric 
charge through the hooded figure. The caption read: ‘That Freedom for Bush’ 
[sic].141 American freedom had become indistinguishable from American 
oppression. 
The senior commander of US forces in Iraq, Lieutenant General Ricardo 
Sanchez, who was advised by a team sent by Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld 
in order to get better intelligence from Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, later 
charged the Bush Administration with ‘gross negligence’ and ‘dereliction of 
duty’ for sweeping away the Geneva Conventions and providing no guidance 
to the armed forces in their place. By doing so, he claimed, ‘the civilian 
leaders at the highest levels of our government […] unleashed the hounds of 
Hell, and no one seemed to have the moral courage to get the animals back in 
their cage’.142 Susan Sontag in her essay about Abu Ghraib entitled ‘Regarding 
the Torture of Others’, has made the point that Americans are as capable of 
inflicting rape and pain upon prisoners as any other people. They do so, she 
says, when 
 
they are told, or made to feel, that those over whom they have absolute power 
deserve to be humiliated, tormented. They do them when they are led to believe that 
the people they are torturing belong to an inferior race or religion. For the meaning of 
these pictures [of the Abu Ghraib prisoners] is not just that these acts were 
performed, but that their perpetrators apparently had no sense that there was 
anything wrong in what the pictures show.143  
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The metaphorical architects of the torture dungeons at Abu Ghraib and 
similar facilities elsewhere were, it can be argued, not the US armed forces, 
but the President and senior figures of his administration under the influence 
of neoconservative ideology. They were assisted by lawyers,144 the military 
commanders and so on, but the message they designed and promulgated 
concerning an endless war on terror was theirs. Torture emphasised, in a 
grotesque way, the unbridled nature of American power since the very act of 
torture is designed to demonstrate the end of the normative world for the 
victim and express the complete domination of the State which the torturer 
represents.  Torture mirrors terrorism, since it is meant to terrorize, and it has 
a symbolic value. As the political writer William Pfaff observed: 
 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Bush administration is not torturing 
prisoners because it is useful but because of its symbolism. It originally was intended 
to be a form of what later, in the attack on Iraq, came to be called ‘shock and awe’. It 
was meant as intimidation. We will do these terrible things to demonstrate that 
nothing will stop us from conquering our enemies. We are indifferent to world 
opinion. We will stop at nothing.145 
 
The use of torture can therefore be interpreted as a tangible example of 
the neoconservative belief that the rightness of the American cause rendered 
conventions, legalities, or the opinion of other nations obsolete. Although, as 
argued above, unlawfulness was always denied by the administration, the 
rhetoric it deployed following the events of 9/11 and which continued 
thereafter often hinted at a strategy that would not rule it out. As President 
Bush stated in October, 2001, in its war against the ‘evil doers’ and the ‘evil 
ones’, America was engaged in a ‘different type of war’, one in which ‘we’ve 
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got to fight on all fronts’. And again: ‘This is a different kind of war that 
requires a different type of approach and a different kind of mentality.’146 As 
the Vice President put it shortly after 9/11: 
 
We’ll have to work sort of on the dark side, if you will. We’ve got to spend time in 
the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here needs to 
be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are 
available to our intelligence agencies – if we are going to be successful. That’s the 
world these folks operate in. And, uh, so it’s going to be vital for us to use any means 
at our disposal basically, to achieve our objectives.147 
 
 
 However, whilst rhetoric played its part in the constructing a culture in 
which torture became almost acceptable, it is the underlying philosophy of 
neoconservatism, that, arguably, played a larger role. It is worth first of all 
setting out briefly why torture is so abhorrent to the liberal individualist view 
of human nature. Berlin for example, following Kant, sees man not as a means 
to an end, but as an end in himself. In this view, there is no value higher than 
the individual, which is why for Berlin 
 
All forms of tampering with human beings, getting at them, shaping them against 
their will to your own pattern, all thought-control and conditioning, is, therefore, a 
denial of that in men which makes them men and their values ultimate.148 
 
Liberalism, which, for Berlin, nourishes his concept of negative liberty, 
intrinsically incorporates a vision of human beings possessed of an inherent 
dignity, which torture and abuse aim to strip away, reducing the victim to an 
isolated and terrified object who is less than human. This is the embodiment 
of the liberal’s worst nightmare as it represents, in microcosm, the idea of 
political tyranny, whereby the weak and powerless are the victims of the 
strong. What is unacceptable in Berlin’s liberalism  
 
is the use of human beings as mere means – the doctoring of them until they are 
made to do what they do, not for the sake of the purposes which are their purposes 
[….] but for reasons which only we, the manipulators, who freely twist them for our 
purposes, can understand […]. [W]hat turns one inside out, and is indescribable, is 
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the spectacle of one set of persons who so tamper and ‘get at’ others that the others 
do their will without knowing what they are doing; and in this lose their status as 
free human beings, indeed as human beings at all.149 
 
Neoconservatism, which regards liberalism as a mistaken political ideal 
responsible for many of the ills of the present, does not, by contrast, see man 
as an end in himself. As argued in Chapter Four, for neoconservatives the 
ideal society is not one in which conditions of maximum choice are created 
for the individual, but one in which men are led, or perhaps even coerced, 
towards certain eternal truths for the sake of their ‘true’ selves. This view of 
human nature, that man can be sacrificed in the name of values higher than 
himself, sits easily with the neoconservative vision of a pre-eminent America 
at war with evil, unconstrained by law or treaties, whose actions are justified 
by abstractions such as the war on terror.  
The philosophy of neoconservatism, with its belligerent optimism that 
the US was acting to defend freedom against evil, that there is but one true set 
of values that can be universally applied across cultures, and that laid claim to 
possessing the truth, (Berlin’s ‘magical eye’), would not, and did not, baulk at 
the sacrifice of individuals on Hegel’s ‘slaughter-bench of history’ provided 
that the interests of the US and the administration were served. Susan Sontag, 
in the extract from her essay quoted above, touched upon a truth that for the 
Abu Ghraib guards, as for the CIA torturers elsewhere, there was nothing 
wrong in their behaviour. There was nothing wrong because the US 
administration became the only arbiter of right and wrong that mattered. This 
was possibly the true meaning of the Bush aide’s remarks in which he boasted 
that now the U.S. was an empire it  ‘create[s] its own reality’.   
A foreign policy that focused upon the unbridled use of American 
military power and incorporated a neoconservative vision in which 
democracy and freedom could be imposed from without was bound to entail 
excesses. The idea of such an imposition of values by force on people who are 
deemed to be in no condition to know what is good for them has been 
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mounted, as Berlin put it, ‘by every dictator, inquisitor and bully who seeks 
some moral, or even aesthetic, justification for his conduct’.150  The use of 





This chapter has sought to demonstrate, using a range of examples, the way 
in which the foreign policy of the Bush administration revealed the nature of 
its interpretation of freedom, and the way in which the discourse of freedom 
was used to underpin these policy goals and the methods used to achieve 
them.  
The origins of the neoconservative influence upon the emerging foreign 
policy and the strands of thought that contributed to it were discussed in 
section II. Section III explained how these influences coalesced after the events 
of 9/11 to form a distinctive foreign policy strategy which was embodied in 
the National Security Strategy of 2002. The main features of this strategy were 
that American military power would need to be used aggressively, not 
passively, proactively rather than simply reactively. Though the ultimate goal 
was the defence of freedom, enemies of the United States may be struck first 
before they can cause harm to America or its interests. Implicit within this 
strategy was the use of American power throughout the world to impose a 
global order conducive to its interests, both economic and political.  
Section III also discussed the overarching theme of the Bush foreign 
policy, namely the war on terror. This phrase refers to what is, in essence, an 
abstraction. Terror is, after all, not a tangible or identifiable enemy; it is a 
concept and a methodology adopted by fanatics. But for the Bush 
administration it was a convenient term, a peg upon which to hang some of 
the ideological baggage associated with neoconservatism, part of which was a 
belief in the desirability of increased presidential and state power, which is 
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discussed further in the next chapter. As the journalist and writer Mark 
Danner summarized, ‘serving as it has as a handy and near-inexhaustible 
rationale for accruing centralized power, the War on Terror has approached 
as close as we have yet come to Orwell’s imagined perpetual war, accruing to 
those in control the increased power that comes with war but without the 
endless costs’.151  
It is arguably the idealistic nature of the administration’s defence of the 
war, the very abstraction inherent in its title, revealing as it does a simplistic, 
reductionist view of the world, that is most revealing of the danger it posed to 
the tradition of liberty to which it constantly appealed. Considering the war 
on terror in terms of the analytical framework, it is worth highlighting how in 
particular this concept appears to run counter to two significant strands of 
Berlin’s thought. First, the war on terror was an abstract concept that 
demanded the sacrifice of others, most of whom had never been asked 
whether they were prepared to make such a sacrifice. Secondly, in pursuing 
the war, the administration appeared to be adopting a Hegelian attitude to 
history which Berlin deplored.  
Berlin was sceptical of the idea that human beings should be sacrificed 
on the altar of abstract ideas, not least because so often the ideas themselves 
turned out to be of a dubious nature. As previously mentioned, he opposed 
the notion that there existed some single great truth, some great historical 
ideal, some achievable final solution that demanded the sacrifice of 
individuals.152 He was particularly sceptical of what he termed (whilst 
referring to Herzen) ‘the despotism of formulas – the submission of human 
beings to arrangements arrived at by deduction from some kind of a priori 
principles which had no foundation in real experience’.153 The abstractions to 
which individuals were so often sacrificed were largely illusory, but 
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The one thing that we may be sure of is the reality of the sacrifice, the dying and the 
dead. But the ideal for the sake of which they die remains unrealised. The eggs are 
broken and the habit of breaking them grows, but the omelette remains invisible. 
Sacrifices for short-term goals, coercion, if men’s plight is desperate enough and truly 
requires such measures, may be justified. But holocausts for the sake of distant goals, 
that is a cruel mockery of all that men hold dear, now and at all times.154 
 
In words that seem particularly apt when applied to the war on terror 
and the rhetoric surrounding both it and the Iraq war, Berlin perceived this 
faith in abstract ideals, which demands the sacrifice of the lives of others, as 
intellectually flawed, almost a retreat from reason: 
 
a confusion of words with facts, the construction of theories employing abstract terms 
which are not founded on discovered real needs […].These formulae grow into 
terrible weapons in the hands of fanatical doctrinaires who seek to bind them upon 
human beings, if need be, by violent vivisection, for the sake of some absolute ideal, 
for which the sanction lies in some uncriticised and uncriticisable vision [...].155 
 
As has been demonstrated above, the war on terror embraced a 
discourse which did indeed promulgate abstract notions such as ridding the 
world of evil and delivering freedom. The sacrifice of others, however, 
principally Afghans and Iraqis, and indeed US military personnel, was 
justified in the name of these abstractions, although the extent of the sacrifice 
was never dwelt upon. The number of Iraqis killed in the war was never 
officially tallied, and the media were forbidden to film the returning coffins of 
the US military who lost their lives.156 The President did not attend the 
funeral of a single US soldier.157 In this discourse of freedom there were to be 
no negatives, only the certainty of being, in the Hegelian sense, ‘on the right 
side of history’s flow’, which rendered regret at the sacrifice of individuals ‘a 
mere indulgence in subjective moods’.158 As the President said in January 
2005, ‘history has a visible direction, set by liberty and the Author of 
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Liberty.’159 Those called upon to die in the sanctified name of ‘freedom’ need 
not be dwelt upon; they are simply what history demands.  
Freedom, however, remained undefined. There was, nevertheless, a 
belief often explicitly expressed, by the President and others, that the 
American ideal of freedom was what all peoples craved, that it was sanctified 
by the Almighty, and the same for all cultures.160 This is a claim that has been 
disputed by, for example, the philosopher John Dewey, who believed that 
what determined the need for freedom, its importance as a social and political 
objective, and indeed its meaning, was determined by cultural factors.161 It 
was not a default position common to all mankind, a universal constituent of 
human nature in the way President Bush in particular suggested, and indeed 
many figures of the Enlightenment also claimed. Seen in this light, the idea  
that an ideal rooted in the American tradition (irrespective of how the Bush 
administration interpreted it), and thus culturally contingent, could be 
exported to other nations like Iraq and Afghanistan, was flawed.  The 
paradox exposed by the Iraq war was that the monist vision of freedom as a 
paramount value to all men everywhere could only be imposed by the use of 
overwhelming force, the projection of fear, and the sacrifice of large numbers 
of Iraqi lives, all of which constituted the denial of their freedom.  
It is of course the case that the use of torture is not a foreign policy goal, 
but it has been argued in this chapter that it was an inevitable adjunct to the 
overall direction of foreign policy and the ideas that underpinned it. The 
absorption of neoconservative ideas by the administration enabled it to 
embrace the concept of unbridled American power, itself likely to undermine 
moral restraint in the treatment of detainees. Furthermore, as discussed in 
Section II above, neoconservatism clove in no small measure to the Orientalist 
assumption that Western and American culture are superior to non-Western 
political and cultural systems. The idea of an inherent superiority easily 
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translates not only to pre-emptive war upon an ‘inferior’ culture 
(Afghanistan, Iraq), but also to a belief that the peoples who belong to such a 
culture are in no sense equal – as human beings – to those members of the 
‘superior’ culture. When such beliefs take hold, as Susan Sontag made clear in 
her essay quoted in Section V above, the outcome is unsurprising. It may be 
argued that the use of torture is one of the most revealing manifestation of the 
administration’s interpretation of the meaning of freedom. As discussed 
above, the key differences between the liberal and neoconservative visions of 
what constitutes a self, a person, lead to an acceptance of the use of torture on 
the one hand, and an almost absolute rejection – except in extreme 
circumstances – on the other. As Berlin emphasises: ‘Enough manipulation of 
the definition of a man, and freedom can be made to mean whatever the 
manipulator wishes’.162 If man is simply perceived as a means to an end, even 
the ideal of freedom and the use of torture may be reconcilable. 
As already demonstrated, much of the freedom discourse as well as that 
associated with the war on terror expressed ideas which ran counter to 
several significant strands of Berlin’s thought that nourished his ideal of 
negative liberty. In constructing the discourse of freedom in the field of 
foreign policy, President Bush took up the implicit challenge of the 
neoconservatives that liberalism had so weakened America it no longer had 
the will to defend itself: the Straussian idea of the crisis of the West. The 
vision of freedom expressed by the President and his administration was not 
a vision of freedom that embraced pluralism and choice, a vision that 
encompassed a world of competing, often incommensurable values in which 
freedom competes with others. This was, by contrast, a monist vision in 
which American hegemony and its ideal of freedom must prevail. Using the 
certainty of the rightness of his cause, underwritten as he believed it to be by 
both God and the tide of history, the President attempted to combat the 
relativism which, the neoconservatives had claimed, had been America’s 
major weakness for many years. This was a discourse that embraced a truth 
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the neoconservatives believed no one else had the courage to see or articulate. 
It was a declaration of war not only upon terror but also upon what they 
perceived to be an exhausted liberal establishment. In this vision, American 
freedom became, as Anthony Burke expressed it, ‘instrumental, strategic and 
divine, all at once’.163 In its confident assertion that all men must rightfully 
want what the United States government says they want, even though they 
may not know it, this discourse adopted – contrary to the character of 
freedom located within the American tradition – elements of Berlin’s idea of 
positive liberty. The launching of a permanent war on terror, a pre-emptive 
war on Iraq, and an implicit acceptance of torture, clearly demonstrated the 
perversion to which this interpretation of freedom is so easily prone. How 
that perversion was manifested in domestic policy is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
 
   ------------------------------------------- 
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CHAPTER SIX: FREEDOM AT HOME   
 
 
As we defend liberty and justice abroad, we must always honor those 
values here at home.1 
 
In America, the Republic is not a dictatorship enforced in the name of 
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To a significant extent, as in the arena of foreign policy, the domestic policies 
of the Bush administration were in a number of areas a reflection of its 
underlying ideology which was largely shaped by the influence of 
neoconservatism. As has been noted, this was an influence rooted in some 
ways in the republican virtue tradition and one that embraced an 
interpretation of freedom which, this thesis maintains, ran counter to the 
American tradition. It is plausible to argue that, just as 9/11 presented the 
neoconservatives with an opportunity for long-planned military adventurism, 
it also provided them with an opportunity to influence the domestic policy 
agenda to reflect their ideals and values. Indeed, well before 9/11, William 
Kristol and Robert Kagan, in their influential article published in Foreign 
Affairs in August 1996 (previously referred to at page 136), made a key 
connection between foreign and domestic policy. In calling for ’moral clarity’ 
in foreign policy, they argued that ’the remoralization of America at home 
ultimately requires the remoralization of foreign policy’.3 Referring to this 
passage in the article, Nicholas Xenos suggests:  
 
The Straussian element in the neoconservative agenda thus contributed to a political 
project that aimed at exploiting America’s unrivalled military power to reverse its 
cultural decline. The regime it sought to change was the American regime.4 
 
The nature of the changes they had in mind was in many respects 
unprecedented and revolutionary. In a work entitled The Great Unravelling: 
Losing Our Way in the New Century (2003), Paul Krugman, a former economics 
professor and writer for the New York Times, relates how an alarm was set off 
for him whilst reading Henry Kissinger’s reflections on the French Revolution 
in his 1957 doctoral thesis on the age of Metternich and Castlereagh.  What 
‘sent chills down my spine’, he recalls, was how Kissinger ‘describes the 
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4 Nicholas Xenos, ‘The Neocon Con Game’, in Confronting the New Conservatism: The Rise of the 
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problems confronting a heretofore stable diplomatic system when it is faced 
with a “revolutionary power” – a power that does not accept that system’s 
legitimacy’. He goes on: 
 
The revolutionary power he had in mind was the France of Robespierre and 
Napoleon, though he clearly if implicitly drew parallels with the failure of diplomacy 
to effectively confront totalitarian regimes in the 1930s […]. It seems clear to me that 
one should regard America’s right-wing movement – which now in effect controls 
the administration, both houses of Congress, much of the judiciary, and a good slice 
of the media – as a revolutionary power in Kissinger’s sense. That is, it is a movement 
that does not accept the legitimacy of our current political system.5 
 
Krugman apparently saw President Bush as ‘a stealth revolutionary, a 
Robespierre in George Bush clothing, relentlessly pushing a revolutionary 
right-wing agenda, a true radical bent on dismantling America’s ancien regime 
[…].’6 
The domestic agenda offered an even greater potential for the radical 
nature of neoconservative ideology (and its concomitant interpretation of 
freedom discussed in sections II and III of Chapter Four), to express itself than 
did the arena of foreign policy. It was an unprecedented opportunity for the 
neoconservatives to attack and reverse the ‘liberal’ cultural relativism that 
they believed had debased America – see for example the views of Allan 
Bloom discussed in Chapter Four. This chapter therefore considers, using the 
same analytical framework as used in the previous chapter, several key 
domestic policy areas that illustrate the extent of the radical attempt to 
reverse America’s perceived cultural demise. The policy areas touched upon 
range from the consolidation of presidential power and the measures taken to 
protect ‘homeland security’, through to issues such as science, climate change, 
and sexual health. What links them for the purposes of this thesis is not 
merely that they are examples of a radical approach to government and an 
attempt to bring cultural values into the heart of politics, but that they each 
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manifest, in slightly different ways, the extent to which the administration 
reflected aspects of the neoconservative interpretation of freedom. 
One of those manifestations relates to a strand of the authoritarianism 
and paternalism that can be discerned in the administration’s domestic policy, 
in which, as in the republican virtue tradition, the State is assumed to have a 
role in shaping and reinforcing the moral virtue of its citizens. It would, of 
course, be an exaggeration to suggest, contrary to Tocqueville’s claim, that 
America, under the Bush administration, was a dictatorship enforced in the 
name of liberty. Nevertheless, the extent to which authoritarian methods were 
adopted domestically by the administration in the name of freedom, whilst in 
effect reducing its reach and changing its meaning, is this chapter’s main 
theme.  
In the domestic sphere, neoconservative influence upon the 
administration was conflated with the influence of the Christian right. The 
alliance of the Christian right with parts of the Republican party is of long 
standing, but, as Esther Kaplan argues, the events of 9/11 galvanised not only 
the neoconservatives, but the Christian right as well, which took the 
opportunity to launch an almost unprecedented attack upon both secularism 
and Islam.7 In a sense, both sides felt vindicated: extremists on the Christian 
right saw the attacks as a judgement upon America for its secular and liberal 
ways,8 and the neoconservatives believed that their previously expressed 
concerns relating to America’s military weakness were thoroughly justified.  
The combination of these two spheres of influence had a marked impact in 
the policy areas discussed in this chapter. Whilst the importance of religion in 
neoconservative thought has been already been referred to, it is worth 
emphasising its role as a backdrop to a number of domestic policies, 
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especially those involving science. The American Catholic neoconservative 
philosopher Michael Novak has commented:  
 
One characteristic of neoconservative thought that is understated – because people 
interpret it politically – is the degree to which it is fundamentally an ethical and 
religious movement. It is characteristic of all the neoconservatives that they have 
regained a religious sensibility and think religion terribly important.9   
 
Neoconservatives hold that the strict separation of Church and State and 
the exclusion of religious symbols from the public sphere damaged the moral 
environment and facilitated cultural relativism.10 Attempts were therefore 
made by the administration to blur this distinction – see Section IV below. 
Although most neoconservatives support the tenets and values of Judeo-
Christianity for their own sake, religion also has a utilitarian function in that it 
provides a ground upon which to align against the cultural left. If public 
debate is robbed of religious references, they believe, it gives ground to 
relativism and damages the polity.11 Religion, for neoconservatives and the 
Christian right, must never be separated from politics and it is in the area of 
science and associated subjects, e.g. sex education and stem cell research, that 
this belief was most clearly manifested in the policies of the Bush 
administration, and where the state made attempts to coerce people towards 
moral virtue. 
In reflecting upon the themes outlined above, this chapter focuses on 
four principal areas. Section II is concerned with aspects of the presidency 
itself:  how presidential power was exercised and the administration’s view of  
its scope and limitations. It considers in particular the development of what 
has been called ‘the Imperial Presidency’,12 as well as the administration’s 
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adherence to the ‘unitary executive theory’, the presidential practice of 
‘signing statements’, and attitudes towards Congress and the law.  
Section III is concerned with the ramifications of the various pieces of 
legislation passed in the wake of the events of 9/11, e.g. the USA Patriot Act 
of 2001 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the provisions of which were 
frequently consecrated by the rhetoric of freedom with which President Bush 
introduced them. Much of the way this legislation was implemented, the 
number of persons detained and deported, the extent of domestic surveillance 
and wiretapping, and intrusions of privacy (which included book-borrowing 
habits, for example), was the responsibility of the Attorney General, John 
Ashcroft, whose interpretation of the meaning of freedom is subjected to 
analysis.   
Section IV illustrates how the administration adopted an anti-science 
stance, which was manifested, in particular, in its approach to climate change, 
stem cell research, and sex education. This stance reflected opinion on the 
Christian right and was a discernible trend within the Republican party that, 
according to writer Chris Mooney, first became evident during Senator Barry 
Goldwater’s presidential campaign of 1964, receiving further impetus during 
President Reagan’s period of office (1981–1989).13 An anti–science stance is 
not therefore exclusive to neoconservatism, but it is an outlook which 
neoconservatives undoubtedly shared, and which was given an 
unprecedented emphasis under the Bush administration in its retreat from 
empiricism towards policies based upon notions of faith and virtue. One 
reason for this distrust of science, as the section illustrates, was that the very 
dynamism of science, its constant onslaught upon old orthodoxies and its 
rapid generation of new technological possibilities, represented one of the 
most threatening aspects of modernism.  
Section V makes reference to Foucault’s ideas concerning discourse and  
is concerned principally with how the discourse of freedom was disseminated 
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through a compliant media. Section VI draws conclusions from the evidential 
examples presented in the body of the chapter. 
 
II PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
 
One of the features of neoconservatism that distinguishes it from other 
political philosophies, according to Stanley Aronowitz, is its willingness to 
replace the doctrine of compromise, the very stuff of practical politics, with 
one of an ‘absolute truth’. ‘Neoconservatism’, he writes, ‘is the sworn 
opponent of one of the sacred cows of pluralism: compromise with one’s 
opponents’.14 In this sense, neoconservatism is, as Krugman suggests above, a 
kind of right-wing Jacobinism, willing both to wage permanent war on its 
critics and to seek, for the presidency and the administration, a concentration 
of power hitherto deemed by many theorists to be incompatible with 
constitutional checks and balances.  As the political philosopher Stephen 
Bronner noted, ‘[Neoconservatives] are revolutionaries or, better, counter-
revolutionaries intent on remaking America’.15 
One of the clearest manifestations of these revolutionary, or counter-
revolutionary, tendencies that characterised the Bush administration, was the 
way in which it interpreted and exercised presidential power. This is well 
illustrated by the development and implementation of the ‘unitary executive 
theory’. The radical expansion of this theory, which had been upheld to a 
greater or lesser degree by past presidents,16 is often attributed to Vice 
President Cheney who, during a television interview in January 2002, talked 
about his commitment to reverse the restraints placed on the powers of the 
presidency after the Watergate scandal which, he complained, had led to 
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’unwise compromises’ that weakened the presidency.17 The theory embraced 
by Cheney was that the president, as head of the executive branch of 
government and commander in chief of the armed forces, is endowed with 
vast ‘inherent’ powers and that all executive power, whatever its source, falls 
within presidential control.18 In the wake of the events of 9/11, the Bush legal 
team expanded the reach of this theory. Within two weeks, John Yoo, deputy 
assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel (author of the so-
called ‘torture memo’) had prepared a memo for the White House which 
asserted:  
 
[t]he centralization of authority in the president alone is particularly crucial in matters 
of national defence, war, and foreign policy, where a unitary executive can evaluate 
threats, consider policy choices, and mobilize resources with a speed and energy that is 
far superior to any other branch.19   
 
The advocates of this enhanced unitary executive theory were relying, at 
least in part, upon Alexander Hamilton’s words in Federalist No. 70. The 
founders had put a single president in charge of the executive branch in order 
to give it a ’unity’ so it could act with ’decision, activity, secrecy and 
despatch’. This is important in time of war when ’energy in the executive is 
[…] essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks’.20 
Thus, the Bush administration lawyers argued, statutes and treaties that 
restrict what the military and other security forces can do are 
unconstitutional, as only the president could decide how the executive branch 
could best defend America. In effect, this doctrine claimed an exclusive power 
for the president unregulated in any way by Congress.  
Proponents of the unitary executive theory also leant heavily on the 
notion of presidential prerogative and relied upon a broad interpretation of 
the vesting clause of Article II of the Constitution, claiming for the president 
what Thomas S. Langston and Michel E. Lind have called ’a near monarchical 
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power’ as a result.21 Frequently citing Locke, who, as has been previously 
emphasised, had considerable influence upon the founders, they point in 
particular to the prerogative power that Locke provides the executive to act in 
cases of emergency, even, if necessary, outside the law. In such cases, Locke 
wrote,  ’tis fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the 
executive power, or rather to this fundamental law of nature and government, 
viz. that as much as may be, all the members are to be preserved’.22 He goes 
on to describe ‘this power to act according to discretion, for the public good, 
and without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is that 
which is called prerogative’, which is to be used in unforeseen 
circumstances.23 But Locke does make clear in the introductory paragraph to 
this chapter that the ability for the executive to act beyond or outside the law 
rests with the executive ‘till the legislative can conveniently be assembled to 
provide for it’.24  
It is also argued, by James Pfiffner for example, that Locke’s intent was 
that the prerogative power could be legitimately exercised only ‘for the good 
of the people’ and is not a discretion to ignore the law, but an authority to act 
in the public good in times of emergency in ways that may not accord with 
the law. The executive is still subject to legislative control except in special 
circumstances.25 Similarly, Langston and Lind, in their study of whether 
notions of presidential prerogative can indeed be grounded in Locke, argue 
that a correct reading of the Second Treatise leads to the conclusion ‘that the 
president possesses limited discretionary powers and that any purely 
executive power is “subordinate and ministerial” to the legislative power of 
the Congress […][A]ny prerogative power of the president  to act in silence of 
the laws, or against the laws, exists only in sufferance of Congress’.26 
Therefore,  the ’presidentialists’, as Langston and Lind refer to them, cannot 
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properly cite Locke as a source for arguing that the president has a residuum 
of extra-legal discretion in virtue of being invested with the ’executive power’ 
alone.27 
The impetus for justifying the accumulation of extraordinary executive 
powers to the presidency, notably advocated by, for example, John Yoo and 
David Addington (the latter was Vice President Cheney’s legal counsel and 
later chief of staff), but with the support of key administration figures such as 
Vice President Cheney, was the conviction, after 9/11, that America was a 
country at war. Addington, in particular, was a fervent advocate of unfettered 
presidential power because in his view the situation demanded it. In a memo 
on torture policy, reported by the Washington Post on 11 October, 2004, 
Addington wrote: 
 
In light of the president’s complete authority over the conduct of war, without a clear 
statement otherwise, criminal statutes are not read as infringing on the president’s 
ultimate authority in these areas. [Prohibitions] must be construed as inapplicable to 
interrogations undertaken pursuant to his commander-in-chief authority. […] 
Congress may no more regulate the president’s ability to detain and interrogate 
enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the 
battlefield. 28 
 
The cornerstone of the Bush administration’s interpretation of the 
unitary executive theory was, therefore, that the president, as commander-in -
chief, was the sole judge of the law, unbound by the Geneva Conventions or 
Congressional oversight. This was a radical development which went 
considerably beyond the practice of other administrations. As Bruce Fein, a 
Republican legal activist who served as deputy attorney general under 
President Reagan, put it, the presidential legal advisers had  
 
staked out powers that are a universe away beyond any other Administration. This 
President has made claims that are really quite alarming. He’s said that that there are no 
restraints on his ability, as he sees it, to collect intelligence, to open mail, to commit 
                                               
27 Ibid. 
28 Dana Milbank, ‘In Cheney’s Shadow, Counsel Pushes the Conservative Cause’, Washington Post, 11 
October 2004 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A22665-2004Oct10?language=printer> 
[accessed 5 July 2010]. 
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torture and to use electronic surveillance […]. His war powers enable him to declare 
anyone an illegal combatant. It’s got the sense of Louis XIV: ‘I am the state’.29  
  
The political scientist Robert Spitzer summarised the Bush 
administration’s view as affirming that ’Presidents have sole and complete 
control of the executive branch and other branches of government may not 
interfere with presidential actions arising from these executive powers’.30 
Spitzer argues that the unitary executive theory is corrosive to the 
constitutional separation of powers, and, as James Pfiffner points out, in 
asserting that, despite the lawmaking powers granted by the Constitution to 
Congress, presidential executive authority and the commander-in-chief clause 
can overcome virtually any constraint upon the executive, the executive is 
claiming unilateral control of the laws and is essentially claiming the power to 
say what the law is.31 
The unaccountable nature of the administration’s concept of executive 
power is further evidenced by the deployment of presidential ‘signing 
statements’. Presidential signing statements are  
 
pronouncements issued by the president at the time a congressional enactment is 
signed that, in addition to providing general commentary on bills, identify provisions 
of the legislation with which the president has concerns and (1) provide the president’s 
interpretation of the language of the law, (2) announce constitutional limits on some of 
its provisions, or (3) indicate directions to executive branch officials as to how to 
administer the new law in an acceptable manner.32 
 
The use of signing statements was by no means a new phenomenon and 
prior to the presidency of George W. Bush it was most frequently used by 
President Reagan, whose attorney general, Edwin Meese III, was largely 
responsible for its development as commonly used instrument of executive 
action.33 What was significant, however, about President Bush’s use of this 
                                               
29 Cited in Jane Mayer, ‘The Hidden Power’,  The New Yorker,  3 July 2006 p. 2  
    <http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/07/o3/060703fa_factl?curent> [accessed 21 June 2010]. 
30 Cited in Pfiffner, Power Play, p. 220. 
31 Ibid., p. 227. 
32 Phillip J. Cooper, ‘George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of Presidential Signing 
Statements’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 35, No. 3 (2005),  pp. 515–532 (pp. 516–7). 
33 Ibid., p. 517. 
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device was the extent to which it was used, its scope, and the underlying 
rationale behind its use. 
By February 2008, President Bush had issued signing statements 
regarding 159 laws. This is fewer than President Clinton (391) but most of 
them (127) made constitutional claims as against 105 by President Clinton. 
More importantly, in those 159 signing statements, President Bush objected to 
more than 1167 law provisions. This is almost twice as many as all previous 
presidents combined, who had issued fewer than 600 constitutional 
challenges to laws in total.34 The main aim of the signing statement strategy 
adopted by the Bush administration was ‘not only to address specific 
provisions of legislation that the White House wishe[d] to nullify but also to 
reposition and strengthen the presidency in relation to Congress’.35 
Maintaining executive independence from Congress is a running theme 
throughout the President’s use of signing statements. Amongst the challenges 
to laws passed by Congress, there were frequent refusals to provide 
information, objections to laws relating to rules and regulations for the 
military, and objections to foreign policy restrictions. President Bush 
instructed his subordinates that the laws to which he objected were 
unconstitutional constraints on his own inherent power as commander-in-
chief and head of the unitary executive branch, and thus did not need to be 
obeyed as written.36 
When Congress reauthorised the USA Patriot Act in March 2006, for 
example, it required that Congress be informed at regular intervals about the 
use of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) expanded search and 
seizure authority. The President announced his intention to construe these 
provisions ‘in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional 
authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold 
information disclosure which could impair foreign relations, national 
security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the 
                                               
34 Pfiffner, Power Play, p. 203. 
35 Cooper,  ‘George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of Signing Statements’. p.515. 
36 Savage, Takeover, p. 237. 
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Executive’s constitutional duties’.37 Legal specialists pointed out that the 
President was, in effect, claiming that only the parts of the bill that expanded 
his power were constitutional, those parts designed to constrain his power 
were nullified.38 Similar signing statement caveats were issued when 
Congress passed laws in 2004 and 2005 forbidding the military from using 
information that was not ‘lawfully collected’,39 and, significantly, a signing 
statement using similar wording as that set out above was issued in respect of 
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which was designed to outlaw inhuman 
or degrading treatment of detainees.40 
President Bush and his administration therefore used signing statements 
as a means of bypassing Congressional oversight and consolidating 
presidential power in a process that many regarded as unconstitutional. In 
June 2006, the American Bar Association considered the question of whether 
the President had the constitutional authority, as he claimed, to ignore the 
law. The Association concluded that it was ‘a violation of the Constitution for 
a president to sign a bill and then issue a signing statement declaring that 
some of its provisions are unconstitutional and need not be enforced (or 
obeyed) as written’. The Association concluded that the founders had given 
only two options to presidents: veto a bill or sign it and enforce all of it. The 
Association went on: ‘The President’s constitutional duty is to enforce the 
laws he has signed into being, unless and until they are held unconstitutional 
by the Supreme Court. The Constitution isn’t what the President says it is.’41  
A remark on the use of signing statements by President Bush by Marvin 
Edwards, a former Oklahoma congressman and founding trustee of the 
American Conservative Union, illustrates the extent to which the radical 
nature of the Bush administration differed from traditional conservatism. He 
said: 
                                               
37 Cited in Keck, ‘The Neoconservative Assault on the Courts’, p.181. 
38 Savage, Takeover, p. 229. 
39 Ibid., p. 237. 
40 Keck, ‘The Neoconservative Assault on the Courts’, p. 181. 
41 Cited in Savage, Takeover, p. 247. 
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It’s not about Bush. It’s about what should be the responsibility of the president. We are 
saying that the president of the United States has an obligation to follow the 
Constitution and exercise only the authority that the Constitution gives him. That’s a 
central tenet of American conservatism – to constrain the centralization of power.42  
 
What neoconservate ideology, under the influence of Strauss, pointed 
towards was not of course the constraint of power, but the very opposite, the 
enhancement of centralized power in the hands of an elite – the executive 
branch. 
This radical approach, and the administration’s implicit belief that it had 
the right to determine what the law was and what laws should apply, is well 
illustrated by the denial of habeas corpus to the detainees brought into United 
States custody following the events of 9/11. In 2003 and 2004 the 
administration incarcerated hundreds of people suspected of cooperating 
with the Taliban or Al Qaeda in Afghanistan or of fighting U.S. troops. The 
administration argued, that those detainees captured and held at 
Guantánamo Bay (around 600), were to be defined as ’enemy combatants’ 
with no right of appeal to the U.S. courts for writs of habeas corpus, and that 
the courts had no jurisdiction to judge these executive branch actions.43 As 
President Bush remarked –  as though his moral view was sufficient to settle 
any legal issues – ‘The only thing I know for certain is that these are bad 
people.’44 However, the denial of habeas corpus to the Guantánamo Bay 
detainees gave rise to several Supreme Court cases. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in 
2004, the Supreme Court held that an American citizen (Hamdi), designated 
an enemy combatant, had a right, under the Constitution’s due process 
clause, to ‘notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair 
opportunity to rebut the Government’s assertions before a neutral decision-
maker’.45 Appropriately constituted military tribunals might satisfy this 
requirement. Justice O’Connor specifically rejected the administration’s claim 
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that the courts do not have jurisdiction over cases concerning detainees, 
declaring: 
 
We necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that the separation of powers 
principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances 
[…].We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the 
President when it comes to the right of the Nation’s citizens […].Unless Congress acts to 
suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a 
necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an 
important judicial discretion in the realm of detentions.46 
 
On the same day, the Supreme Court held, in Rasul v. Bush, that the 
Guantánamo detainees were entitled to bring a challenge of habeas corpus, 
even though the administration had argued that they were held outside 
sovereign territory of the United States. With the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005, and the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the Republican-dominated 
Congress sought to overthrow this judgement and remove the possibility of 
habeas corpus protection for the Guantánamo detainees. In Boumediene v. Bush 
(2008), the Supreme Court ruled that Congress cannot overrule the 
Constitution, the ‘suspension clause’ can only be invoked at a time of invasion 
or rebellion, and, accordingly, the protection of habeas corpus applied to the 
Guantánamo detainees. In the preamble to the Supreme Court’s judgement, 
Justice Kennedy, having pointed out that the framers viewed freedom from 
unlawful restraint as a fundamental precept of liberty, quoted Alexander 
Hamilton in Federalist No. 84 on the dangers of arbitrary imprisonment: 
 
[T]he practice of arbitrary imprisonments have been, in all ages, the favourite and most 
formidable instruments of tyranny. The observations of the judicious Blackstone are 
worthy of recital : “To bereave a man of life […] or by violence to confiscate his estate, 
without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as 
must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but 
confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are 
unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous 
engine of arbitrary government.47  (Italics in original.) 
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Justice Kennedy then went on to emphasise that the Suspension Clause is 
designed to protect against the cyclical abuses of habeas corpus witnessed in 
England even up until World War I. The Clause ensures that, except during 
periods of formal suspension, the judiciary will have a time-tested device, the 
writ, to maintain ‘the delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the surest 
safeguard of liberty. He goes on: ‘The Clause protects the rights of the 
detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailor 
to account.’48 
As evidenced above, by its expansion of the unitary executive theory, the 
use of signing statements, and its attitude towards habeas corpus, being held 
to account was exactly what the Bush administration went out of its way to 
avoid, either by Congress, the law, or the Constitution. The attitude towards 
accountability by the administration reflected the Straussian and 
neoconservative view of government and democracy discussed in section IV 
of Chapter Four. It accords specifically with Strauss’s ideas about elites, his 
assumption that mass democracy is a bad thing, that the people cannot be 
trusted with the truth and that ‘the philosophers’ (the executive branch in this 
case) have privileged knowledge about what is best for ‘the city’ (the State).  
This thesis claims that this approach was underwritten and motivated by 
an interpretation of freedom that ran counter to the American tradition. The 
attitude of the administration towards accountability, power, and the law was 
in sharp contrast to the ideals of those theorists discussed in Section II of 
Chapter Three, particularly, for example, Locke, Price, Priestley, and Paine, 
who, in formulating their ideas concerning the nature of liberty, which fed 
into the American tradition, were motivated in large part by their concerns 
about the dangers of arbitrary power and the nature of tyranny. By 
undermining the extent of the executive’s accountability to the people, the 
Bush administration compromised the people’s freedom. Further evidence of 
the administration’s attitude toward the law and individual freedom is 
explored in the next section. 
                                               
48 Ibid., p. 15. 
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III FREEDOM AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
 
The authoritarian nature of the Bush administration is manifested in some of 
the measures that it took to improve domestic security following the events of 
9/11. These frequently had the effect of subverting individual freedoms, 
including the expression of dissent. Isaiah Berlin accepted, in ‘Two Concepts 
of Liberty’, that it was frequently the case that in political society one value 
might have to give way to another as circumstances directed, and that in 
order to achieve higher levels of justice or equality, for example, a diminution 
in the scope of freedom may sometimes be necessary. As he wrote, 
‘Everything is what it is, liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness, or justice or 
culture’.49 Neither, he might have added, is it security. The important thing 
was to recognise the ‘trade-off’ and not pretend that a loss of absolute liberty 
had not occurred. Such adjustments between values, which are sometimes 
incommensurable, are part of the pluralism that he advocated and in which 
his concept of negative freedom is grounded. So whilst Berlin may well have 
recognised that in the post 9/11 circumstances some curtailment of the 
freedom of American citizens may have been justified, he would have wanted 
that curtailment to have been acknowledged. There were, however, dangers 
to be recognised, as even democracies can still ‘crush individuals’ and a 
universal consent to loss of liberty does not ‘somehow miraculously preserve 
it merely by being universal, or by being by consent’.50 The infringements of 
individual liberty with which this section is concerned may well therefore be 
considered to run counter to key aspects of Berlin’s thought. 
This is particularly the case if the analytical framework of Berlin’s ideas 
is used to consider the vision of freedom expressed by President Bush’s first 
Attorney General, John Ashcroft. His vision serves as a useful backdrop 
against which to examine some of the activities and measures relating to 
homeland security that the Bush administration introduced following the 
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events of 9/11. In a speech delivered in Belgium on 16 September 2002, 
Ashcroft made a defence of what he termed ‘ordered liberty’. Unlike Berlin, 
who saw ‘everything is what it is’, Ashcroft saw security and liberty as 
‘symbiotic and reinforcing principles’. Citing Edmund Burke, who claimed 
that liberty cannot exist without both order and virtue, Ashcroft went on to 
express the view that ‘Ordered liberty is the structure that, by directing and 
constraining the actions of individuals, allows us each the freedom to achieve the 
potential that is within us’ [my italics].51 Thus does Ashcroft tacitly accept the 
notion that true freedom is only achieved through the expression of some 
inner potential, an inner self which, in Berlin’s critique of positive liberty, can 
be identified with a ‘real’ or ‘autonomous’ self, the self ‘at its best’. Ashcroft’s 
view of the nature of freedom can be closely compared to the view expressed 
by T. H. Green of which Berlin was emphatically critical.52 As previously 
discussed, for Berlin, this idea that there exists in men ‘an occult entity – their 
latent rational will, or their ‘true’ purpose,’ can give rise to the view that it is 
only this inner spirit which deserves to have its wishes taken into account.53 
Once this view is taken, suggests Berlin, the actual wishes of men or societies 
can be ignored, men can be bullied or oppressed  
 
in the name, or on behalf of their ‘real’ selves ‘in the secure knowledge that whatever is 
the true goal of man (happiness, performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-
fulfilment) must be identical with his freedom – ‘the free choice of his ‘true’, albeit often 
submerged and inarticulate self’.54 
 
 
In the quest for ‘ordered liberty’, the administration embarked on a series 
of measures that resulted in a radical abridgement of civil rights. Arguably, 
the spectacle of State power that was unleashed in ‘the war on terror’ 
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encouraged the public’s belief that it shared in that power, even though the 
people themselves were one of its targets, especially in the realm of 
surveillance. The word ‘homeland’ appeared in the public lexicon with the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, establishing the Department of Homeland 
Security which combined several government agencies. ‘Homeland’ became 
something of a metaphor; this was the space in which a vulnerable citizenry, 
violently dislocated and disturbed by the events of 9/11, could shelter under 
the protection of the State which acquired an ever greater range of powers.  
The Attorney General’s first legislative attempt after 9/11 was his 
Mobilization Against Terrorism Act (MATA), which sought an array of 
executive powers that included the imprisonment of aliens in perpetuity 
without charges, sweeping rights of surveillance, and the removal of judicial 
oversight. A compromise bill, the Patriot Act, was passed in October 2001, 
with provisions that enabled law enforcement agencies to search telephone 
and electronic communications, medical and financial records, and eased 
restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering. Law enforcement agencies were 
given greater powers to detain and deport immigrants. They also had powers 
to enter any library or bookstore and demand a list of what people had 
borrowed or bought and to conduct secret searches of private homes, in some 
circumstances without a warrant. These new powers gave rise to immediate 
concerns over civil liberties, particularly in relation to the Fourth Amendment 
to the Constitution, which guards against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
and the removal of judicial oversight in a number of areas. The American 
Civil Liberties Union, for example, warned that the Patriot Act 
‘misunderstands the role of the judicial branch of government; it treats the 
courts as an inconvenient obstacle to executive action rather than an essential 
instrument of accountability’.55  
Under the Act an alien could be locked up for up to seven days without 
charges, and this could be extended indefinitely at the Attorney General’s 
discretion. The post 9/11 initial arrests totalled over 1,200 Muslims, Arabs 
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and others, and these arrests gave rise to numerous complaints about an 
erosion of civil rights and abuses. At a press conference held on 27 November 
2001, Ashcroft denied that ‘detainees are not able to be represented by an 
attorney or to contact their families’.56 Before the Senate, in April 2003, 
Ashcroft claimed that ‘there have been 478 deportations linked to the 
September 11 investigation’, 57 although why anyone so ‘linked’ should be 
deported was not made clear. Contrary to Ashcroft’s denial, the Justice 
Department Inspector General reported in June 2003 that many detainees 
were held incommunicado for weeks after their arrest and prevented from 
contacting lawyers or family members. Some had been subject to physical and 
mental abuse.58  
A significant feature of the Act was the easing of standards by which FBI 
agents could seize telephone, banking and credit card records without a 
warrant. The changes heralded a dramatic rise in the use of seizures without a 
warrant: from 8,500 occasions in 2000 to 45,000 occasions in the year following 
the passage of the Act.59 In March 2007, an audit by the Justice Department’s 
Inspector General found that the FBI had made improper and illegal use of its 
new tools on numerous occasions, including collecting information not 
permitted by law, collecting information from those who were not proper 
subjects of an FBI investigation, failing to report such errors, and 
undercounting its use of warrantless powers by as much as twenty per cent.60 
None of these infringements of civil liberties, foreseen or otherwise, 
appeared to impact upon Ashcroft’s enthusiasm for the ‘ordered liberty’ 
which he clearly believed to be embodied in the Patriot Act. In August 2003, 
Ashcroft was dispatched by the administration on a nationwide tour to 
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promote the Patriot Act. At the launch of the tour on 19 August 2003, he told a 
Washington think tank: ‘We have built a new system of justice.’ In 
Philadelphia he told a meeting of police officers that without the Patriot Act, 
‘America will pay the price in lost liberty’, and to another meeting of police 
officers in Minneapolis he claimed Americans are ‘freer today than at any 
time in the history of human freedom […]. The lives and liberties of all 
Americans are protected by the Patriot Act’.61  The Justice Department and the 
Secret Service tightly controlled the media at the various cities that Ashcroft 
visited on the tour, protesters were kept away, and public admission, 
according to the Society for Professional Journalists, was conditional upon 
agreement with Ashcroft’s position on the Act.62 Referring to those who 
warned of the loss of civil liberties or were concerned with the rights of 
suspects, he told the Senate in December 2001, ‘to those who scare peace-
loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: your tactics 
aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. 
They give ammunition to America’s enemies and pause to America’s 
friends’.63  
In this domestic ‘homeland security’ context, therefore, freedom for 
Ashcroft, and indeed the Bush administration as a whole, meant the freedom 
to agree, to consent to government actions, rather than the freedom to 
disagree, to dissent. Freedom meant to be at one with the direction of public 
discourse and the national mood; to share, as it were in the mythic 
dimensions of American freedom, rather than participate in the reality of its 
meaning. The place of dissent within the discourse of freedom that Ashcroft 
helped to promote became almost treasonous.  
The distrust of potential dissent and free speech was also manifested by 
President Bush, perhaps most obviously when he asserted in his address to 
Congress on 20 September 2001 that ‘Either you are with us, or you are with 
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the terrorists.’64 In such a landscape it is arguable that free speech and dissent 
have no meaning; it had – as Section VI below argues – the effect of silencing 
critics and helping to create a climate in which dissent went unheard. Private 
dissent by ordinary citizens was further stifled by the President’s practice of 
designating ‘free speech zones’ in every city he visited – cordoned-off areas in 
which protestors could gather outside his field of vision and away from the 
main event itself. White House officials routinely despatched the Secret 
Service to set up these zones to quarantine protesters wherever the President 
went. Several cases ended up in court where protesters were arrested for 
refusing to move to the zones, notably at Pittsburgh in 2002,65 and also at 
Columbia, South Carolina, where one Brett Bursey was arrested for a similar 
offence. It was on this occasion that President Bush remarked in his speech to 
Republican congressional candidates: ‘There’s an enemy out there that hates 
America because of what we love. We love freedom. We love the fact that 
people can worship freely in America. We love our free press. We love every 
aspect of our freedom and we’re not changing.’66 The Bursey case prompted 
several members of Congress to write to the President pointing out that as far 
as they were concerned, the First Amendment meant that the whole of the 
United States was a ‘free speech zone’, but this is not known to have had any 
impact on the practice.67 
Perhaps the most significant example of the tension between civil 
liberties and the authoritarian leanings of the administration was evidenced 
in the field of surveillance. The ‘war on terror’ promoted massive federal, 
state, and local surveillance policies, most of which were promoted and 
enabled by the Patriot Act. Surveillance itself has, as Michel Foucault pointed 
out, certain social ramifications and is a powerful element in the process of 
self-discipline and power relations. In Discipline and Punish (1977), Foucault 
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describes the power of the idea behind Jeremy Bentham’s ‘Panopticon’, a 1791 
design for a model prison.68 With an inner core and an outer ring, the 
Panopticon was designed so that the guards could see the prisoners but not 
the other way round. As Todd May interprets Foucault, ‘panopticism’ is our 
modern condition; we act as though we are constantly under observation, and 
even though we may not be being watched at all, the mere possibility is 
sufficient to ensure that to a large extent we discipline ourselves. We are like 
Bentham’s prisoners; we guard ourselves as we adopt internalised 
disciplinary practices.69 Surveillance by the state then, in Foucauldian terms, 
has implications for power relations and behaviours, but it also has other 
impacts.  
David Altheide, for example, suggests that surveillance is linked to the 
politics of fear, and in that sense it serves to increase the authority of the State. 
He points out that a key aspect of surveillance is that ‘it focuses on the “body” 
as an object rather than a subject, with feelings, emotions, rights, and, in short, 
humanity[…]. Surveillance becomes institutionalized and promotes, often 
subtly, the notion that all of us are under attack and need protection’.70 The 
intensive surveillance programmes put in place by the Bush administration, 
under which, for example, the Homeland Security Department warned local 
law enforcement agencies to keep an eye on anyone who ‘expressed dislike of 
attitudes and decisions of the US government’; where protest groups were 
infiltrated by the FBI;71 where those with suspect or anti-Bush views were 
placed on ‘no fly’ lists,72 and where the secret Counter Intelligence Field 
Activity (CIFA) agency of the Department of Defense gathered information 
about domestic organisations engaged in peaceful activities,73 were coercive 
in nature and insidiously corrosive of individual freedom. Lawrence Tribe, a 
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Harvard professor of international law, described the dangers of the Bush 
administration’s domestic surveillance policy thus: 
 
The more people become accustomed to a listening environment in which the ear of 
Big Brother is assumed to be behind every wall, behind every e-mail, and invisibly 
present in every electronic communication […] that is the kind of society, as people 
grow accustomed to it, in which you can end up being boiled to death without ever 
noticing that the water is getting hotter, degree by degree. The background 
assumptions of privacy will gradually be eroded to the point where we’ll wake up 
one day, or our children will, and it will seem quite quaint that people at one time, 
long ago, thought they could speak in candour.74 
 
As is well known, the framers of the Constitution believed that the 
citizen needed to be protected from the dangers of government intrusion into 
personal privacy and, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution provides that (with certain exceptions) the executive must obtain 
a warrant from a judge before it can search the home, papers or 
communications of a suspect. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
was passed by Congress in 1978 in response to the Supreme Court’s rejection 
of President Richard Nixon’s illegal domestic wiretapping activities. The FISA 
law set up a secret court that could grant the government permission to 
wiretap American citizens after showing probable cause. Following the events 
of 9/11, President Bush authorised the National Security Agency (NSA) to 
conduct electronic surveillance of thousands of Americans without employing 
the traditional warrant process or the congressionally created foreign 
intelligence warrant mechanism codified by FISA.75 This was not, however, 
something he admitted to. On 24 April 2004, he said: ‘Now, by the way, any 
time you hear the United States government talking about wiretap, it requires 
– a wiretap requires a court order. Nothing has changed by the way. When 
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we’re talking about chasing down terrorists, we’re talking about getting a 
court order before we do.’76   
The extensive nature of this surveillance programme became public  in 
an article published in the New York Times on  16 December 2005. At a news 
conference on 19 December 2005, President Bush claimed that his authority to 
order the surveillance programme rested (yet again) in his role as 
commander-in-chief and Article II of the Constitution. He also claimed that 
the authority which Congress had vested in him following the events of 9/11 
to use military force against al-Qaeda gave him additional powers. Whilst 
deprecating the leaks that made the details of the programme public –‘a 
shameful act’– even discussing it was ‘helping the enemy’– the programme 
had been ‘effective in disrupting the enemy while safeguarding our civil 
liberties’.77   
Liberty was again being invoked to defend actions that undermined it. 
The safeguarding of civil liberties was the very reason that the FISA court was 
established. In fact, the NSA surveillance programme (characteristically 
named the ‘terrorist surveillance’ programme) permitted wiretapping without 
either of the safeguards presumptively required by the Fourth Amendment 
(individualised probable cause and a warrant from a judge or a magistrate) or 
the FISA requirement of a warrant issued by a federal judge upon an 
individualized showing of probable cause that the subject is an ‘agent of a 
foreign power’.78 At a press conference held on 19 January, 2006, Alberto 
Gonzales, the (new) Attorney General, emphasised that ‘one party to the 
communication has to be outside the United States’ and insisted that there 
had to be ‘a reasonable basis’ for concluding that one party had an al-Qaeda 
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connection.79 But these were decisions and assessments made by the 
administration, not the FISA court. Asked why the administration did not ask 
Congress for authorization to wiretap domestic calls in terrorism cases 
without a warrant, Gonzales thought that it would have been ‘difficult if not 
impossible’.80 But the administration, claiming the privilege of executive 
powers, did it anyway. The unconstitutional nature of the NSA surveillance 
programme and the poor legal nature of the justifications offered in its 
defence were highlighted by many constitutional lawyers, notably Curtis 
Bradley et al who claimed in their open letter to Congress (referred to in the 
above footnote) that the Department of Justice ‘failed to make a plausible 
legal defence of the NSA domestic spying programme’. They concluded their 
letter by saying that in a democracy it was always open to the president to 
seek a change in the law ‘[b]ut it is also beyond dispute that, in such a 
democracy, the president cannot simply violate criminal laws because he 
deems them obsolete or impractical’.81 
In May 2006, it came to light that the NSA surveillance programme 
included an aspect hitherto unacknowledged by the White House. In an 
article published in USA Today, Leslie Cauley reported that the NSA had been 
secretly collecting the phone call records of tens of millions of Americans 
using data provided by the major telephone companies. Instead of one end of 
the communication having to be outside the US (the President’s previous 
claim), it now became apparent that this was not the case. As the article states: 
‘With access to records of millions of domestic calls, the NSA has gained a 
secret window into the communications habits of millions of Americans’.82 
This practice, known as ‘data mining’, did not, strictly speaking, require the 
consent of the FISA court provided that ‘personal identifiers’, such as names, 
Social Security numbers and street addresses, were not included as part of the 
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search. However, the article claimed that such information could easily be 
obtained by cross-checking with other databases. Needless to say, the White 
House denied that there was any domestic surveillance without court 
approval, although one major company, Quest, declined to take part because 
it had qualms about the legality of the programme, requesting evidence of the 
approval of either FISA or the Attorney General. The NSA declined to 
provide either.83 Eventually, the Bush administration’s covert surveillance 
programme was bought within the law when, on 10 July, 2008, Congress 
amended FISA.  
Measures adopted in the cause of homeland security by the Bush 
administration were therefore less than compatible with both traditional 
individual liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and indeed with the law 
itself. The ‘ordered liberty’ of John Ashcroft bore down upon freedom of 
speech, dissent and rights of privacy. The measures taken to increase 
homeland security were attempts to curtail freedom for Americans, not to 
expand it. Instead of freedom from state surveillance or from interference 
with free speech and dissent, the citizen, secretly and without consultation, 
was expected to surrender these freedoms in exchange for greater security. As 
discussed above, such trade-offs might sometimes be necessary, but security 
cannot be called freedom or confused with it. But the way in which these 
security measures were introduced and implemented, either in secret or 
outside the law, or both, implicitly manifested a distrust of the people and the 
freedoms that the Constitution guarantees. Since the people, through their 
institutions, could not apparently be trusted to choose rationally themselves, 
the administration saw no need to consult with them or even reveal these 
curtailments of their freedoms. These behaviours accorded, it might well be 
argued, with the ‘covert tyranny of the wise’ in which Shadia Drury claimed 
Strauss believed,84 and were consistent with neoconservative views about 
elites and the dangers of an open society. 
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These policies and behaviours also encapsulate a denial of an important 
element of Berlin’s thought and his view of human nature – the importance of 
choice. It can be argued that in spying on the population in secret, collecting 
data on private habits like library use, amassing telephone records, and in 
suppressing dissent, the administration was not only acting in a coercive way, 
antipathetic to the concept of negative liberty; it was also seeking to rob 
individuals of their capacity to choose, to invade their area of private choice, a 
choice not to give private information to the state, not to have telephone calls 
tapped, and to use the right of free expression. As previously discussed, being 
able to choose, is for Berlin, a fundamental human value and any violation of 
it undermines one of the necessities of human life and runs counter to the 
theme of pluralism which runs through his thought:  
 
it is sufficient, perhaps, to say that those who have ever valued liberty for its own 
sake believed that to be free to choose, and not to be chosen for, is an inalienable 
ingredient in what makes human beings human; and that this underlies both the 
positive demand to have a voice in the laws and practices of the society in which one 
lives, and to be accorded an area artificially carved out, if need be, in which one is 
one’s own master, a ‘negative’ area in which a man is not obliged to account for his 
activities to any man so far as this is compatible with the existence of organised 
society.85 
 
 Thus in bypassing their constitutional safeguards, the Bush 
administration, in effect, ‘chose for’ the people and, in so doing, undermined 
their freedom. 
 
IV. THE RETREAT FROM EMPIRICISM 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the separation of religion and the State was a 
fundamental principle of the founding doctrine. It recognised that the State 
had no proper role in the propagation of faith, and in adopting this position 
the founding doctrine secured an important element of pluralism in which 
negative liberty was able to flourish. The Bush administration, however, 
made unprecedented attempts to undermine this separation and used religion 
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as part of its political armoury. In the culture war that the neoconservatives 
wished to wage, Judeo-Christian values were central, and in this respect, as in 
many others, the interests of the administration and its influential 
neoconservative constituency coincided. As Richard John Neuhaus, the 
author of The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America (1984)86 
and also unofficial adviser to President Bush on bioethical issues, wrote, 
‘politics is chiefly a function of culture, at the heart of culture is morality, and 
at the heart of morality is religion’.87  
It has been argued that neoconservatives, traditional Jews, and 
traditional Christians could painlessly align themselves politically because 
they essentially shared the same values.88 Neoconservatism also appealed to 
an influential fringe of the Roman Catholic Church. These so-called ‘theocons’ 
included previously mentioned AEI scholar and philosopher Michael Novak, 
George Weigel, Senior Fellow of the conservative think tank the Ethics and 
Public Policy Centre, and Robert Bork, another AEI scholar who was once a 
rejected nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court. Referring to the Catholic 
neoconservatives, although his comments can be more universally applied, 
Frank Cocozzelli, a director of the Institute for Progressive Christianity, 
wrote:  
 
Many believe that neoconservatism is nothing more than a unilateral approach to 
United States foreign policy. But this is a dangerous misconception. Lost in the focus on 
a clique of Washington, D.C. militarists (as important as they are) is the role of the 
highly theocratic brand of neoconservatism. These ‘theocons’ see their philosophy as a 
mechanism to transform the whole of society into one based upon a highly orthodox, 
traditionalist form of Roman Catholic morality, a fringe form resoundingly rejected by 
the vast majority of the Church’s American flock.89 
 
Perhaps one of the best examples, in this context, of the way in which 
Christian right and neoconservative values coalesced was over creationism 
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and the rejection of evolutionary theory. For the neoconservatives, anything 
that might undermine an ordered society, irrespective of scientific veracity, 
was regarded as a threat. As Irving Kristol wrote in 1991, ‘if there is one 
indisputable fact about the human condition it is that no community can 
survive if it is persuaded – or even if it suspects – that its members are leading 
meaningless lives in a meaningless universe’.90 Darwinism, for Kristol and the 
neoconservatives was a materialist ideology which threatened to unravel 
religious belief and they were determined to discredit it accordingly. ‘All I 
want to do’, he told an AEI audience in 1997, ‘is to break the bonds of 
Darwinian materialism which at the moment restrict our imagination. For the 
moment that’s enough’.91 Another neoconservative, and Fellow of the AEI, Dr 
Leon Kass, later appointed as Chairman of President Bush’s Council on 
Bioethics – see below – expressed similar views. Kass, a prominent scientist, 
and professor at the University of Chicago where he founded a course with 
Allan Bloom, said to the same audience: 
 
[T]he creationists and their fundamentalist patrons […] sense that orthodox 
evolutionary theory cannot support any notions we might have regarding human 
dignity or man’s special place in the whole. And they see that Western moral teaching, 
so closely tied to Scripture, is also in peril if any major part of Scripture can be shown to 
be false.92 
 
This distrust of science, is not, as made clear in Section I of this chapter, 
exclusive to neoconservatism; it is a stance shared with large parts of the  
Republican party. Nevertheless, scepticism towards science is a feature of 
neoconservatism, and can be considered one of its basic tenets, drawing as it 
does upon Strauss’s belief in the supremacy of revelation over reason. It was a 
stance shared notably by Kristol, Kass, and others at think tanks such as  
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the AEI and the Heritage Foundation.93 Importantly, too, it accords with a 
strand of neoconservative thought that is similar to that found within the 
Romantic movement or the Counter-Enlightenment discussed briefly in 
Chapter Two, namely, a rejection of rationalism.  
In some key areas, neoconservative ideology and the values of the 
Christian right become mutually reinforcing, e.g. the importance of ‘family 
values,’ the place of tradition, anti-relativism, and the distrust of science 
referred to. Other values which the Christian right held dear, relating to sex 
outside marriage, abortion, gay marriage, feminism and so on, were easily 
accommodated under the neoconservative philosophical umbrella, since they 
not only resonated with the President’s personal beliefs and those of large 
parts of the Republican party, but were key value issues in the war against 
cultural relativism which the neoconservatives wished to wage.  
What the journalist Ron Suskind called a ‘faith-based presidency’94 thus 
reflected a belief in revelation and a mistrust of reason characteristic of both 
the Christian right and neoconservatism. It was also a further example of the 
administration’s no doubt unconscious rejection of a key tenet of Locke’s 
thought. Locke insisted that reason could not be overridden by faith, for 
reason, he argued, was God-given. ‘Faith’, he said, ‘can never convince us of 
anything that contradicts our knowledge’.95 As will be shown, the 
contradiction of knowledge through considerations of religious faith and 
politics, which mirrored its attitude towards military intelligence described in 
the previous chapter, was precisely how the Bush administration conducted 
policies towards science and the scientific community.    
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Perhaps the most obvious sign of this general policy characteristic was 
the ‘faith-based initiative’ itself. Soon after taking office in 2001, the President 
established the Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives (referred to 
subsequently as ‘the Office’), the first federal office of its kind intended to 
promote the integration of religious groups into federally funded social 
services. The Office was created by executive order and faith-based centres 
were created in five cabinet-level departments, all charged with ensuring that 
any obstacles to the participation of faith-based organisations in the delivery 
of social services were overcome. Hitherto, these groups had been legally 
precluded from competing for government contracts on the grounds that such 
participation violates the distinction between religion, as represented by the 
churches, and the State. The Office attracted some opposition and criticism 
from Congressmen and others, including the American Civil Liberties Union, 
on the basis that the activities of the Office would inappropriately entangle 
religion in the political affairs of the State and thus violated the Establishment 
Clause to the First Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids the 
establishment of a state religion.96  
That religion and politics had become an unhappy mix in the operation 
of the Office was a charge levied by David Kuo, its first Deputy Director, who 
resigned in December 2003. In a 60 Minutes interview with CBS News, Kuo 
maintained that taxpayer funds were used to hold religious events for 
Republicans in tight electoral races in order to ‘energise religious voters’.97 
Disillusioned, Kuo went on to claim that in the Office’s work, ‘God and 
politics had become very much fused together into a sort of single entity. 
Where, in a way, politics was the fourth part of the trinity. God the father, 
God the son, God the holy spirit, God the politician’.98 He continued,  
 
                                               
96 Diana M. Judd ‘Tearing Down the Wall’, in Confronting the New Conservatism, ed. by Thompson, 
p. 135. 
97 Cited in David Schorn, ‘A Loss of Faith’, CBS News, 60 Minutes, 15  October 2006 




This message that has been sent out to Christians for a long time now: that Jesus came 
primarily for a political agenda, and recently primarily a right-wing political agenda 
– as if this culture war is a war for God. And it’s not a war for God, it’s a war for 
politics. And that’s a huge difference.99 
 
In the context of this thesis, the central importance of the Office lies not 
so much, as Kuo’s complaints suggests, in the fact that it was a vehicle for an 
implicit attack on the Establishment clause, important and revealing though 
that is, but in the message that the establishment and high profile of the Office 
sent to a large part of the President’s political base. For the Bush 
administration, the message was that religion was at the heart of politics, 
especially on the shared value issues that were so important to the Christian 
right and the neoconservatives. Reflecting its authoritarian tendencies, the 
administration thus signalled its attempts to coerce the populace towards 
virtue in areas hitherto largely regarded as areas of private individual choice 
and freedom, such as reproductive health. 
Disinformation, and the distortion of scientific evidence, were  
characteristics of the Bush administration’s approach to reproductive health 
issues. By contrast to the funding stance on sex education programmes, which 
were virtually discontinued,100 sexual abstinence programmes were heavily 
funded ($170 million in 2005, for example), with year on year increases from 
January 2001.101 These abstinence programmes seriously misinformed the 
public in a number of areas. In 2004, Congressman Harry Waxman’s office 
released a report that revealed that of the thirteen most popular federally 
funded abstinence programmes, eleven included false or distorted 
information about reproductive health.102 The report, which evaluated the 
programmes, found that the vast majority exaggerated the failure rate of 
condoms, spread false claims about the health risks associated with abortion 
(including mental health problems), and, in one case, even claimed that sweat 
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and tears could transfer the HIV virus.103 Both the Centre for Disease Control 
and Prevention and the State Department’s Agency for International 
Development altered information on condoms in order to undermine the 
reported levels of effectiveness, and scientifically false information was 
posted to foster doubt about the effectiveness of condoms in preventing 
HIV/AIDS.104 In the case of the former organisation, a fact sheet was edited 
that showed that education about condoms does not increase sexual activity, 
and information about correct condom use was removed.105  
The value-driven opposition to contraception is illustrated by the 
controversy over ‘Plan B’, an emergency ‘morning-after’ pill which its makers, 
Barr Pharmaceuticals, wanted to make available over the counter rather than 
on a prescription-only basis. It was estimated by the Guttmacher Institute, an 
independent non-profit making organisation working in the field of 
reproductive health, that Plan B had prevented about one hundred thousand 
unwanted pregnancies in 2000.106 The Institute believed that the availability of 
Plan B over the counter would significantly reduce the annual abortion rate of 
1.3 million out of an annual total of 3.1 million unintended pregnancies.107 
The application by Barr Pharmaceuticals to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) for permission to sell the drug over the counter was, 
however, denied in May 2004. This was despite the fact that in December 2003 
the FDA’s own advisory panel voted 28-0 that it was ‘safe for use in a non-
prescriptive setting’ and a 23-4 vote by the panel in favour of granting the 
application. It transpired that Dr David W. Hager, a Christian conservative 
member of the FDA’s Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory Committee, 
appointed by President Bush, had reservations. He expressed the fear that 
widespread use of the drug would increase sexual promiscuity amongst 
teenagers. This was not supported by large-scale studies, and both the 
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American Academy of Paediatrics and the Society for Adolescent Medicine 
endorsed the application.108 Hager admitted to his central role in persuading 
the FDA to withhold approval although he granted some credit to God. 
Describing his input to the minority report, which the FDA ultimately 
accepted, he said, ‘I argued from a scientific perspective, and God took that 
information, and he used it through this minority report to influence this 
decision’.109 
This decision prompted the resignation of Susan Wood, the director of 
the agency’s Office of Women’s Health together with that of Dr Frank  
Davidoff, a member of the FDA’s Non-prescription Drugs Advisory 
Committee. Dr Davidoff said ‘I can no longer associate myself with an 
organization that is capable of making such an important decision so 
flagrantly on the basis of political influence rather than scientific and clinical 
evidence’.110 
There were other manifestations of what might be termed ‘behavioural 
coercion’. The administration’s Healthy Marriage Initiative (HMI), 
administered by the US Department of Health and Human Services, used 
federal funding to publicise the importance of marriage to a wide array of 
people, including high-school students. The same Department also sponsored 
a Fatherhood Initiative because, a spokesman said, ‘the President is 
determined to make responsible fatherhood a national priority’.111 The 
definition of what constituted ‘responsible fatherhood’ had apparently 
become a matter for an agency of the State.  According to R Claire Snyder, 
Associate Professor of Political Theory at George Mason University, the Bush 
administration even secretly hired an anti-gay activist, Maggie Gallagher, the 
president of the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy, ‘to help advance its 
moral agenda in the mass media and the web’.112 
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What all this distortion and suppression of information and interference 
in reproductive health issues amounted to was not only an attack upon 
empiricism, but an attempt by the Bush administration to impose the moral 
value system of neoconservatism and the Christian right upon sexual and 
other private behaviour. In particular, these measures spoke to the cultural 
rage experienced by neoconservatives and the Christian right at the decline of 
patriarchy, the rise of feminism and the diminution of the role of traditional 
religion as an authoritative organising and governing influence upon the 
private lives of Americans.113  
These practices also crystallised the neoconservative belief, espoused in 
particular by Irving Kristol following his mentor Leo Strauss, that certain 
forms of authoritarianism were superior to degraded democracies. Kristol 
thought that the state was responsible for shaping and reinforcing the moral 
virtue of its citizens.114 The path to virtue was not to be decided as a matter of 
individual choice; the choice was to be made by those who claimed to know 
better. The freedom that the Bush administration constantly espoused did not, 
apparently, include the freedom of the individual to make choices about their 
reproductive health without encountering obstacles placed there by agencies 
of the State. The administration presumed to know what was best for the 
individual even if the individual did not know it him- or herself, and it is in 
this sense, again, that the Bush administration manifested its tacit belief, 
contrary to the ideas of Berlin, that the end for which freedom is a means is 
virtue.  
The distrust and distortion of science and the desire to placate the 
Christian right were further illustrated by the administration’s attitude 
towards stem cell research. Indeed, neoconservative attitudes towards 
biotechnology reflected their distrust of science and technology in general. In 
an article by Jonathan Moreno and Sam Berger of the Centre for American 
Progress, published in the American Journal of Bioethics, the authors claim that 
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neoconservatives regarded biotechnology as typifying their concern about the 
‘corrosive effects of technology on human society, twisting Marx’s arguments 
against capitalism into critiques of technology […]. They fear that technology 
commodifies and alienates man from himself and worry that the 
technological outlook obscures more important values’.115  Whereas Marx saw 
the influence of capitalism as the source of alienation, neoconservatives blame 
technology rather than economic systems.116 The authors cite William Kristol 
and Eric Cohen, former editor of the neoconservative journal The New 
Atlantic, who thought that supporters of biotechnology ‘are making the same 
mistakes as communists did 50 years ago in thinking they can create a better 
society’.117 Kristol and Cohen argue that supporters of biotechnology exhibit 
 
altogether an odd mixture of the hubris of the medical researcher seeking to lead his 
fellow men beyond nature, and the sentimentality of the post-Communist romantic, 
who seeks in genetic science man’s new hope for building a kind, just and liberated 
heaven on earth.118 
 
 In the light of these concerns, the administration’s attitude towards stem 
cell research becomes more comprehensible. In August 2001, President Bush 
declared that the federal government would only support stem cell research 
where the life and death decision had already been made.’119 His reason for 
doing so was ostensibly because, as he said, ‘I worry about a culture that 
devalues life, and believe that as your president I have an important 
obligation to foster and encourage respect for life in America and throughout 
the world’.120 Stem cell research, apparently, was ‘at the leading edge of a 
series of moral hazards’.121  He stated that some sixty cell lines already existed 
which ‘allows us to explore the promise and potential of stem cell research 
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without crossing a fundamental line’.122 The President had exaggerated the 
number of viable embryonic stem cell lines by a considerable margin. A year 
after the address, USA Today reported that that many stem cell lines were not 
viable and some had not even been developed.123 In the end the number came 
down to eleven, but researchers were only permitted to work on lines 
developed before the President’s speech. Even so, the President’s decision 
enabled him to placate the Christian right, whilst not appearing to attack the 
science too openly.  
In a more subtle way, however, the neoconservative/Christian right 
agenda was still being served. At the same time as his August 2001 speech, 
the President established a Council on Bioethics to monitor stem cell research, 
and appointed the neoconservative Dr Leon Kass as Chairman. Kass was 
noted for strongly conservative views on embryonic stem cell research and 
therapeutic cloning. Indeed, Kass, like many neoconservatives, seems to have 
harboured grave doubts about modernity and the ability of human values to 
resist the march of technology. Discussing the lives of his grandchildren, he 
once remarked ‘I hope they will find pockets where they can enjoy what 
modernity has to offer without becoming its slave. But I wouldn’t trade my 
life for theirs’.124 In a prominent report issued in July 2002, the Council 
recommended a moratorium on cloned embryo research or therapeutic 
cloning. A member of the Council who opposed these conclusions, Elizabeth 
Blackburn, was dismissed in February 2004. She later said that ‘at Council 
meetings I consistently sensed reluctance to present human embryonic stem 
cell research in a way that would acknowledge the scientific, experimentally 
verified realities’.125 She also correctly identified the malaise inherent in the 
administration’s attitude towards scientists: ‘When prominent scientists must 
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fear that descriptions of their research will be misrepresented and misused by 
their government to advance political ends, something is deeply wrong’.126  
People such as Blackburn were replaced by those more sympathetic to 
the President’s views, including Dr Benjamin Carson, a neurosurgeon from 
Johns Hopkins University. Dr Carson, a Seventh-Day Adventist who also 
rejects Darwinian evolution, described therapeutic cloning as ‘morally 
offensive’.127 A further replacement was the political scientist Diana Schaub of 
Loyola College in Maryland, who once compared the harvesting of stem cells 
to ‘slavery’ and said in one speech that ‘Every embryo used for purposes of 
research is someone’s blood relative’.128  
Interfering with the objectivity of science by appointing to advisory 
boards those with a religious or political agenda sympathetic to the 
administration was a common practice under the Bush administration.129 
Commenting on this trend in March 2006, together with other aspects of the 
Bush administration’s attitude towards science, Alan Leshner, the chief 
executive officer of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
said: 
What we are seeing is the empowerment of ideologues who have the ability to 
influence the course of science far more than ever before. They [the ideologues] say ‘I 
don’t like the science, I don’t like what it is showing,’ and therefore they ignore it. 
And we are at a place in this country today where that can work. The basic integrity 
of science is under siege.130 
 
The sense of science being ‘under siege’ was perhaps most apparent in 
the field of climate change. Climate change for the Bush administration 
represented a particular challenge bearing in mind the influence of the 
Christian right and the neoconservatives. To have accepted the science of 
climate change would have appeared to be supportive of science itself; 
empiricism at the expense of faith or revelation. Furthermore, as emphasised 
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in the previous chapter, the neoconservative view of the nature of American 
power was that it was unlimited; whereas treaties, protocols, and 
international obligations – the necessary machinery for the world to combat 
climate change – implied the application of limits to that power. America’s 
untrammelled right to exert its hegemony upon the world stage would thus 
be undermined. Indeed, ‘environmentalism’ itself, in which climate change 
concerns play a large part, was suspect, linked as it was in the minds of 
neoconservatives and others on the right wing of the Republican party with 
the threat of global governance and, as in the case of biotechnology, socialism. 
The neoconservative journalist Charles Krauthammer probably expressed this 
view most succinctly. Writing in the Washington Post he suggested that 
environmentalism was socialism by other means, a brazen attempt to transfer 
wealth from rich to poor: 
 
With socialism dead, the gigantic heist is now proposed as a sacred service of the 
newest religion: environmentalism[…]. [T]he left was adrift until it struck upon a 
brilliant gambit: metamorphosis from red to green. […] Since we operate an 
overwhelmingly carbon based economy, the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] 
will be regulating practically everything […] Not since the creation of the Internal 
Revenue Service has a federal agency been given more intrusive power over every 
aspect of economic life. […] Big Brother isn’t lurking in [a] CIA cloak. He’s knocking on 
your door, smiling under an EPA cap.131 
 
On 11 June 2001, President Bush stated in the White House Rose Garden 
‘My administration is committed to a leadership role on the issue of climate 
change’.132 At the same time, he rejected the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, on the 
grounds that it was too costly for the US, it was ‘unrealistic’ and ‘not based on 
science’.133 Instead, he presented a ‘voluntary’ alternative plan that was 
supported by no other nation.134  One of the President’s tactics was to 
continually suggest that the science of climate change was uncertain, and that 
no firm conclusions could be drawn. A report by the National Academy of 
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Science produced at the same time as the Rose Garden announcement, 
entitled Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions, whilst 
acknowledging that uncertainties remained regarding natural climate 
variation and current climate models, emphasised that ‘greenhouse gases are 
accumulating in the Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities’.135 The 
President’s response to the report was to focus not on this primary emphasis, 
but upon uncertainties, seeming to suggest that without near-certainty, 
nothing much could be done. ‘We do not know’, he said, ‘how much our 
climate could, or will, change in the future. We do not know how fast change 
will occur, or even how some of our actions could impact it’.136 
Even the report produced by the EPA, which was submitted to the 
United Nations in June 2002, was more or less dismissed. This report noted 
that in the decades ahead the US would experience extensive environmental 
changes due to global warming. The President’s response was ‘I read the 
report put out by the bureaucracy’, but it later transpired that in fact he had 
not.137 A subsequent EPA report of spring 2003 was edited so heavily by the 
White House, which wanted to dilute and eliminate key sections on climate 
change, that EPA officials decided to drop the entire global warming 
passages.138  
When the US Climate Change Science Program produced its draft annual 
report in 2003, entitled Our Changing Planet, over one hundred changes were 
insisted upon by Philip Cooney, a lawyer with no scientific credentials, who 
had been appointed as Chief of Staff at the Council on Environmental Quality. 
In virtually every instance, these changes were designed to add ‘an 
appearance of uncertainty to explanations of what climate scientists were 
learning about the relationship between the build-up of greenhouse gases, 
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climate changes, and impacts on the earth’s ecosystems’.139 Similar problems 
were encountered in November 2004, when the Washington Post reported that 
the administration had been actively working for months to keep an eight-
nation Arctic Impact Assessment report from endorsing policies aimed at 
reducing global warming. The report stated that Arctic latitudes were facing 
historic rises in temperature and glacial melting, but the Bush administration 
had ‘repeatedly resisted even mild scientific language that would endorse the 
report’s findings’.140 One European negotiator said that the administration 
was trying to ‘sidetrack the whole process so it is not confronted with the 
question, “Do you believe in climate change, or not?”’141 
It was not until the G8 summit of July 2008 that the President seemed at 
last to admit the existence of the problem, when the US agreed to join with 
other countries to try and halve greenhouse gases by 2050, although many 
experts and campaigners doubted that the measures agreed were in any way 
adequate.142 Significantly, the US blocked proposals on the introduction of 
interim targets and benchmarks.143 Even this tacit acknowledgement that 
climate change was indeed a threat did not prevent Vice President Cheney 
from attempting to interfere with evidence that associated climate change 
with public health issues. In a letter released on 9 July 2008, the former 
climate adviser to the EPA, Jason Burnett, claimed that Cheney’s office 
pushed to delete ‘any discussion of the human health consequence of climate 
change’.144 When the EPA made available initial findings in December 2007 
that climate change posed public health risks, the White House refused to 
open the message to avoid acknowledging its existence. The subsequent 
                                               
139 Shulman, Undermining Science,  p. 19. 
140 Juliet Eilperin, ‘U.S. Wants No Warming Proposal’, Washington Post, 4 November 2004 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23541-2004Nov3.html> [accessed 28 March 
2010]. 
141 Cited in ibid. 
142 ‘Climate campaigners slam “pathetic” G8 statement’, Reuters, 8 July 2008 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUST54523._CH_.2400> [accessed 12 March 2010]. 
143 Toni Johnson, ‘Climate Change Clouds the G8 Summit’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2008 
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/16721/climate_change_clouds_and_the_g8_summit.html> [accessed 
14 April 2010]. 
144 Elanar Schor, ‘Cheney tried to alter climate change testimony, says official’, Guardian, 10 July 
2008, p. 20. 
 229 
deletions in the report (eight pages of evidence submitted by the US Centres 
for Disease Control) were ordered, according to Burnett, ‘to keep options 
open’ for the agency to deny that climate change endangers public health.145 
As has been shown, this attempt to distort scientific evidence in the field 
of climate change was merely a further manifestation of a policy emphasis 
that extended right across the spectrum of scientific activity. Even by 2004, 
this trend had become too pronounced for a significant section of the scientific 
community. On 14 February 2004, the Union of Concerned Scientists issued a 
statement signed by over 62 leading scientists and former government 
officials, among them 20 Nobel laureates, which denounced the Bush 
administration for misrepresenting and suppressing scientific information 
and tampering with the process by which scientific advice makes its way to 
government officials. By 2006, 8,000 US scientists had added their names in 
support of restoring scientific integrity in policy making.146 A key passage of 
the statement read: 
 
When scientific knowledge has been found to be in conflict with its political goals, the 
administration has often manipulated the process through which science enters into 
its decisions. This has been done by placing people who are professionally 
unqualified or who have clear conflicts of interest in official posts and on scientific 
advisory committees; by disbanding existing advisory committees; by censoring and 
suppressing reports by the government’s own scientists; and by simply not seeking 
independent scientific advice. Other administrations have, on occasion, engaged in 
such practices, but not so systematically nor on so wide a front. Furthermore, in 
advocating policies that are not scientifically sound, the administration has 
sometimes misrepresented scientific knowledge and misled the public about the 
implications of its policies.147 
 
The Bush administration’s interference with science and its retreat from 
empiricism was unprecedented. It reflected the radical nature of 
neoconservatism and its commitment to remodelling the moral architecture of 
America and its adherence to the notion that revelation was more important 
than reason. It also revealed a strand of parochialism and authoritarianism 
common to neoconservative thought. In the war against cultural relativism, 
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people were to be encouraged or coerced into certain patterns of behaviour 
that the administration held to be virtuous. What was denied was access to 
impartial scientific evidence which would enable individuals to make their 
own decisions, or inform their own opinions on issues from reproductive 
health to climate change. Choice, the essential feature of negative liberty, was 
effectively denied.  
Science was seen by the neoconservatives – and the Bush administration 
over which they wielded such influence – as one of modernity’s corruptors in 
that it had a potentially corrosive effect upon traditional human values and 
encouraged, in their view, an impiety towards God and nature. Importantly 
too, it offered the possibility of unmediated truth. Irving Kristol once 
remarked in an interview: 
 
There are different kinds of truth for different kinds of people. There are truths 
appropriate for children; truths that are appropriate for students; truths that are 
appropriate for educated adults; and truths that are appropriate for highly educated 
adults, and the notion that that there should be one set of truths available for 
everyone is a modern democratic fallacy. It doesn’t work.148 
 
Kristol seemed to express a basic tenet of neoconservatism, namely that 
the people cannot be trusted, that if given the freedom to know the truth, they 
might make the ‘wrong’ decisions or come to the ‘wrong’ conclusions, and if 
they make the wrong choices it is because their ‘true’ self is submerged and 
can only be realised by being led to enlightenment by those much wiser. It is 
better, therefore, the implication seems to be, that the State (or its agencies), 
which is indeed wiser and more rational, decides on what the people can be 
permitted to know. The idea that men do not know what they ‘truly’ want 
and the State must therefore want it on their behalf is exactly what Berlin 
believed to be the real betrayal of freedom.149  In the discourse of freedom 
constructed by the Bush administration there was no freedom for scientific 
truths to be known by all, and science was accordingly mediated and 
manipulated in order to comply with a political value system.  
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V THE SELLING OF FREEDOM 
 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration, embarking on the ‘war on 
terror’, apparently decided that America’s image abroad needed 
transforming. It appeared to conceive the US as a kind of brand to be 
marketed and one of its biggest selling points was thought to be ‘American 
freedom’. Accordingly, Charlotte Beers, who served as chief executive of the J. 
Walter Thompson advertising agency, was appointed to the new post of 
under-secretary of state for public diplomacy. In announcing her appointment 
the Secretary of State, Colin Powell said, ‘I wanted one of the world’s greatest 
advertising experts, because what are we doing? We’re selling. We’re selling a 
product.’150 
The idea of American freedom as a product to be sold was in a sense 
integral to the discourse of freedom that the Bush administration constructed 
and used as an instrument of policy. As has been shown it was through this 
discourse that many aspects of foreign and domestic policy were explained 
and justified to the American people. The events of 9/11 were presented as 
being an attack upon freedom itself, which in turn justified the ‘war on terror’. 
Because freedom, in American public life, is, as noted elsewhere, such a 
powerful word (and ‘product’), its very mention, as Professor of International 
Relations Andrew Bacevich has remarked, is ‘enough to stifle doubt and 
terminate all debate’.151 By using the discourse of freedom to frame foreign 
and domestic policy, this ‘termination of debate’ was an almost inevitable 
outcome, given the characteristics of discourse itself, and the nature of the 
power relations between the administration and the mass media. 
The main characteristics of Foucault’s ideas concerning discourse are set 
out in Chapter Two, and it is within that context that the way in which the 
discourse of freedom under the Bush administration was shaped and 
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constructed is considered. Foucault suggested that rather than seeing 
discourse as simply a set of statements that have some coherence, we should 
think of discourse as existing because of a complex set of practices which try 
to fence off some sets of statements from others and keep other statements out 
of circulation. This thesis contends that because the discourse of freedom kept 
oppositional tendencies out of circulation so effectively, it assumed the nature 
of normatively binding authority. As a consequence of the way in which the 
relationship between the Bush administration and the media operated, the 
discourse that was constructed had the appearance of ‘truth’. As previously 
mentioned, Foucault believed that ‘Each society has its regime of truth, its 
“general politics” of truth: that is the types of discourse it harbours and causes 
to function as true’.152 This section seeks to demonstrate that the discourse of 
freedom that they created was what the Bush administration and the media 
caused to ‘function as true’. 
There are several explanatory strands to the way in which this outcome 
was achieved. It is helpful in this context to consider briefly the nature and 
function of the mass media in modern society. It is a commonplace that the 
mass media are neither neutral nor autonomous, but are linked to the 
prevailing political and economic system, and closely reflect cultural values. 
They are also a territory that competes for public opinion, steering it in certain 
directions and encoding certain mythic values (such as freedom) in ways  that 
ensure that the recipients will decode the content in intended ways. Thus 
global television news channels for example, which in the U.S. and indeed 
elsewhere, are controlled by powerful corporate interests, can, as Daya 
Kisham Thussu, professor of International Communication, suggests, 
 
construct a mythical reality and encourage conformity to the value systems of the 
dominant groups in society. In this sense the mass media play a crucial ideological 
role, promoting the values and interests of dominant groups and implanting beliefs 
and representations that sustain and legitimize their domination. 153 
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The view that the mass media serves the interests of dominant groupings 
is one that is shared by other media experts. Noam Chomsky and Edward 
Herman, for example, suggest that among other functions the ‘media serve, 
and propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control 
and finance them’.154  Chomsky and Herman argue that whatever dissent is 
displayed within the media ‘system’, these structural factors of control and 
finance ensure that no dissent is ever significant enough to interfere with the 
domination of the official agenda. They go on to state: 
 
the societal purpose of the media is to inculcate and defend the economic, social, and 
political agenda of privileged groups that dominate domestic society and the state. 
The media serve this purpose in many ways: through selection of topics, distribution 
of concerns, framing of issues, filtering of information, emphasis and tone, and by 
keeping the debate within the bounds of acceptable premises.155 
 
This representation by the media of dominant agendas (which in a 
Foucauldian sense helped to keep dissenting statements or views out of 
circulation, except in a limited way) therefore assisted the political agenda of 
the Bush administration, which had the ‘Freedom Agenda’ at its core. This 
process was significantly advanced by the nature of the media itself, and 
indeed the audience that it addressed. The media critic Thomas de Zengotita  
contends that the modern media place a barrier between the real and the 
represented. There is an implicit shift in the focus of attention from the object 
to the subject, from, as it were, the world to us, a process that he calls 
‘mediation’. He argues that today’s political issues are iconic, in the sense that 
instead of being an expression of principles rooted in serious thought, they 
merely invite you to express your own identity.156 Using this interpretation, 
each political idea, such as the Bush administration’s emphasis on ‘freedom,’ 
is merely one of a flattering field of represented options. When presented 
with the idea of American freedom as opposed to Saddam’s tyranny for 
example, the insulated flattered self, which Zengotita argues, has been 
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systematically conditioned by the media to disregard anything that cannot be 
understood within a minute, has no need for any kind of demanding ethical 
reflection; he/she simply defaults to their sense of identity as part of a 
‘freedom-loving people’. ‘Yet one more convenience’, as he puts it, ‘in a 
convenient world’.157 
That television in particular reflects a world of images that are both 
beguiling and seductive is well-recognised. Robert Jackall and Janice Hirota, 
for example, argue that what images can do is to convince without argument 
and suggest realities that are in a way purely fictive. In the world of media 
representation, they suggest that experience corresponds with appearance 
and shapes beliefs in a particular way. Thus does the world of news 
conferences and photo opportunities at the White House reflect a kind of 
make-believe world in which any notions of truth as a correspondence 
between the mind and reality becomes ever harder to achieve. In this world of 
what they term ‘shimmering ephemera’ Jackall and Hirota note that 
 
Experts select or invent an image to stand for a person, or organization, or cause, not 
because of the image’s truth-value, but because it is simple to articulate and 
understand, has emotional resonance with some target audience, an ability to link 
disparate personal associations, to command belief or the passive assent that follows 
half-belief, or to elicit the desire for the belief. In this sense emotion replaces reason. 
The shaping of credibility displaces the search for truth.158 
 
This passage ably explains the way in which the Bush administration 
was able to conflate the images of the destruction of the twin towers with an 
attack upon American freedom, and how it persuaded the nation that the 
defence of that freedom necessitated a ‘war on terror’ and the invasion of Iraq. 
The failure for example, of many Americans to understand that the 9/11 
attacks had nothing to do with Iraq together with misunderstandings about 
WMD, supports the notion that in the world of the mass media ‘credibility  
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displaces the search for truth’.159 Thus was the dissemination of the discourse 
of freedom by the Bush administration a relatively easy matter. The media 
was a willing partner to the framing and dissemination of this discourse, 
partly because of the structural factors mentioned, and partly because of the 
nature of the media itself, particularly television.  
Chapter One touched upon the influence of the neoconservative network 
of news organisations in propagating the administration’s policies, and it is 
worth emphasising this point further. After the events of 9/11, for example, 
the cable channel Fox News reported the news within the context of a 
continuous crisis well after life had returned to normal, implying that terror 
was just around the corner. According to Halper and Clarke, this kind of 
breathless, doom-laden reporting and the neoconservative values that the 
channel promoted went hand in hand.160 As Irving Kristol remarked, ‘many 
people in Fox News have been supportive of Bush’s foreign policy. They 
deserve a bit of a mention. And [Rupert] Murdoch personally’.161 Several 
Washington thinktanks received funding from conservative foundations such 
as the Bradley Foundation, the Olin Foundation, and the Smith Richardson 
Foundation, which in turn helped to finance a print media that served the 
neoconservatives well. By the end of the 1990s, the neoconservatives had 
receptive editors at the New York Post, the New Republic, Commentary, the 
National Review, the New York Sun, the American Spectator, the Wall Street 
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Journal and the Weekly Standard. Many contributors to these journals became 
regulars on the cable talk shows, including Fox News.162  
These outlets achieved an amplification of the administration’s 
neoconservative agenda, often at the expense of the facts. Fox News, for 
example, which was consistently among the higher audience ratings, showed, 
according to the PIPA/KN poll referred to in footnote 159, that in terms of the 
misperceptions concerning the Iraq war – i.e. that links between al-Qaeda and 
Iraq had been found, that WMD had been found in Iraq, and that world 
public opinion approved of the US going to war with Iraq – Fox News 
viewers had by far the most misperceptions and the PBS-NPR (non-profit-
making public service channel) viewers the fewest.163    
It would be wrong to suggest that Fox News, which faithfully reflected 
neoconservative views, was alone in acting as a cheerleader for the Iraq war. 
After the events of 9/11, it is widely acknowledged that a jingoistic spirit 
infected elements of the media and for a long time they largely abandoned the 
practice of holding the government to acount.164 A study by the Pew 
Charitable Trust for example, showed that between September and December 
2001, 74% of television coverage about 9/11 and America’s response to those 
events was ‘all pro-US’ or ‘mostly pro-US’, with only 7% ‘dissenting’.165 A 
study of network news stories on Iraq over two weeks in January – February 
2003 found that more than half of the 393 sources quoted were U.S. officials, 
and only 17% of sources expressed any scepticism about government 
policy.166 Dissent concerning the ‘war on terror’ and later concerning the Iraq 
war itself was being excluded from the dissemination of news by the media. 
In a Foucauldian sense, a complex set of practices effectively fenced off 
dissenting views and statements from circulation, with a predictable impact 
upon the way the news consumer perceived reality. As the Professor of 
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Communication at the University of Colorado, Stanley Deetz has observed, 
‘The greatest censorship comes in what is never thought of, and in the forces 
that make some things unthinkable’.167 
Even if dissent or opposition to administration’s policies was privately 
felt by those in the media, it was seldom expressed due to a prevailing self-
censorship. Network executives, for example, have admitted to tailoring their 
coverage in order to avoid the appearance of criticising US foreign policy 
because of fear of a conservative backlash. The prominent journalist and 
television commentator, Michael Kinsley admitted to self-censorship, 
deciding not to write or publish things for reasons that were sometimes 
‘simple cowardice’.168 Fear of standing out, giving time or space to questions 
that could not somehow be asked, was also mentioned by the CBS news 
anchor, Dan Rather, who expressed it thus:   
 
It is an obscene comparison – you know I’m not sure I like it – but you know there 
was a time in South Africa that people would put flaming tyres around people if they 
dissented. In some ways the fear is that you will be necklaced here, you will have a 
flaming tyre of lack of patriotism put around your neck. […] Now it is fear that keeps 
journalists from asking the toughest of tough questions.169   
 
Most of the media never effectively, therefore, challenged the White 
House version of events about WMD, or the Iraq war, or the ‘war on terror’ 
generally.  Indeed, when the administration’s own public relations were weak 
the media helped out, with the New York Times offering a special daily section 
entitled ‘America at War’ and Fox News deploying an ‘Operation Iraqi 
Freedom’ news logo, complete with martial music.170 The self-censorship 
exercised by the media was applauded by the neoconservatives. Michael 
Novak was annoyed by the independent stance that journalists tried to 
exercise during the Gulf War of 1991–92.  He argued that America’s foreign 
policy correspondents should continually remind themselves: ‘My liberty to 
report the truth comes from the American republic – and from American 
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military power. I am not neutral.’171 Liberty is thus reduced to reporting what 
the administration, which wields this military power, decides is true.172 
The lack of any real critique of the administration by the news media was 
mirrored elsewhere, especially in respect of dissent expressed against the Iraq 
war. Flash points developed where opposition to the Iraq war was suspected. 
Professional athletes not wearing American flags on their uniforms were 
reprimanded or threatened with job loss;173 a remark by the lead singer of the 
pop group the ‘Dixie Chicks’, who said she was ashamed that the President 
came from Texas resulted in a thirty-day ban on Cumulus Media’s country 
music stations.174 Syndicated radio also took a sharp turn to the right, and 
Clear Channel’s 1200 radio stations organised bans on songs by musicians 
who had made anti-war remarks. Clear Channel also organised hundreds of 
‘patriotic rallies’ around the country to advocate the pro-war agenda, which 
they expressed as a response to an attempt by the ‘liberal media’ to 
‘marginalize the voices of patriotic Americans’.175  
What contributed towards this virtual elimination of dissent was that the 
use of the freedom discourse in speech after speech by the President (as 
demonstrated throughout this thesis) produced, because of its status as a 
potent signifier, a narrowing of the American public’s field of vision; 
phenomena that did not fit with the discourse were not considered real or 
worthy of attention. In a manifestation of Foucault’s ideas about discourse, 
‘statements’ of opposition or dissent were thus not deemed legitimate, and 
therefore not considered or aired. What was promoted in this process, aided 
and abetted by influential neoconservative figures in the media world, was an 
interpretation of freedom that somehow brooked no argument; freedom as an 
                                               
171 Cited in Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind, p. 367. 
172 The journalist Michael Massing has written extensively of how the Bush administration and the 
Christian right set out to disparage and criticise the mainstream media and suppress dissent within 
those outlets. See, in particular, ‘The End of News?’, New York Review of Books, 1 December 2005 
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18516> [accessed 17 June 2010]. 
173 Artz ‘Political Legitimacy, Cultural Leadership, and Public Action’, p. 17. 
174 Matthew A. Killmeier, ‘Pre-emptive Strikes on the Cultural Front: Big Radio, the Dixie Chicks, and 
Homeland Security’, in Bring ’Em On, ed. by Artz and Kamalipour, pp. 175–187 (p. 175). 
175 Adel Iskandar,‘The Great American Bubble : Fox News Channel, the “Mirage” of Objectivity, and 
the Isolation of American Public Opinion’, in ibid., pp. 160–174 (p. 170). 
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ideal that begrudged or failed to deliver even freedom of speech in the sense 
of publicly contested viewpoints; freedom as an empty rhetorical device, to be 
invoked by means of flags, lapel buttons, and martial music. It may have 
‘functioned as true’ but it was a truth without meaning. This was freedom not 
as a pluralist manifestation of choice, but as a passive, almost mindless assent 
in which the flattered self was offered effortless self-realisation through 
identification with the most durable of American myths. For the domestic 
audience of Americans, the obsession of the Bush administration and a 
compliant media to narrate events in terms of freedom arguably resulted in 
something close to what Anthony Burke called an Orwellian paradox: 
‘freedom in slavery’s grey uniform’.176  
The media failed signally in its manipulation and exploitation of the 
news for political ends to promote the conditions in which it was worth 
pursuing freedom in the first place: namely, the provision of choice and the 
recognition that human beings are infinitely diverse and deserve to be treated 
as such. Instead, the media imposed a conformity of opinion that curtailed 
and restricted liberty of thought. Referring to John Stuart Mill, whose 
longstanding desire for individuality and variety he much admired, Berlin 
wrote of Mill’s anxiety, which he shared, ‘to preserve variety, to keep the 
doors open to change, to resist the dangers of social pressure; and above all 
his hatred of the human pack in full cry against a victim, his desire to protect 
dissidents and heretics as such’.177 That the Bush administration’s discourse of 
freedom as transmitted and disseminated by the media had no place for 
dissent, and encouraged ‘the human pack in full cry’, is, it may be argued, 





                                               
176 Burke, ‘Freedom’s Freedom: Enlightenment and Permanent War’, p. 316. 
177 Berlin, ‘John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life’, in Liberty, pp. 218–251 (p. 238). 
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VI CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has discussed the way in which the Bush administration’s 
interpretation of freedom was reflected in a number of significant domestic 
policy areas. It has argued that the domestic agenda offered as great an 
opportunity to express support for the radical nature of neoconservative 
ideals and the republican virtue tradition as the area of foreign policy, 
perhaps even more so. It has shown how the authoritarian instincts that are 
latent within neoconservative philosophy were given full rein in a number of 
key areas and has cited relevant examples to support that claim. These 
examples included aspects of the way in which presidential power was 
exercised, including application of the unitary executive theory, the use of 
signing statements, and the denial of habeas corpus to enemy combatants. It 
has also illustrated how the use of the Patriot Act (2001) and the Homeland 
Security Act (2002) resulted in infringements of civil liberties and the 
suppression of dissent. 
This chapter considered the way in which the values of neoconservatism 
and those of the Christian right coalesced to form a potent political force that 
impacted upon domestic policy and how the administration sought to blur 
the separation of religion and the state. It has shown how the combined 
neoconservative/Christian right value system, ill at ease with the concept of 
individual freedom not in the service of virtue, sought to coerce the 
population into certain patterns of sexual and reproductive behaviour. The 
chapter has highlighted how this value system, which the administration 
absorbed and reflected in its policies, resulted in a retreat from empiricism 
and an attack upon, and manipulation of, science for political ends, 
particularly in the fields of stem cell research and climate change. Finally, it 
has illustrated how the discourse of freedom, which dominated the political 
narrative during the Bush administration, was transmitted and conveyed by a 
largely docile and unquestioning media that stifled and suppressed dissent. 
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It is the burden of this thesis that all of the characteristics of the Bush 
administration’s domestic policy highlighted in this chapter reflect a monist 
belief system antipathetic towards the pluralism which nourishes the negative 
concept of freedom, discussed in Chapter Two.  These characteristics manifest 
instead a belief in the idea that the individual can be denied choice, and 
indeed, potential choice, for his own good, and that the State can legitimately 
coerce him or her towards virtue, the definition of which was left in the hands 
of a governing elite. They demonstrate how uncomfortable the administration 
was with the idea of individual freedom, how it sought to control and 
suppress information upon which the individual could base his or her 
choices, and how it sought to impose a political value system that embraced a 
positive concept of freedom embodied, for example, to a significant extent, in 
John Ashcroft’s concept of ‘ordered liberty’, which was incompatible with the 
American tradition of liberty. 
 







































                                               
1 Madame Roland on the scaffold of the guillotine, Paris, 1793. Cited in Geoffrey Thomas, 
Introduction to Political Philosophy (London: Gerald Duckworth, 2000), p. 153.  
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This thesis has not attempted a conventional policy analysis of the Bush 
administration. It has focused upon freedom, what it meant in the American 
tradition, what it came to mean, and how interpretations of its meaning by the 
Bush administration provide a philosophical explanation of the paradox at the 
heart of its policies: namely, how the very policies that the discourse of 
freedom constructed by the administration claimed were designed to defend 
and extend freedom, perverted its meaning. By considering a range of 
examples in both foreign and domestic policy, together with the way in which 
the discourse of freedom with its Foucauldian attributes was used by the 
administration and disseminated by a willing media, the thesis has 
demonstrated that the administration adopted a definition of the meaning of 
freedom that ran counter to the American tradition. 
The analytical framework that has been applied to the Bush 
administration’s interpretation of freedom rests principally upon the thought 
of Isaiah Berlin. Although the work of other philosophers has been referred to 
as appropriate, it is Berlin’s ideas relating to pluralism and his insights into 
the nature of freedom that have been the guiding points of reference 
throughout.  
As previously emphasised, the Bush administration, probably more 
than any other in the post-war era, grounded its ideas and its political appeal 
upon the American tradition of liberty. Freedom, once the rallying cry of the 
dispossessed, was adopted by the administration as a continuous theme to the 
extent that, in its own eyes, the administration became practically the 
embodiment of freedom itself. One of the many attractions of choosing 
freedom as a political leitmotif was that it spoke to the authority of myth, 
which, as Roland Barthes suggested, ‘has the task of giving an historical 
intention and making contingency appear eternal’.2 By appealing to tradition, 
the Bush administration sought to ratify the present and legitimize its 
policies.  
                                               
2 Cited in Bruce Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society Comparative Studies of Myth, 
Ritual, and Classification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 5. 
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The thesis has considered some of the key early influences upon that 
tradition, ranging from John Locke and Tom Paine to the 
Commonwealthmen. Each had a vision of freedom, and each in their different 
ways fed into the American founding doctrine, as sections II and III of 
Chapter Three explain. The thesis has shown that within the historiography of  
the American Revolution and the founding there are two competing 
interpretative paradigms. The first was the republican ‘virtue’ model, 
advanced, in particular, by Bernard Bailyn and J. G. A. Pocock, based upon 
the classical neo-Roman republican tradition of thought. The second was the 
‘liberal’ doctrine, based to a large extent upon the ideas of John Locke. Despite 
the undoubted appeal and influence of the republican virtue tradition, it has 
been argued, following the analyses of Joyce Appleby and Gordon Wood 
amongst others, that the eventually prevailing influence in the post-
Revolutionary period was that of Lockean liberalism, and it was therefore 
within that paradigm that the American tradition of liberty can be said to be 
the more solidly grounded. 
In applying the analytical framework to these two interpretative 
paradigms, it was possible to conclude (Section V of Chapter Three) that the 
republican virtue tradition exhibited certain of the characteristics that can be 
associated with Berlin’s definition of what he termed ‘positive’ freedom, 
namely, a belief that the individual can be ‘perfected’ through citizenship 
(which implies a belief in the existence of a ‘higher self’); an acceptance of the 
idea that the enforcement of virtue is legitimately a function of the state; and, 
above all, that virtue and freedom are values that can be conflated. Freedom 
in this sense is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, and the end for 
which it is a means is virtue. Whereas Berlin may well have argued that 
unless an individual is free to reject virtue, he or she is not free to pursue it, 
the republican virtue tradition holds that freedom is the ability to do what one 
‘ought’.  Rousseau wanted men to choose absolutely freely only that which 
was right, and there are echoes of this in Attorney General John Ashcroft’s 
ideal of ‘ordered liberty’, referred to in the previous chapter. In this concept of 
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freedom not only are liberty and authority compatible, but they are almost as 
one. The more men seek to realise themselves through choosing what is right, 
the freer they are. Thus freedom and virtue coincide. This, for Berlin, was an 
interpretation of freedom liable to the perversion likely to turn it into its 
opposite. He believed that it was more important for people to be free rather 
than happy, because unless they are allowed to choose, they cannot be either 
happy or unhappy in any sense in which these conditions are worth having.3 
Coercion in the name of virtue was thus an abiding danger: 
 
People should not be coerced, even if they are coerced in the name of virtue. It is 
more important that people be allowed to choose for themselves than that they hold 
correct opinions. Willing slaves, virtuous slaves, even happy slaves, are still slaves 
[…].4 
 
Whilst the Bush administration’s reasons for choosing freedom as its 
core political discourse were, as suggested, no doubt grounded in its appeal 
to the past and the authority of myth, the way in which the meaning of 
freedom was interpreted was a matter of ideological influence. The thesis has 
argued that the dominant ideological influence upon the Bush administration 
was that of neoconservatism combined with that of the Christian right. 
Neoconservatism, through its early thinkers, absorbed and reflected an 
interpretation of freedom that chimed with the republican virtue tradition 
and rejected the liberal pluralism in which Berlin’s concept of negative 
freedom is grounded.  
The key influence upon the development of neoconservativism was 
Leo Strauss, although others, notably Irving Kristol and Allan Bloom, also 
made significant early contributions, as Chapter Four highlights. The 
philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch wrote that ‘it is always a significant 
question to ask any philosopher: what is he afraid of?’.5 What Leo Strauss and 
the neoconservatives who followed appeared to be afraid of was modern 
man, man not subject to or in awe of metaphysical authority, able and willing 
                                               
3 Berlin, ‘A Letter to George Kennan’, in Liberty, p. 342. 
4 Berlin, ‘Montesquieu’, in Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas (Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), pp. 130–161 (pp. 158–9). 
5 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge Classics, 2003), p. 71. 
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to think for himself, to define his own sense of virtue and morality, non-
dependent and uncoerced. In other words, free.  
Much of Strauss’s unease with modernity stemmed from his beliefs 
concerning natural law and rights. According to Nicholas Xenos, Strauss 
viewed classical natural right as ‘an orientation towards nature hierarchically 
structured with virtue at the top’.6 Strauss regarded Locke, along with 
Hobbes, as an originator of modern natural law theory, which was grounded 
in the way in which men, with their passions and fears, actually behave, 
rather than the way in which they ought to. This shifted the focus from the 
duties required by virtue to the rights demanded by self-preservation. Xenos 
emphasises the point made elsewhere in this thesis, that the ‘self-evident 
truths’ of the Declaration of Independence are grounded in a Lockean 
understanding of natural right, and, in his reading of Locke, Strauss perceives 
the effects of this modern natural law doctrine leading to ‘a political society 
without purpose other than self-preservation and public happiness’.7 
The view of human nature held by Strauss demanded an authoritarian 
political form which found its voice in neoconservatism, as did his beliefs 
concerning elites and his mistrust of democracy. Neoconservatism sought to 
restore a sense of moral purpose and the imposition of what neoconservatives 
perceived to be a range of higher-order values which focused upon cultural 
nationalism, moral righteousness, the importance of family, and the right to 
life, amongst others. This complex web of ideals and cultural and political 
values, formed by the meshing of neoconservative ideology and the faith 
values of the Christian right, impacted upon and helped define the Bush 
administration’s interpretation of the meaning of freedom.  
The neoconservative interpretation of freedom, influenced as it was by 
the ideas of Leo Strauss, ran in direct contrast to Berlin’s concept of negative 
freedom. This is the concept of freedom that the thesis has shown is 
embedded within the Lockean liberal interpretative paradigm, and hence is 
                                               
6 Nicholas Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue, p. 133. 
7 Ibid. 
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the dominant influence within the American liberty tradition. It is a concept 
of freedom resting upon the principle of individual uncoerced choice and 
rooted in value pluralism, which accommodates and accepts the 
imperfectability of human life and understands that human goals are many 
and sometimes incommensurable. By contrast, the ‘positive’ concept of 
freedom, resting on the idea of a divided self, is liable to be perverted by what 
Berlin called the ‘monstrous paradox’, whereby liberty turns into a kind of 
slavery because the State (or other authority) claims to know best what the 
individual ‘really’ wants and will therefore liberate the individual from his 
misconceived desires. It is through this paradox, Berlin argued, that freedom 
coincides with the authority of the liberator. This is a concept of freedom 
grounded not in the acceptance of pluralism and conflicting values and goals, 
but in moral monism: the idea that there must exist some final and certain 
answers to moral dilemmas, a key feature of neoconservative and Christian 
right thought. Implicit in this thought is the notion, inimical to negative 
liberty, that people should be led, or possibly coerced, towards virtue (the 
nature of which was for the leaders to decide); even the truth was to be 
denied them, because, as Kristol so memorably observed, it is too dangerous 
to be made universally available.  
In the field of foreign policy the tradition of American liberty and its 
negative character were undermined by the Bush administration’s Hegelian 
interpretation of history, which combined with the notion that America was 
the chosen instrument of God. When the President said, ‘History has an ebb 
and flow of justice, but history also has a visible direction, set by liberty and 
the Author of Liberty’,8 this was an essentially Hegelian understanding of 
history as inevitable: things cannot happen otherwise than they do; events did 
not merely happen as they did, but had to happen. The President’s statement 
also implied that the ‘Author of Liberty’ had provided America with an 
infinitely expandable grant of authority to assert its influence anywhere it 
chose since, by definition, it acted on freedom’s behalf. Thus there is a sense 
                                               
8 President George W. Bush, ‘Second Inaugural Address’, 20 January 2005. 
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of a form of determinism at work; history has already mapped out America’s 
destiny, which is to act, in Andrew Bacevich’s phrase, as God’s ‘Agent of 
Liberty’.9  
Berlin suggested that Hegel perceived no paradox between 
determinism and freedom, and in this view, therefore:  
 
To be happy, to be free, is to understand where one is; where one is on the map; and 
to act accordingly. If you do not act, you are acted upon, you become historical stuff, 
you become as Seneca said, a slave dragged by the Fates, and not the wise man who 
is lead by them.10 
 
This is surely, as suggested in Section II of Chapter Five, the underlying if 
unconscious theme that runs through Paul Wolfowitz’s Defense Planning 
Guide, PNAC’s Rebuilding American Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for 
a New Century and the National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002, 
which underpinned foreign policy and the war on terror. America had the 
right to attempt to enforce an ‘American Century’, to assert its dominance in 
the name of freedom, because history, to say nothing of God, was on its side. 
The neoconservatives, as Anne Norton has emphasised, literally believed that 
American power, ‘unmatched since Rome’, should be used to remake the 
world.11 History favoured the bold, the proactive, the victorious, those who 
ran with its tide. To hang back, to falter in this purpose, is to risk being 
‘dragged by the Fates’. The victims of history’s requirements, which in the 
context of the war on terror include the Iraqi dead, the tortured prisoners of 
Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, the victims of black sites, or those who might be 
opposed to the march of American hegemony with its undertow of Said’s 
Orientalism, are merely, according to this Hegelian concept of history, ‘feeble 
flotsam adequately taken care of by history which has swept them away as, 
being against the current, they eo ipso deserve. Only the victors deserve to be 
heard; the rest […] all the critics […] these are historical dust’.12  
                                               
9 Bacevich, The Limits of Power, p. 74. 
10 Berlin, ‘Hegel’, in Freedom and Its Betrayal, p. 90. 
11 Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire, p. 189. 
12 Berlin, ‘A Letter to George Kennan’, in Liberty, p. 343.  
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In the Hegelian view of history it is the resistance to history’s flow that 
makes you unfree, to wish that things were other than they were or are, to fail 
to understand the objective march of history, the inexorable march of what he 
(Hegel) calls ‘God’s march through the universe’.13 Indeed, President Bush 
seemed to see his administration’s foreign policy as being in step with this 
march and, rather as Hegel viewed the State, suggested that the US was 
indeed the actualization of freedom. Hegel’s great crime, according to Berlin, 
was ‘to have created an enormous mythology in which the State is a person, 
and history is a person, and there is one single pattern which metaphysical 
insight alone can discern’.14 It seems no exaggeration to suggest that it was 
precisely this metaphysical insight that President Bush claimed to have 
possessed. The Hegelian view of history runs counter to the idea of individual 
choice which lies at the heart of Berlin’s idea of what true liberty consists in, 
and he highlighted what he calls the ‘vast confusion’ wrought by Hegel, 
namely, ‘a historically fatal identification of liberty, as we understand it, with 
security’.15 This confusion was one in which, this thesis has maintained, the 
Bush administration shared. 
As well as this Hegelian strand of thought, neoconservatism, as it 
expressed itself in foreign policy, carried with it echoes of the Romantic 
movement which originated in the late eighteenth century. It was this 
identification of the nation not only with the freedom but with the right to 
exert almost unlimited military power that seemed to replicate some of the 
values of the Romantic movement and its excesses. When writing about this 
movement, Berlin noted how its nationalist implications invited a heroic view 
of ‘nations that asserted themselves against others and identified their own 
liberty with the destruction of all that opposed them’.16 There can be fewer 
more apt descriptions of President Bush’s rhetoric when speaking of the war 
on terror in which, as the many examples cited in this thesis confirm, liberty 
                                               
13 Cited in Berlin,‘Hegel’, in Freedom and Its Betrayal, p. 93. 
14 Ibid., p. 103. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, p. 197. 
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and American power were frequently conflated. This is not a new 
phenomenon, as Berlin noted. ‘The notion that liberty and power are 
identical’, he wrote, ‘that to be free is to make free with whatever stands in 
your path, is an ancient idea which the romantics seized on and wildly 
exaggerated’.17 The neoconservatives incorporated such exaggerations into 
their foreign policy outlook, as exemplified, for example, by Richard Perle’s 
call for ‘total war’. Indeed, the President himself helped to set this trend when 
he suggested that the proper response to those who ‘hate our freedoms’ was 
to ‘export death and violence to the four corners of the earth in defence of our 
great nation’.18 This sense of exaggeration was further reinforced by the 
notion, embodied in the freedom discourse, that the war on terror was a war 
against evil. This had predictable consequences in terms of the means used to 
wage it as well as implications for the American tradition of liberty. As the 
author and journalist William Pfaff has pointed out: 
 
If the enemy is Evil (the Evil One?), there can be no quarter given, no negotiation, no 
pity, no mercy. This marks an advance of American political thought towards the 
darkness of totalitarian conceptions of discourse, translating human conflict into 
metaphysical conflict.19 
 
In the domestic sphere, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, the 
neoconservative interpretation of the nature of freedom, which was so 
influential upon the administration, resulted in authoritarian or paternalistic 
outcomes that undermined individual freedoms. This was manifested in the 
suppression of dissent, the illegal use of surveillance, and in the 
unconstitutional consolidation of presidential power. In the field of science, 
the neoconservative influence was especially evident in the manipulation of 
scientific information in order to encourage or coerce certain patterns of 
behaviour. Rather like one of the leading figures of the Counter-
Enlightenment, Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821), the neoconservatives and their 
                                               
17 Ibid. 
18 Cited in Geoffrey Wheatcroft, ‘The Voice of Unconventional Wisdom’, New York Review of Books, 
11 November 2010, p. 51. 
19 William Pfaff, The Bullet’s Song: Romantic Violence and Utopia (London: Simon and Schuster, 
2004), pp. 308–9. 
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allies on the Christian right appeared to believe that the scientific outlook 
‘finds fault in authority; it leads to the “disease” of atheism’,20 and they 
therefore sought, echoing the commitment to irrationalism that Berlin 
associated with much of twentieth-century political thought (see p. 37), to 
manipulate and distort it in a number of areas.   
Berlin’s thought is suffused with an antipathy towards the 
dehumanisation and humiliation caused by paternalism, and the 
manipulation and exploitation of the individual for political ends, 
characteristics manifested in key areas of the Bush administration’s domestic 
agenda. For Berlin, paternalism was despotic not because it is the same as 
unenlightened tyranny, but because it insults the concept of the individual as 
a human being determined to make his or her own life in accordance with his 
or her own choices, whether rational or otherwise. The individual is therefore 
rendered unfree by paternalism in the sense of not being recognised as a self-
governing individual human being.21  This objection to paternalism extended 
to the way in which governments justified increasing accumulations of power 
which, as demonstrated, was a characteristic of the Bush administration.  
 
The doctrine that accumulations of power can never be too great, provided that they 
are rationally controlled and used, ignores the central reason for pursuing liberty in 
the first place – that all paternalistic governments however benevolent, cautious, 
disinterested and rational, have tended, in the end, to treat the  majority of men as 
minors, or as being too often incurably foolish or irresponsible […]. This is the policy 
that degrades men, and seems to me to rest on no rational or scientific foundation, 
but on the contrary, on a profoundly mistaken view of the deepest human needs.22 
  
The overall conclusion that this thesis draws is that by adopting, 
through the influences of neoconservatism and the Christian right, an 
interpretation of freedom that was, seen through the prism of Berlin’s 
thought, positive in nature and therefore contrary to the American liberty 
tradition, the Bush administration amply demonstrated the perversion to 
which positive liberty is prone, and succeeded in betraying the very value 
                                               
20 Ibid., p. 120. 
21 Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Liberty, p. 203.  
22 Berlin, ‘Introduction to Five Essays on Liberty’, in Liberty, p. 54. 
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that it claimed to hold most dear. The administration’s apparently Hegelian 
perception of history, its attitude towards power, the way in which its foreign 
policy rhetoric frequently echoed the excesses of the Romantic movement, 
and its commitment to the imposition of a value system at the expense of 
choice, all combined to underpin and reinforce this betrayal. Thus, despite its 
relentless appeal to and identification with freedom, the Bush administration 
arguably became, rather like Berlin’s verdict on Rousseau, one of liberty’s 
‘most formidable and sinister enemies’.23   
As mentioned in Chapter One, one of the most important aspects of 
Berlin’s thought is its capacity to act as a warning. He warned that freedom, 
perhaps more than any other social good, is liable to be twisted to mean 
something very close to its opposite and that those who constantly appeal to 
it need to understand what he believed to be its proper interpretation. In the 
late eighteenth century, the French philosopher Condorcet (1743–94) uttered 
similar warnings about the dangers of the ‘mask of liberty’ being worn by the 
unscrupulous. Tzvetan Todorov paraphrases this warning as follows: 
 
Condorcet in Cinq Mémoires unfolds before the readers’ eyes a real doomsday 
scenario. Imagine, he says ‘that a troop of audacious hypocrites’ manages to get 
control of the central power of a country and to create relays throughout its regions. 
It could lay its hands on the main sources of information and consequently be 
believed by ‘a people whose ignorance makes them prey to the phantoms of fear’. 
Alternating seduction and threats it ‘will exercise under the mask of liberty’ a 
tyranny that is in no way less efficient than those that preceded it.24 
 
By considering the policies of the Bush administration and the freedom 
discourse that it created and disseminated, this thesis has demonstrated how 
the force and relevance of these warnings endure.  
 
 
  ------------------------------------------  
 
                                               
23 Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, in Freedom and Its Betrayal, p. 49. 
24 Tzvetan Todorov, In Defence of the Enlightenment, translated by Gila Walker (London: Atlantic 
Books, 2009), p. 66.  
